Community, patriotism and the working class in the First World War: the home front in Wednesbury, 1914-1918 by Fantom, Paul Adrian
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMUNITY, PATRIOTISM AND THE 
WORKING CLASS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR: 
THE HOME FRONT IN WEDNESBURY, 1914-1918 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
PAUL ADRIAN FANTOM 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to 
The University of Birmingham 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of History and Cultures 
College of Arts and Law 
The University of Birmingham 
October 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 STATEMENT 
 
 
Elements of Chapters 2, 4 and 5 have been published as 'Industry, Labour and 
Patriotism in the Black Country: Wednesbury at War, 1914-1918' in The Great War: 
Localities and Regional Identities eds. N. Mansfield and C. Horner (Newcastle: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), pp. 53-76. 
 
A version of Chapter 6 has been published as ‘Zeppelins over the Black Country:          
The Midlands’ First Blitz’ in Midland History, 39 (2) (2014), pp. 236-254. 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis examines the impact of the First World War on the town of Wednesbury.  
Although receiving limited scholarly consideration to date, it is contended that this 
Black Country town played an important wartime role and this study, based upon 
extensive archival research, has investigated the key economic, political and social 
consequences and changes occurring during this period.  Embedded within the broader 
contexts of time and place, it draws extensively on the experiences of the town’s 
working-class community to demonstrate how a local history can enrich our 
appreciation of the lives of working people and inform our understanding of the national 
picture.  Following the establishment of the rationale, methodology and the principal 
historiographical debates, life and society in Wednesbury on the eve of war are 
described.  Reaction to the outbreak of hostilities, economic and manpower 
mobilization, and wartime industrial relations are assessed.  Also charted are the main 
social and political developments.  There is a chapter devoted to the locality’s first air 
raid, when the German Navy’s airships bombed Wednesbury, Bradley, Tipton and 
Walsall.  In evaluating this community’s patriotism, it is concluded that whilst the 
adjustment of attitudes was unavoidable, many aspects of Wednesbury’s contribution 
should be viewed as truly unique. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 
1.1 Background to the thesis 
 
This thesis seeks to assess the manner in which the people of the Black Country town of 
Wednesbury experienced the First World War.  It is an investigation of the home front 
and is made in accordance with the assertion of John Bourne that this was ‘not only as 
important as the war front but also inseparable from it’.1  During such a period of 
immense and traumatic change, the lives of the town’s inhabitants were affected in a 
multitude of ways.  Hence, it will consider the economic, political and social impact of 
the conflict and, in view of the demography of this locality, and its socio-economic 
composition, will pay particular attention to the patriotism of Wednesbury’s large 
working-class community and the significance of the role it played throughout the war.2 
The central question that this thesis endeavours to answer is expressed as 
follows: what forms did working-class patriotism take during the First World War and 
how did this impact upon the working-class people of Wednesbury?  Accordingly, 
consideration will be given to various notions of patriotism, especially those described 
as community patriotism, Labour patriotism, popular patriotism and working-class 
patriotism.  Several supplementary questions may also be discerned.  Did working-class 
patriotism change between 1914 and 1918?  Were pre-war attitudes and behaviours 
modified?  Did war change the town’s cultural, economic, political and social 
structures?  Are the causes of these developments located during wartime or in the pre-
war years?  How did patriotic behaviour affect military recruitment and munitions 
production, and did this change over time?  Were there any examples of dissent from 
the patriotic viewpoint discernible within Wednesbury’s working-class community? 
                                               
1
  J.M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918 (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), p. 199. 
2
  N. Kirk, Change, Continuity and Class: Labour in British Society, 1850-1920 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1998), p.143.  Kirk has confirmed that in 1901 approximately 85 per cent of the country’s 
total working population were employed by other people, whether in agriculture, industry or domestic 
service.  Furthermore, approximately 75 per cent of the working population were employed in manual 
occupations and the greater majority of these people were concentrated in urban rather than rural areas. 
2 
 
It will be argued that a range of shared identities and values existed in 
Wednesbury that bolstered the sense of belonging to the town and shaped this 
community’s contribution to the war effort.  The assessment of changes and 
developments occurring during the period, some of which were national, whereas others 
were local, serve to demonstrate this.  Examples include the increased solidarity and 
strength of the labour movement, extension of the franchise, greater participation of 
women in the workplace and society generally, and the close connection between the 
town and local military units.3  The thesis explores whether these changes are 
attributable to the war or whether their roots should be associated with earlier events. 
It is appropriate to provide some background information at the outset in respect 
of Wednesbury.4  It is situated eight miles to the north-west of the City of Birmingham, 
in the area that has been known since the nineteenth century as the Black Country, and 
during the period concerned the town resided within the County of Staffordshire.  Yet 
the precise boundaries of the Black Country have long generated controversy, with 
competing views existing on which of the outlying towns should be included.5  The 
most compelling definition, however, relies on the extent of the South Staffordshire 
coalfield and the associated manufacturing districts.  John Fletcher has stated that ‘since 
it is the mineral producing region that should rightly be known as the Black Country’, it 
is certain that Wednesbury occupies a position that is well within the Black Country.6 
                                               
3
  The military formation that enjoyed the closest attachment to the town of Wednesbury was the Fifth 
(Territorial Force) Battalion of the South Staffordshire Regiment.  See J.P Jones, History of the South 
Staffordshire Regiment 1705-1923 (Wolverhampton: Whitehead Brothers, 1923); A. Thornton, ‘The 
Territorial Force in Staffordshire, 1905-1915’ (Unpublished MPhil thesis, University of Birmingham, 
2004); W.L. Vale, History of the South Staffordshire Regiment (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1969). 
4
  The principal work on the history of the town has been J.F. Ede, History of Wednesbury (Wednesbury: 
Wednesbury Corporation, 1962; reprinted Wednesbury: Simmons Publishing, 1991) but this concentrates 
mainly on Wednesbury’s emergence as a key centre for manufacturing during the Industrial Revolution.  
Two Master’s degree dissertations have also covered aspects of the town’s history, namely: S. Langley, 
‘History of the Iron and Steel Tube Trade in Wednesbury’ (Unpublished MCom thesis, University of 
Birmingham, 1948); P.A. Fantom, ‘Radicalism, Reaction and Reform: Popular Protest, Public Order and 
the Working Class in Wednesbury, 1838-1848’ (Unpublished MA thesis, Open University, 2008). 
5
  A map of the Black Country is provided in Appendix 1.  This is taken from D. Vodden, Our Black Country 
(Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2003).  This confirms Wednesbury’s location within the Black Country and its 
proximity to the other towns in the area, together with Wolverhampton and the suburbs of Birmingham. 
6
  J.M. Fletcher, ‘What is the Black Country?’, The Blackcountryman, 1 (1967), p. 12. 
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Economically distinct and geographically separate from their neighbours, each 
of the Black Country’s towns used the abundant resources of coal, ironstone and 
limestone to specialize in a variety of manufacturing and mining activities.7  
Developments in the early years of the nineteenth century facilitated large-scale 
production, which expanded considerably during the subsequent years to provide for not 
only the needs of Britain and her empire but also many other international trading 
partners.8  This was the period of the area’s greatest industrial and population 
expansion, with census records for Wednesbury indicating that the town’s population 
rose from 4,160 in 1801 to 14,281 in 1851 and from 26,554 in 1901 to 30,407 in 1921.9 
However, this level of intense industrialization carried with it considerable 
consequences for Wednesbury’s physical environment and the health of a population 
that was characteristically working class.  There was the network of canals and railways 
that had been created in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively to transport 
the output of the area’s manufacturers so that it could be sold on national and 
international markets.  In between this, the people of the town resided in housing that 
was densely interspersed with a multitude of factories, foundries, coal pits and mine 
workings.  These crowded a landscape that was already congested with slag heaps and 
toxic industrial spoil.  The coal was also burnt to supply the energy required by the 
steam engines utilized to mechanize many of the working processes formerly done by 
manual labour.  As the thick plumes of black smoke emerged from chimneys, not only 
did this darken the sky; it also blackened buildings by coating them in a tar-like residue, 
caused environmental pollution by contaminating the land and the supply of water, and 
contributed to the various respiratory diseases that afflicted so many of the people. 
                                               
7
  G.C. Allen, The Industrial Development of Birmingham and the Black Country, 1860-1927 (London:  
Frank Cass, 1929), p. 78.  Darlaston produced nuts, bolts and screws, Dudley and its surrounding district 
supplied nails and chains, in West Bromwich they made springs, and in Willenhall locks and keys.  
Wednesbury was renowned for manufacturing steel tubes, edge tools, axles and wheels for railway rolling 
stock, and bridges and many other items of railway infrastructure that were exported across the world. 
8
  J.F. Ede, pp. 236-239. 
9
  Ibid., p. 413; G.J. Barnsby, Social Conditions in the Black Country, 1800-1900 (Wolverhampton: 
Integrated Publishing, 1999), pp. 3-4. 
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1.2 The rationale and structure of the thesis 
 
A number of factors contributed to the selection of Wednesbury as the focus of this 
study, shaping the overall rationale and the aims and objectives of this thesis.  As stated, 
Wednesbury occupies a key position in the Black Country’s industrial heartland, both 
geographically and in terms of the particular trades associated with the town.  During 
the period concerned, it was host to an impressive array of manufacturing companies.10  
These ranged from the small firms employing a handful of workers to large complexes 
such as James Russell & Sons Crown tube works and the multi-sited Metropolitan 
Railway Carriage, Wagon and Finance Company, which enjoyed a high international 
reputation and provided substantial local employment.11  With the outbreak of 
hostilities, many of Wednesbury’s firms began to adapt their expertise and processes, 
with the resultant output making a vital contribution to supplying the nation with 
essential war materials.  This included participation in the production of such items of 
ordnance as the Mills hand grenade and Stokes mortar bomb, and from 1916, the 
assembling of the British Army’s first tanks.12  The extent of this manufacturing activity 
generated substantial employment, reviving the local iron and steel industries, with the 
Metropolitan subsequently posting record profits during the wartime period.13 
Considerable social and political tensions pervaded the years immediately prior 
to the outbreak of the war.  Although Britain was the greatest imperial power the world 
had ever seen, deriving enormous benefits from world trade, diminishing returns had 
now settled in.  It also became embroiled in an escalating rivalry with Germany, which 
                                               
10
  Examples of the pre-war advertising for the firms of James Russell & Sons and John Russell & Co. Ltd., 
and which indicate the ranges and types of products manufactured by these companies were featured in the 
1907 Ryder’s Annual.  They are reproduced in Appendix 6, Illustrations 5 and 7, pp. 283-284. 
11
  G.C. Allen, pp. 193 and 358.  The Metropolitan Railway Carriage, Wagon & Finance Company was formed 
in 1902.  Its creation was the result of the amalgamation of the Patent Shaft & Axletree Company with two 
other carriage and wagon-building firms.  The Patent Shaft & Axletree Company had been established in 
1834 and it had undergone a merger involving another large Wednesbury firm, Lloyd Fosters, in 1867. 
12
  The National Archives Munitions Papers (hereafter TNA MUN) 4/4175: Negotiations with the 
Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon & Finance Co. Ltd. for a contract for tanks.  Of the first 100 tanks to be 
ordered by the British Army, twenty-five were manufactured in Lincoln by William Foster & Co. Ltd. and 
seventy-five were built by the Metropolitan in Wednesbury at the Patent Shaft’s Old Park works.  Forty-
nine of these vehicles saw action at Flers-Courcelette in September 1916.  See Chapter 4, pp. 116-117. 
13
  J.F. Ede, pp. 283-284. 
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prompted a costly naval arms race.  Domestically, by 1914, the Liberal Government’s 
avowed intention of introducing Home Rule for Ireland had almost brought the rival 
Protestant and Republican factions to the point of civil war.  Furthermore, the 
Suffragettes were pursuing an increasingly violent campaign as they strove to win the 
vote for all women.  Numerous industrial disputes and strikes punctuated the years 
1911-1914, as the trade unions exerted their growing influence and strength in order to 
advance their demands for improved conditions and wages for their members.14 
One example of this was the Black Country strike, with the local press 
remarking that ‘when the industrial history of the Black Country comes to be reviewed 
in the distant future it will be been seen that much space will have to be devoted to the 
happenings of May 1913’.15  This dispute began in Wednesbury at the Old Patent tube 
works of John Russell & Co. Ltd. and the strike spread rapidly across the Black 
Country, so that more than 40,000 skilled, semi- and unskilled workers participated in 
demonstrations and meetings.  Furthermore, it also gained national attention, with 
marches to London and South Wales, and such prominent figures in the labour 
movement as Tom Mann visiting the Midlands to offer both publicity and support.16 
There had also been considerable growth in and wider recognition for trade 
unions in the area as a direct consequence of this action, described as ‘one of the most 
remarkable labour movements of recent years’.17  This was particularly evident in the 
Workers’ Union.18  This trade union had taken the lead in organizing many of the 
workers participating in the strike.  The intervention of Sir George Askwith, the Chief 
                                               
14
  H.A. Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions since 1889, Volume Two: 1911-1933 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985), p. 24. 
15
  Tipton Herald, 31 May 1913; S. Langley, pp. 74-75.  See Chapter 2, pp. 51-69.  Demands were made for a 
weekly minimum wage of 23s. for unskilled men and 12s. per week for women (to achieve parity with the 
pay levels for comparable work being offered to workers employed in similar jobs in nearby Birmingham). 
16
  Who’s Who and Who Was Who (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  Tom Mann (1856-1941) was a 
national trade union leader and noted advocate of syndicalism.  As a trained engineer, he had joined the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) before becoming involved in the foundation of the Workers’ 
Union in 1898.  He later returned to the ASE as General Secretary from 1918-21.  He visited Wednesbury 
twice in 1913 to offer his support during the Black Country strike.  See Appendix 6, Photograph 15, p. 288. 
17
  Tipton Herald, 31 May 1913. 
18
  H.A. Clegg, pp. 57-59.  The Workers’ Union was one of the fourteen trade unions that amalgamated in 
January 1922 to form the Transport & General Workers’ Union. 
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Industrial Commissioner of the Board of Trade, facilitated the strike’s conclusion, 
reaching an accommodation with most of the demands of the workers concerned being 
satisfied.19  Yet, it is salient that upon the declaration of war in August 1914, many of 
those who had been on strike during 1913 demonstrated their patriotism, either by 
volunteering to serve with the various branches of the armed forces or by harnessing 
their efforts to increase the supply of munitions for those serving at the front line. 
The parliamentary constituency of Wednesbury was established by the 
Representation of the People Act 1867, and in the eight general elections held between 
1868 and 1910, the seat was won by the Conservative Party on five occasions; with the 
other three being victories for the Liberal Party.20  In the two general elections of 1910, 
the Conservative candidate was the enigmatic John Norton Griffiths, known as ‘Empire 
Jack’, who fought a populist campaign taking the seat from the Liberals and retaining 
it.21  The 1910 election was a highpoint for local Conservatism, both in Wednesbury and 
across the Black Country, with a change to the complexion of local politics increasingly 
evident thereafter.22  Manifestation of this occurred with the creation of an Independent 
Labour Party (ILP) branch in Wednesbury in 1913, followed by a Divisional Labour 
Party in 1918.  Labour candidates stood in Wednesbury for the first time at the 1913 
municipal elections, albeit unsuccessfully.  The Wednesbury Herald proclaimed: 
A party has been brought into being in the Borough of Wednesbury 
which will have to be reckoned with in the future.  Whether it be 
dubbed Labour or Socialist or whatever else, it is clear it will have some 
following.23 
                                               
19
  J.F. Ede, p. 293. 
20
  Ibid., pp. 360-361.  This legislation had also extended the franchise to urban working-class males. 
21
  The Times, 29 September 1930; Who’s Who and Who Was Who (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
An engineer and soldier before his political career, John Norton Griffiths (1871-1930) served in the 
Matabele and South African wars before becoming Wednesbury’s MP in 1910.  During the First World 
War, and at his own expense, he raised the 2
nd
 King Edward’s Horse, a detachment of the King's Overseas 
Dominions Regiment.  Following his commissioning as a Major in this unit, he attained the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel and was involved in establishing the first of the Royal Engineer tunnelling units, being 
then awarded with the Distinguished Service Order (DSO).  Having relinquished the Wednesbury 
constituency, from 1918, he held Central Wandsworth for the Conservative Party until his suicide in 1930. 
22
  The Times, 17 January 1910; The Times, 5 December 1910.  The principal issues for the Conservatives at 
this election were tariff reform, national defence and the extension of freehold ownership; the Liberal issues 
included national defence, free trade and social reform.  See Appendix 6, Photograph 10, p. 285. 
23
  Wednesbury Herald, 8 November 1913.  Labour candidates stood in the Kings Hill and Town Hall wards. 
7 
 
These local elections occurred during the same year as the Black Country strike, 
when support for the labour movement was growing, with the establishment of four 
branches of the Workers’ Union in the town.  During the war years, there was an 
augmentation of Labour and trade union involvement in local politics, and by 
organizations that now represented former servicemen.  Taking an increasingly 
prominent role in the affairs of the town, the Trades and Labour Council gained 
representation on various patriotic committees that were concerned with the welfare of 
the people of Wednesbury.  The general election of December 1918 has become known 
to historians as the ‘Coupon’ election.24  Notably, this was the first contest to be fought 
with an increased electorate.25  It was also the occasion for Wednesbury to return its first 
Labour Member of Parliament, Alfred Short.26  In this respect, the town was one of four 
Black Country constituencies to disregard the overtures of the Coalition’s candidate.  In 
Wednesbury, this was Archibald White Maconochie.27  The Express and Star newspaper 
verified that during the campaign Alfred Short was carried shoulder high from election 
meetings, ‘not by pacifists nor by pro-Germans but by discharged soldiers’.28 
Wednesbury was one of the first localities in the British mainland to receive a 
direct attack by the air from enemy forces during the First World War.  On the night of 
31 January 1916, the Black Country was an early victim of aerial warfare when two of 
                                               
24
  This is attributable to the remarks of the former Prime Minister H.H. Asquith with reference to the joint 
letter of support penned by the leader of the Coalition Liberals, David Lloyd George, and the leader of the 
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25
  The Representation of the People Act 1918 expanded the British electorate from 7.7 million to 21.4 million.  
This was achieved by abolishing most of the property qualifications for adult males over the age of 21 years 
and the enfranchisement of females over 30 years of age if they met the minimum property qualifications.  
Full electoral equality required the passing of the Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act 1928. 
26
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(1882-1938) was a boilermaker by occupation, had been a City Councillor in Sheffield and from 1911 had 
been the Secretary of the Sheffield Branch of the Boiler Makers’ Society.  He was the Member of 
Parliament for Wednesbury from 1918-1931.  In his later career, he worked for the Transport & General 
Workers’ Union.  Elected as the Labour MP for Doncaster in 1935, he held that seat until his death. 
27
  The Times, 4 February 1926; Who’s Who and Who Was Who, 2012.  Archibald Maconochie’s (1855-1926) 
had been the Liberal Unionist MP for Aberdeenshire East from 1900-1906 and was managing director of 
the firm ‘Maconochie Brothers’, which was responsible for the manufacture of a range of tinned foods that 
were issued as rations to the front line troops in the First World War.  The best known of these products 
was Maconochie’s Stew, which the contemporary accounts indicate consisted of a thin gravy containing 
carrot and turnip but very little meat.  It did not enjoy an enviable reputation amongst British soldiers. 
28
  Express and Star, 4 December 1918.  See Chapter 8, pp. 243-253. 
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the Imperial German Navy’s Zeppelin airships, the L19 and L21, entered its air space.  
Having deviated from their planned route during a mission intended to bomb the port of 
Liverpool, the outcome of this incursion was that thirteen Wednesbury people died 
because of the bombs dropped during the raid.29  The consequence of this and other 
actions against unarmed civilians had a profound impact on the attitudes of those on the 
home front and its investigation will be an important element of this research. 
The first aim of this thesis therefore will be to examine this complex set of 
dynamics in greater depth.  Accordingly, it will describe and challenge the prevailing 
notions of patriotism and voluntarism by exploring the range of motivations that caused 
exactly those members of the industrial working class that had participated in the 1913 
Black Country strike to rally to the colours from 1914 onwards.  The second aim is 
assess change over the period concerned by considering the home front from a number 
of different perspectives, including coverage of the economic and industrial, political 
and social viewpoints.  A third aim is to investigate these experiences, to evaluate the 
changes in attitudes, morale and wartime performance of industry and its workforce.  
Hence, the intention is to evaluate critically the home front, thereby allowing the 
formulation of some fresh conclusions in respect of this area of investigation. 
These aims are attainable through the completion of a local study that reviews 
the prevailing issues at the outbreak of the war and charts those that were to emerge 
during the course of the conflict.  This approach should also satisfy the objectives of 
providing insights into the mechanisms and operation of contemporary social attitudes, 
class structures, and economic and political factors.  The significance of this research 
will allow it to contribute to a number of areas of scholarship, principally First World 
War studies, labour history, and the social history of the Black Country.  Studies of this 
                                               
29
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TNA AIR 1/2123/207/73/5: Air raids on Britain, 1 January 1916 – 28 February 1916. 
9 
 
type advance our understanding at a local level and throw light on the national picture, 
too; opening up debates about the importance of and correct historiographical context 
for a piece of research such as this.  Whilst no other exposition has investigated the 
town of Wednesbury at this time and in such depth, it is suggested that this thesis does 
complement the work of a number of historians with similar research interests.30 
Turning attention to the structure of the thesis, a thematic rather than a 
chronological approach has been adopted.  This ensures that each of the core chapters 
provides a discrete, self-contained analysis of a particular issue or topic.  Furthermore, 
in view of the volume of primary and secondary material available, duplication of effort 
or repetition of material is minimized to produce a thesis of manageable proportions. 
Following on from this first chapter, which has sought to define the rationale 
and structure, set out the methodology employed and review existing scholarship, 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of Wednesbury’s working class in 1914, together with 
a survey of its composition and structure based on a sample of six streets.  In examining 
the industrial, political and social structures, this chapter identifies some of the 
formative influences and issues that pre-dated and yet endured the war.  Chapter 3 is 
concerned with the mobilization of the town’s population and the transition from 
voluntarism to eventual conscription for military service.  Chapter 4 explores economic 
mobilization, the industrial requirements for waging the war and the impact on local 
industry of munitions production and the growing role of the state.  Chapter 5 focuses 
attention on industrial relations and trade unionism, and the instances of dislocation, 
disputes and their resolution during the war.  Chapter 6 addresses the 1916 Zeppelin 
raid on the Black Country, the first incursion into the area by hostile aircraft, and its 
impact on the community and the wider repercussions for national defence.  Chapter 7 
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devotes attention to the impact of war on Wednesbury’s society and evaluates the role 
of the local press on the home front.  Chapter 8 endeavours to explain political change, 
community activism, the growing influence of the labour movement and the importance 
of ‘patriotic Labour’ in local politics, and provides an analysis and assessment of the 
1918 general election.  Chapter 9 is the final chapter that summarizes the evidence 
regarding the community’s role, sense of identity and sacrifices made.  It will present 
some pertinent conclusions in terms cohesion, motivation and patriotism on the home 
front, demonstrating the extent of the shared commitment to winning the war. 
 
1.3 The methodology of the thesis 
 
To determine the scope of the research required for a thesis such as this, a number of 
decisions were necessary as to the most appropriate methodology.  Several overarching 
themes emerged, the first of which being the crucial importance of the class structure in 
British society, both before and during the conflict, and more specifically the 
composition and location of Wednesbury’s working class in relation to that structure. 
It was in the first half of the nineteenth century that the terms ‘working class’ 
and ‘working classes’ came into common usage, becoming largely synonymous with 
‘the people’.  As E.P. Thompson stated, ‘most English working people came to feel an 
identity of interests as between themselves and as against their rulers and employers’ 
and he noted that ‘the ruling class was itself divided’ but gained cohesion over the same 
period as the emergent working class.31  However, within the working class itself, 
several overlapping strata were also discernible with ‘a vertical division based on the 
adherence or otherwise of its members to the general values of the group which were 
accepted as pertaining to it’.32  This was a separation imposed by such considerations as 
employment and income, housing provision and living conditions, culture and lifestyle, 
                                               
31
  E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 3
rd
 edn (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 11. 
32
  C.S.A. Chinn, ‘The Anatomy of a Working Class Neighbourhood: West Sparkbrook, 1871-1914’ 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 1986), p. 110. 
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attitudes and prospects.  Amongst these, the primary factor was undoubtedly income.  
As Carl Chinn has pointed out so succinctly, ‘The poor had no options.  Their lives 
were circumscribed by a lack of money’.33  The more prosperous upper or ‘respectable’ 
working class tended to have regular and stable employment, typically in the skilled 
occupations as members of the so-called ‘aristocracy of labour’; they had greater 
aspirations for self-improvement through education and social mobility, and often 
adhered to religious non-conformity and teetotalism.  Many of these values were shared 
by the ‘middling’ section of the working class, who were elevated above the lowest 
levels by possessing a sense of pride in their community and family.  A reliance on 
semi-skilled employment reduced the opportunities available for them to enjoy the 
relatively greater prosperity afforded to their ‘respectable’ counterparts, however. 
At the base of this class structure were society’s poorest members, often 
denigrated as the ‘residuum’, the ‘rough’ element or the ‘submerged tenth’ and who 
endured the harshest conditions of all.  Mostly employed as casual or unskilled labour, 
they had little opportunity for advancement in work or life generally.  Bernard Waites 
asserted that the ‘skilled and unskilled wage-earners were almost two different races, set 
apart from one another by wide disparities in income, dress and personal bearing’. 34  
They were also subjected to judgemental views from those of the higher social ranks 
who viewed their predilection for alcohol, gambling and tobacco as fecklessness.  Of 
course, the changeable economic circumstances of Victorian and Edwardian Britain 
meant that the ‘respectable’ and ‘rough’ elements constituted two ends of a scale, with 
most working-class families occupying a position somewhere between the extremes.35 
                                               
33
  C.S.A. Chinn, Poverty Amidst Prosperity: Urban Poor in England, 1834-1914 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995), p. 5. 
34
  B.A Waites, ‘The Effect of the First World War on Class and Status in England, 1910-1920’, Journal of 
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The second theme to have emerged is that of the cohesiveness and identity of the 
community, which Donald Macraild and David Martin suggest is a concept that ‘can be 
used to examine a number of characteristics of working-class life’.36  A family’s place of 
residence during this period being determined by the cost in relation to household 
income, the size and quality of the dwelling, and the proximity to the place of 
employment (since, in the absence of public transport, working-class people had little 
alternative than to walk to work).  This was important because unless unavoidable due 
to adverse economic conditions inducing relocation from rural areas or migration from 
Wales and Ireland, few working people possessed the means to travel great distances for 
their employment.  Accordingly, most of Wednesbury’s large working-class community 
sought their livelihood in the town’s numerous engineering and manufacturing 
companies, the details of which were evidenced from trade directories of the period.37 
The community also acted as an intangible but nonetheless real barrier that gave 
the working class some defence against intrusion from officialdom.  Moreover, it also 
segregated the different strata that existed within the working class itself, as the more 
‘respectable’ families would be found in one enclave, while the ‘rough’ elements might 
often be located in another cluster of streets.  In turn, it was the street, or the 
concentration of a clutch of streets that coalesced to became a neighbourhood, which 
really informed and fashioned the character of a community and ‘despite poverty, 
despite migration, despite isolation, working-class neighbourhoods were an established 
fact of urban life by 1900’.38  A further layer derived from the ties of family and 
friendships, the accepted common codes of behaviour and value systems, and the levels 
of orderliness and stability, especially since the ‘rougher’ areas generally experienced 
                                               
36
  D.M. MacRaild and D.E. Martin, Labour in British Society, 1839-1914 (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 86. 
37
  Kelly’s Directory of Staffordshire, 1912 (London: Kelly & Co., 1912).   This trade directory (together with 
the 1916 volume) provided clear evidence of the extent of the heavy metal-based industries in the area and 
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higher levels of crime.  This translated into a community spirit giving the essence of 
belonging, a unifying force of class loyalty and support through the difficult times but 
also a suspicion of outsiders; just as these qualities were important to life on the home 
front, they were equally applicable to those men who would serve at the front line. 
Gender also had a vital role in fashioning the community’s values and the debate 
about how the position of women in society changed during the course of the war, and 
whether there was a real improvement, has been extensive.39  Economic necessity 
dictated that many working-class women in the Black Country were already part of the 
nation’s workforce before the outbreak of the war.  Yet it should be noted that they 
earned considerably less when compared with the men, as witnessed in the 1913 Black 
Country strike.  They performed a variety of jobs, often in factories and workshops or as 
homeworkers, to supplement the generally meagre family incomes.40  However, as 
women attained greater responsibilities and participated through the war-related work 
there ‘opened up a wider range of occupations to female workers and hastened the 
collapse of traditional women’s employment, particularly domestic service’.41 
The third theme regards the various notions of patriotism in terms of the 
working class and with reference to the concepts of citizenship and nationalism.  The 
declaration of war on 4 August 1914 sparked an unprecedented response, becoming 
‘one of the most extraordinary mass movements in history, the voluntary enlistment of 
two and a half million men in the British Army in the first sixteen months of the war’.42  
Numerous motivations are identifiable with respect to those who volunteered to join the 
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ranks.43  These included patriotic sentiment, the loyalty to one’s own community, 
friends and peers, a desire for adventure, or to leave behind a mundane job and, at its 
most fundamental level, the prospect of escaping from the grinding poverty and 
unemployment that so often beset the working class.  Many of the industrial workers 
from Wednesbury’s factories volunteered to join the armed forces, some of whom 
according to the records of the Workers’ Union were also active locally in their trade 
union.  For example, the 1915 volume of the Union’s Annual Report and Statement of 
Accounts featured a Roll of Honour of its members who had been killed in action in 
1915.44  These impulses and motives were frequently complex and often interconnected, 
since the poorest members of British society were frequently amongst the most 
patriotic.  By the end of the war, almost six million British men had served with one of 
the armed forces during a conflict entailing horror, misery and a good chance of injury 
or death, with over 40 per cent receiving wounds and over 720,000 being killed.45 
The mobilization of British industry is the fourth theme.  A pre-war growth in 
foreign competition had resulted in manufacturing decline during the years between 
1870 and 1914.  This was attributable to protectionist policies and tariffs that prevented 
British companies from competing in American and German markets, thereby shielding 
these markets and enabling American and German companies to become strong enough 
to challenge and penetrate unprotected British home markets.  Consequently, British 
exports had to be re-directed from their traditional American and European markets and 
alternative trading opportunities sought within the constituency of the British Empire.  
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Whilst masked by an economic boom which began in around 1908, the ‘pomp and 
glitter of the prosperous Edwardian period therefore rested on insecure foundations’.46 
When the war came, its effects on British industry were numerous.  By February 
1916, over a quarter of the men employed in industry had enlisted and, in some sectors 
of the economy such as commerce and financial services, over 40 per cent had joined 
the armed forces.  A quarter of a million coal miners had volunteered during the first 
year of the war and ‘so serious did the loss of manpower become that in 1916 the 
Government prohibited the enlistment of any more workers from the coal industry’.47  
The tremendous demand for men and materials placed terrific strain on the British 
economy and required that the remaining workers be used more efficiently, with greater 
flexibility being encouraged by measures ‘including dilution – the employment of 
unskilled men and women on jobs that had been the preserve of skilled men’.48  As well 
as restricting practices that had been crucial to the influence of skilled men in the 
workplace, the 1915 Munitions Act introduced the Leaving Certificate system, which 
effectively tied workers to specific jobs by stipulating that they could not accept new 
employment without documentation from their current employer verifying that they 
were no longer needed.49  One feature of this arrangement was that because employers 
still feared losing workers to competitors, they began to use the system draconically 
with the threat of dismissal without a certificate as a means to discipline the workforce.50 
Leading on from the third and fourth themes, the fifth theme deals with what can 
be viewed as the beginning of a major realignment of British politics, with the 
emergence of the Labour Party and the notion of ‘patriotic Labour’, together with the 
eventual decline in support for Asquithian Liberalism.  In his work on the pre-war 
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Liberal Party, George Dangerfield made the case that the unrest resulting in the decline 
in working-class support for the Liberals began during the years 1910-1914.  He 
attributed this to an inability to respond to the problems in Ulster concerning Home 
Rule, the increasingly militant campaign by the suffragettes, and strike action by a 
strengthened labour movement with grievance emanating from the continual erosion of 
real wages.51  However, Labour’s advancement was not straightforward and, particularly 
during the pre-war years, many within Wednesbury’s working-class electorate 
continued to support Conservative Party candidates.  This could be viewed as an act of 
consolation and self-interest, to support the party that favoured protectionism and tariff 
reform, rather than Liberal free trade policies that might jeopardize working-class jobs. 
By also embodying the virtues of hard work, patriotism and self-help, 
Conservatism appealed to a ‘respectable’ working class and especially the ‘aristocrats of 
Labour’ who were more susceptible to feeling some measure of deference.  This 
Conservatism, which was particularly strong amongst the Anglican working class of the 
Victorian and Edwardian eras, also tended to be far more tolerant of the popular culture 
and pastimes enjoyed by the working class.  This was in contrast to its frequently Non-
Conformist Liberal counterpart, which routinely argued forcibly against the fondness 
for alcohol and gambling and in favour of teetotalism, for instance.  The social role 
played by the Conservative and Unionist Associations, clubs and friendly societies was 
also notable.  This should be seen as working in a complementary manner to the 
practice adopted by many employers in the Black Country of using the workplace as a 
means to instil some political loyalty amongst their employees towards Conservatism.52 
Yet the pre-war years had heralded changes in the local economy that had wider 
implications.  With the transition from small workshops to larger factories, the bonds 
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between employer and employee were weakening.  On the one hand, there was less 
paternalism (although some Black Country family-run companies, such Rubery Owen 
and F.H. Lloyd & Co. Ltd., continued to provide social and welfare facilities for their 
workforces); although, on the other hand, there was reduced pressure for working men 
to vote for the same political parties as their social superiors, the employers.  The trade 
unions’ improved bargaining position in many industries was augmented by a 
membership that rose from about 800,000 in 1880 to over three million in 1914.53  This 
lifted the movement’s profile considerably. Growing pre-war trade unionism had also 
seen the rise of industrial militancy, most notably during the years 1911 to 1914 and, in 
some quarters, the contention was that this derived from the ideas of syndicalism.54 
Whilst a small minority of trade unionists and Labour politicians had spoken out 
against the war, including James Keir Hardie and James Ramsay MacDonald (the latter 
resigning the Party’s leadership in August 1914), the majority of the labour movement 
endorsed Britain’s approach to winning the war.  Arthur Henderson succeeded 
MacDonald as Labour’s General Secretary, and when appointed as President of the 
Board of Education in the Coalition administration in 1915, he became the first Labour 
Party politician to hold a Cabinet post.  With a political system that had for so long 
given power to the privileged and wealthy, this was remarkable.  Henderson’s 
experience in government, along with that of George Barnes, as Minister of Pensions, 
and John Hodge, as Minister of Labour, would add considerable weight to Labour’s 
electoral credibility at the general election called in 1918.55  At local level, the wartime 
activities of the trades councils were supportive of the community, helping to establish a 
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moderate and patriotic stance.56  This was in marked contrast to the Bolshevism that 
Labour’s political opponents prophesized would follow electoral success for the Party. 
Furthermore, within the labour movement itself, the outlook of the alliance of 
the trade unions and socialists achieved greater accord with a broader working-class 
audience.57  An example of this occurred in the document Labour and the New Social 
Order, which became Labour’s 1918 electoral programme.58  This incorporated policies 
that proposed greater state involvement and the public management of key sectors of the 
economy. With an increased electorate arising from the introduction of the 
Representation of the People Act 1918, the December 1918 general election gave the 
Labour Party a fresh opportunity to assert itself.  Having won 42 out of the 56 seats 
contested in 1910, the Party gained 57 of the 361 seats it fought in 1918 and fine-tuned 
its position from being the Liberal Party’s junior partner to the nation’s second political 
party and the foremost parliamentary opposition to the Coalition Government.59 
Turning to the sources used to carry out this research, the primary source 
material has been both diverse and extensive, covering national and local perspectives 
to support all dimensions of the work.60  A careful reading of the bibliographies of other 
studies suggested that quite limited use had been made of many of the primary sources 
used in this research, with some of them being apparently completely unexplored.  This 
thesis sought to make better use of this neglected evidence so that through its analysis, 
further insight into this area of work would be achievable.  For ease of reference, the 
description of the primary sources utilized the following four broad headings. 
Firstly, there were the manuscript sources in the holdings of various archives.  
Particularly relevant are the National Archives of the United Kingdom (formerly the 
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Public Record Office), the People’s History Museum at Manchester, the University of 
Warwick’s Centre Modern Records Centre, Sandwell Community History and Archive 
Services, the Staffordshire County Record Office, and the Walsall Local History Centre.  
Additionally, access has been acquired to a number of miscellaneous artefacts and 
documents through the generous permission of the owners of several private collections, 
and the names of the collections’ owners are listed in the bibliography at the end of the 
thesis.  Amongst the documents of the National Archives, there is particular reference to 
the papers of the Cabinet and the War Cabinet (CAB) and to the documents concerning 
the Zeppelin raid (AIR) and to industry, munitions production and industrial relations in 
the West Midlands region (LAB and MUN).61  The National Archives Labour and 
Munitions records furnished a tremendous amount of valuable information about the 
local situation during the war.  For example, they provided extensive documentation of 
the steps taken by the government and both sides of industry to avert industrial relations 
problems and the strikes that would otherwise have adversely affected munitions 
production.62  Amongst the records available at the various local and national archives 
visited throughout this study, there was the correspondence for the Wednesbury Trades 
and Labour Council, and files of the various employers, trade unions and their local 
branches, and of the Wednesbury Borough Council and a number of its committees. 
Secondly, there were the contemporary printed sources relating to the home 
front, including the political and social dimension, and the emergence of thinking about 
the post-war world.63  Thirdly, there were the official records, including parliamentary 
papers, dealing with a wide range of contemporary issues including military recruitment 
and the reports of the various bodies addressing economic matters and the problems of 
industrial unrest, and the comprehensive volumes recording the activities of the 
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Ministry of Munitions.  Also of relevance were the memoirs of key figures of the 
period, particularly those of Sir George Askwith of the Board of Trade, for example. 64 
Fourthly, there were the contemporary local and national newspapers and 
periodicals.  Although accepting that all the newspapers had the agendas of their editors 
and owners, together with any overt political allegiances, it was evident that from 1915 
they were prevented from making full reports from the front line; subsequent reports 
being noticeably reduced when compared with those of the early months of the war.65  
However, much useful information was still harvestable from the available spread of 
local and national newspapers.  It was imperative to note the role of local newspapers in 
reinforcing the link between the home front and the front line by carrying news not just 
of local patriotic meetings, fundraising events and military service tribunals but by 
reporting on such matters as the distinctions and medals awarded to sons of the town.66 
Having regard to secondary sources, a vast quantity of articles, books, essays, 
theses and web content on the First World War was already in existence.  This wealth of 
material was constantly augmented, especially with the centenary commemoration in 
2014.  Similarly, there was much scholarship about the Black Country’s industrial and 
social history.  Yet there were still gaps and Bourne identified that ‘there remains scope 
for sophisticated modern treatment of how the war was experienced and perceived in 
local communities’.67  The abundance of this secondary material made it possible to 
locate the work within the correct context; nevertheless, there was also a problem.  In 
order to produce a thesis of manageable proportions, it was inevitable that there would 
be items that ideally could or should have been consulted and included but considerable 
selectivity as to their relevance and hence inclusion or exclusion could not be avoided. 
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1.4 A review of historiographical debates and literature 
 
In seeking to efficiently engage with and achieve an appreciation and understanding of 
this area of scholarship, this section offers a review of the literature together with a 
broad overview of the key historiographical debates in order to facilitate this process. 
In his examination of the civilian experience of Wolverhampton, Stephen Gower 
identified what he believed to be two leading approaches to historical writing on the 
First World War.68  The first was that adopted by some military historians.  It 
concentrated on battles, campaigns and operational minutiae, and was reliant on the 
biographies and diaries of the principal people involved; divisional and regimental 
histories can typically be of this type.  The second approach was that utilized by social 
historians to apply a ‘history-from-below’ methodology to ordinary soldiers or citizens 
to determine how events were to shape or change their lives.  However, criticism of the 
over simplicity of this ‘binary’ division prompted an alternative approach, as 
demonstrated by Trevor Wilson in The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great 
War.  Drawing on social, political and military history, Wilson gave comparable 
attention to the front line and the home front and integrated decisive insights into how 
the war was fought by ordinary soldiers and its hardships endured by ordinary people.69 
The pioneer in stimulating the interest of many into the impact of war on society 
was Arthur Marwick, through his groundbreaking work The Deluge: British Society and 
the First World War.  In his further volume, Total War and Social Change, Marwick 
advanced the concept that he termed the four dimensions of war, and which served as a 
framework for discussion of the socio-economic experiences and consequences of war.  
Firstly, was the ‘destructive and disruptive dimension’ (war’s destructiveness created an 
impulse to any post-war reconstruction).  Secondly, there was the ‘test dimension’ (by 
placing society under pressure, war tested how society changed to avoid defeat).  
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Thirdly, there was the ‘participation dimension’ (war required the involvement of 
marginal groups whose involvement heralded the possibility of post-war social change).  
Fourthly, there was the ‘psychological dimension’ (by generating such emotional 
responses as hatred of an enemy, again war could bring post-war social change).70 
Following on from Marwick’s analysis and emphasizing the importance of 
social class was the work of Bernard Waites.  His contention being that class was ‘a 
fundamentally contested concept’ with there being disagreement ‘not only on how we 
should define class position and formation but also on the import of class division and 
conflict for modern history’.71  This has focused on the home front and perceived little 
variation in society’s social structures because of the war.  Gerard de Groot asserted that 
there was a continuous process at work, beginning in the last years of the nineteenth 
century; whilst the war did lead to social change, it was probable that the change would 
have happened in any case at some point, and that the impact of the war served to 
accelerate this process.72  Recent additions to the history of the British home front that 
have delivered a convincing challenge to the 1914 ‘rush to the colours’ thesis are Adrian 
Gregory’s The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War and Catriona 
Pennell’s A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World 
War in Britain and Ireland.73  In throwing new light onto propaganda and patriotism, 
volunteerism and the equality of sacrifice, Gregory described how the tensions that 
threatened to spill over were averted through the process of commemoration. 
Other, thematic, studies have been carried out as the result of the enduring 
fascination with all aspects of the First World War.  However, a criticism has been 
levelled by Nicholas Mansfield that the literature has predominantly ‘concentrated on 
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the larger strategic, domestic or military issues and especially the minutiae of the war, 
without connecting them to the reactions of localities’.74  Subsequently, there has been 
an increased interest in local history and the war, and this has generated some detailed 
and valuable studies of several communities.75  When considering the importance of 
social class to this area of scholarship, it has been important to note the point made by 
Patrick Joyce about the complexities of class, in that it has a relationship to the concepts 
of nation, region and community that makes it relevant to the study of the community at 
war.76  Furthermore, that ‘class in Britain seems indeed to have grown in the cumulative, 
aggregate way; neighbourhood, town, region and nation being gradually pieced together 
in the outlook of working people’.77  In attempting to locate this thesis in relation to 
these main theoretical approaches and the contemporary debates concerning class, it 
was noteworthy that similar studies have employed an essentially revisionist, ‘history-
from-below’ approach to elicit insights into the motivations of the working-class.  As 
David Silbey pointed out, ‘The soldiers and factory workers are as important to 
understanding modern war as are the strategy, tactics and technology, and leadership’.78 
Marxist historiography has sought to divide modern British social history into 
three interconnected and simultaneously distinct periods that fit into a three-stage 
model.79  Firstly, the classical age of the industrial revolution (1780s–1840s), when the 
concept of social class was ‘made’ and there was growing class-consciousness and 
popular protest movements.  Secondly, the mid-Victorian years (1840s–1870s), during 
which there was a retreat from class-consciousness, an eventual disintegration of the 
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protest movements and fragmentation by reference to occupational, skills and 
purchasing power.  Accompanying this were some gains, including the negotiated 
benefits arising from an ‘aristocratic’ outlook on the part of the labour movement.  
Thirdly, the period to the end of the First World War, when the modern working class 
became characterized by the emergence of a mass labour movement, and this acted in 
response to intensified economic competition and employer pressure.  Eric Hobsbawm 
attributed the class-consciousness of British workers to a morality based on ‘solidarity, 
fairness, mutual aid and co-operation and the readiness to fight for just treatment’.80 
A different approach to viewing social class featured in Gareth Stedman Jones’ 
collection of powerful essays, which assessed the conception of class relative to its 
manifestation in the history of culture and politics since the 1830s.  He asserted that ‘the 
word class has acted as a congested point of intersection between many competing, 
overlapping forms of discourse – political, economic, religious and cultural – right 
across the political spectrum’.  Furthermore, the distinctions between two conceptions 
of class are emphasized, that is the everyday and commonplace perception, and the 
revolutionary-significant Marxist view.  These are challenged vis-à-vis the essential 
meaning of such concepts as class-consciousness and with regard to the employment of 
language.81  Since Stedman Jones maintained that the embodiment of class is in the 
language used, analysis should be in terms of its linguistic content.  Stedman Jones also 
discussed what he termed the ‘culture of consolation’ whereby the defeat of Chartism 
resulted in the working class being imbued with a feeling that they could not defeat 
capitalism.82  Accordingly, the ‘respectable’ working class accepted the prevailing 
socio-economic circumstances and entered into an accommodation with the Liberals 
and Conservatives that persisted from the 1860s until the early twentieth century. 
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However, this approach has been subjected to considerable criticism because its 
narrowness took insufficient account of the wider socio-economic context.  It assumed 
the working class had no ‘agency’, by which is meant ‘purposive human action’ or, in 
other words, the capacity to act independently and make their own choices, and so they 
acted according to the social structures set out for them by the ruling classes.83  In fact, 
the working class ‘prided themselves upon the power of their own agency – upon the 
proven ability to create their own ways of life and institutions’ and the gains achieved.84 
Alternative models have been presented that have endeavoured to rectify this 
oversight, and John Belchem has been prominent in employing Michael Mann’s 
methodology which, in turn has been derived from the social sciences, to identify what 
are deemed to be the four aspects of social class.85  The first element of this model was 
class identity, i.e. the definition of oneself as being working class.  Secondly, there was 
class opposition, namely, the perception of employers and other agents as enduring 
class opponents.  Thirdly, there was class totality, which has meant the making of both 
class identity and opposition the central defining feature of one’s situation.  Fourthly, 
class alternative, which was the conceptualization of an alternative form of social 
organization.  This model possessed some considerable merit in terms of this topic of 
research because of the view advanced by John Benson that ‘the growth of 
individualities and patriotic ideals combined with one another to impede the 
development of a coherent sense of working-class consciousness’.86  Each of these 
approaches can contribute to the analysis of class, in terms of community and 
patriotism, and should advance understanding of the interactions and motivations 
concerned, particularly as they were at the outbreak of the First World War. 
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A number of other secondary sources interact with particular facets of social 
class generally, and the working class in particular.  For example, Miles Savage and 
Andrew Miles investigated aspects concerning trade union militancy, the development 
of capitalism, and the social mobility of the working class.  They also investigated the 
pre-war impact of New Liberalism and concluded that whilst it was attractive to some 
elements within the working class, namely the ‘respectable’ working class, it ‘simply 
did not address the sort of issues which they knew to be important to them’.87  Macraild 
and Martin argued that when contemplating the lives of working people and their lives, 
historians should ‘demonstrate a willingness and an ability to wrestle with the 
complexities of the term class, and to apply it, and the alternative models offered by its 
critics’.88  Hence, there was the derivation of a large amount of useful insight into 
working-class culture, communities and the means of self-help available to them. 
Both Jon Lawrence and Ross McKibbin have provided an extensive assessment 
of political ideology in relation to the British working class.  Lawrence researched the 
rise of class politics during the period from 1867 to 1914, paying particular attention to 
the phenomenon of working-class Conservatism as experienced in nearby 
Wolverhampton.89  This can be connected to Benson’s assessment of those factors held 
to be responsible for the lack of a strong trade union movement in the Black Country 
during the later Victorian and early Edwardian years.  He attributed this to the survival 
of small-scale production and sub-contracting in local manufacturing, which, whilst not 
unique to the Black Country, arguably accounted for a working class that exhibited 
notable industrial weakness and political conservatism.90  Ross McKibbin has also 
charted the advance and consolidation of the Edwardian Labour Party, maintaining that 
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by 1914 it was already a class-based political party, although the attempts to introduce 
Marxist ideologies were unsuccessful.91  In contrast, James Young has been highly 
critical of much of the labour historiography.  This is because he considered it to have 
‘focused almost exclusively on socialist intellectuals and working-class movements at 
the expense of portraying the lives and culture of the unimagined majority, the anti-
capitalism of the latter has been largely ignored by labour historians’.92 
Several historians, including most notably Patrick Joyce, Gareth Stedman Jones 
and Bernard Waites, have argued persuasively for the deep embedment of patriotism 
within British working-class culture.  In his investigation of Birmingham’s working 
class during the years 1899-1914, Michael Blanch has further articulated that there was 
a deeply ingrained nationalism, although this was not merely a class-motivated 
chauvinism, and his contention was that it was more defensive than aggressive.93  
Further endorsement of this perspective arose from Hugh Cunningham’s observation 
that ‘there can be few more obviously patriotic acts than to volunteer to defend one’s 
country’.94  Patriotism was a very real sensation for many British men and women, with 
a decisive point being made by Bourne being that ‘it is easily confused with jingoism, 
though the two are not the same: patriotism is about love, jingoism is about hate’.95 
There have been numerous efforts to trace and explore the basis of patriotism in 
relation to the working class.  Attention has been given to changes in the perception of 
patriotism, with a transition from it being associated with radicalism to it becoming 
synonymous with conservatism, which commenced in the mid-to-late Victorian period.  
August recounts that ‘working-class patriotism was well-established before the war, 
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persisted beyond it alongside scepticism of authority reinforced by the day-to-day 
experience of working-class men and women in Britain’.96  Both Hugh Cunningham and 
Miles Taylor have studied the alternative, democratic/pluralist or democratic/radical 
concepts of patriotism, which emphasized citizenship, democracy and political rights.  
They asserted that these were displaced by an essentially conservative patriotism that 
associated the national character with national interest and defence against both internal 
and external threats, originating with the Russo-Turkish disputes of 1876-1878 (and the 
associated Jingoism) and the new imperialism in South Africa (including the 
repercussions of the disastrous 1895 Jameson raid).97  J.H. Grainger has provided a 
stimulating discussion of the development of the concept of Englishness with respect to 
patriotism.98  Paul Ward has offered a most effective analysis of patriotism and the 
political left, including both the anti- and pro-war groupings within the labour 
movement during the First World War.99  Covering similar ground is J.O. Stubbs’ 
article, in which he described how Lord Milner successfully cultivated those prominent 
social democrats who favoured the prosecution of the war to a victorious outcome.100 
In an examination of Edwardian militarism, Anne Summers created a further 
connection between social class and patriotism.  She noted that in the Volunteer Force 
(a forerunner of the Territorial Force that came into existence in 1908), ‘at least 70 per 
cent of the Force came from the working class.  On the whole, they represented that 
section of the working class which was in more or less regular employment’.101  This 
was associated with the military’s increasing popularity; previously, it was seen as only 
being fit for the unskilled working class or the unemployed.  A typical reaction was that 
received by William Robertson when he told his mother he had joined the Army and she 
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declared that ‘she would rather bury him than see him in a red coat’.  Nevertheless, his 
career was truly phenomenal and Sir William Robertson has remained unique in being 
the only professional head of an army to have risen from its lowest rank to its highest.102 
John Osborne has conducted an investigation into volunteering during the early 
period of the war.103  In a subsequent article he proceeded to explore the Volunteer 
Training Corps (VTC), observing that ‘without the spur of the complex and 
comprehensive national military service systems common on the continent, hundreds of 
thousands of Britons considered it their duty to enlist’.104  John Hartigan has carried out 
an evaluation of Birmingham’s experience during the first year of the war.  In this, he 
weighed up the local impact of various motivational factors that he believed affected 
voluntarism, including economic necessity, psychological pressure and popular 
conviction about the war.  His findings were that the men came predominantly from the 
working class, and were often older than previously thought to be the case.105 
Nicoletta Gullace furnished an alternative perspective in her body of work 
concerning female patriotism and the memory of the war.  In her other studies, she 
examined examples of the utilization of language in propaganda, citing examples of the 
recruitment posters and linking overt masculinity and male pride with appeals to enlist 
on patriotic grounds.106  This research has delved deep into the origins, implications and 
consequences of the distribution of white feathers by women to those men believed to 
be shirking their duty.  It has also charted the emotiveness of propaganda, and how this 
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progressed from Alfred Leete’s iconic poster of Lord Kitchener with the message, 
Britons - Your Country Needs YOU, to those featuring vulnerable female figures 
espousing the slogan, Women of Britain say GO!  Even children were depicted, the 
foremost example being the poster of the guilty-looking man seated with his son and 
daughter, who has just been asked by them, Daddy what did You do in the Great War? 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
Therefore, having established the background to and motivation for this research, the 
methodological approach employed, and the key scholarly debates, it should be added 
that this local study – or micro history – will be firmly embedded within a national 
framework.  Hence, it will examine the significance to Wednesbury of local and 
national evidence identifiable as relevant to the location and time period in question. 
It is important to note that the home front experience of the working class was 
markedly different from that of the other social classes in several crucial respects.  All 
families suffered anxieties and concerns for the safety and welfare of sons, husbands 
and brothers serving with the armed forces, especially at the front line.  The arrival of a 
War Office telegram, announcing that a loved one had died or was missing in action 
was felt equally as grievously in the most affluent as well as in the poorest of 
households.  All were also vulnerable to indiscriminate enemy attack, such as from the 
enemy air raids that began in 1915 with the bombing of cities and towns by German 
airships.  However, for the privileged the access to luxuries was not problematic until 
the war had been waged for almost three years, when the unrestricted submarine warfare 
began to take its toll.  For those with business interests, the conflict became very 
profitable, particularly for the producers of munitions, and the suppliers of the domestic 
goods that now replaced those which were previously imported from abroad.  For many 
of the working class, and especially the unskilled labourers, their deprivation, together 
with hunger and sub-standard housing, had always been constant companions.  In 
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wartime, such families faced the prospect of reliance on the inadequate Separation 
Allowances or, when a breadwinner was lost, the meagre pensions offered by the state.  
By undertaking paid employment, even when this was for the war effort by the female 
munitions workers, such state allowances would be reduced or even removed entirely, 
reversing any minor improvement gained.  Battles with authority over such matters had 
a profound impact on the wider perceptions of the equality of sacrifice being made by 
those in the respective classes of British society.  These factors would eventually come 
to influence the political allegiances of many within the working-class community. 
Over the course of the following chapters, this thesis will aim to demonstrate 
that by the end of the conflict the working-class people of Wednesbury had been 
actively and extensively involved in all aspects of the nation’s war effort.  Whether by 
the military service of their men at the front line or by their work on the home front, the 
people of this community had an intense commitment to winning the war. Yet their 
patriotism was motivated as much by the values, sense of identity and a desire to look 
after their own communities, homes, and families and friends as it was their country.  
The actions and the sacrifices that were being made on the home front were in their own 
way essential to provide support to their loved ones in the armed forces at the front line. 
Pre-war events serve as an essential contextual reference point from which to 
measure the impact of the First World War.  The class antagonisms that reached crisis 
point in the latter years of the war had their origins in the industrial unrest that occurred 
in the years from 1911 to 1914.  For that reason, the economic, social and political 
facets of everyday life for the working class in Wednesbury on the eve of the war are 
considered in depth in Chapter 2, together with a detailed examination of the causes and 
consequences of the 1913 Black Country strike.  This has been provided because it 
yielded many insights into this community and its motivations of benefit in achieving a 
greater understanding of what occurred on the home front during 1914 to 1918. 
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CHAPTER 2:  WEDNESBURY ON THE EVE OF THE WAR 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter will provide an overview of life in the town of Wednesbury prior to the 
outbreak of the First World War to ascertain whether it was, in the words of the narrator 
of the landmark BBC television series The Great War, ‘a world of firm beliefs; the 
established order was not widely questioned’.1  To achieve this, the key factors deemed 
to have contributed to Wednesbury’s growth during the latter years of the nineteenth 
century and early years of the twentieth century will be examined.  Firstly, an increasing 
population, combined with a resultant expansion in geographic area, and the progressive 
urbanization of the town.  Secondly, the establishment of a local government structure 
with electoral accountability, together with the formulation of a unique civic identity.  
Thirdly, the changing patterns of economic development, as local industries contended 
with the demands of an increasingly competitive global marketplace.  In focusing on the 
town’s pre-war economy and society, there will be consideration of social class and 
structure, economic and industrial organization and performance, and political activity 
and class allegiance.  This analysis will provide insights into the local community, 
enabling comparison to be made of the economic, political and social activities and 
networks, so that the extent and nature of any change can be evaluated effectively. 
A significant portion of this Chapter is devoted to the 1913 Black Country 
strike.  Although occurring in the year preceding the outbreak of hostilities, it was an 
event of great significance and importance to Wednesbury.  The strike’s implications 
and far-reaching consequences continued to resonate with the town’s working people 
during wartime, as will be shown in the following Chapters.  Therefore, it is appropriate 
for there to be a comprehensive account of the background to and causes of the dispute, 
its outcome and legacy, and the involvement of Wednesbury’s men and women. 
                                               
1  The Great War (BBC TV, 1964, re-issued as DVD collection, 2002), Episode 1, On the Hill of Summer. 
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2.2 The Growth of Wednesbury to 1914 
 
The report of Wednesbury’s Medical Officer of Health for the year 1914 is replete with 
information and statistics.2  It confirmed that the town had a population of 29,100 
inhabitants, an increase from the 28,103 that were recorded in the 1911 census.3  This 
demonstrated continued growth from the beginning of the nineteenth century, with the 
population in 1801 being a mere 4,160.4  In 1914, there were 929 births (rising from 808 
in 1913), 497 deaths (a decrease from 521 in 1913), giving a net increase to the 
population of 432.  Wednesbury Borough Council’s municipal boundaries described an 
area of 2,287 acres within which there were 5,900 houses, each occupied by an average 
household of 4.9 persons.  The number of new houses built in 1914 was 26, falling from 
the 53 that were built in the previous year.  The rateable value of the entire area was 
£102,991, the district rate was 3s. 10d. in the £, and the poor rate was 4s. 8d. in the £.5 
The Borough of Wednesbury was one of the new parliamentary constituencies 
inaugurated by the Second Reform Act of 1867.6  The geographic area covered 
originally included Wednesbury, West Bromwich, Darlaston and Tipton, and it was then 
the largest single constituency in England.  However, consequent to the 1884 Reform 
Act, West Bromwich became a separate constituency in 1885 so that Wednesbury’s 
total electorate in 1914 was 13,857.7  Nevertheless, with the conferring of Borough 
status by Parliament in 1886, it was at least fifty years ahead of other comparable Black 
Country towns.8  The Borough Council was comprised of four unelected Aldermen 
(former senior Councillors) and twelve Councillors, the latter serving four-year terms 
when returned by municipal elections in the four wards of Kings Hill, Market, Town 
                                               
2
  Sandwell Community History and Archives Service (hereafter SCHAS) Report of Wednesbury’s Medical 
Officer of Health, 1914, pp. 2-42.  The reports for 1913-1918 are summarized in Appendix 4, p. 278. 
3
  Cd. 62591912-13 Census of England 1911 – Area, families or separate occupiers and population, Vol. II, 
Registration Areas, Command Papers (London: HMSO, 1914), p. 200. 
4
  G.J. Barnsby, Social Conditions in the Black Country, 1800-1900, p. 70. 
5
  SCHAS Report of Wednesbury’s Medical Officer of Health, 1914, pp. 2-42. 
6
  The Representation of the People Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 102). <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/> 
[Accessed 30 April 2015]. 
7
  1912-13 [53] Parliamentary Constituencies (electors, & c.). (London: HMSO, 1913), p. 10. 
8
  The Municipal Corporations Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c.50). <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/> 
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Hall and Wood Green.  The Mayor and Deputy Mayor could be either Aldermen or 
Councillors and enjoyed a two-year period of office.9  By 1914, civic activities were 
conducted from Wednesbury’s Town Hall on Holyhead Road (erected in 1871), 
administered by a small professional staff including the Town Clerk, Thomas Jones, the 
Treasurer, Edward Wilson, and the Medical Officer of Health, Dr Walter Garman.10 
Wednesbury’s economic development and industrialization was rooted in its 
long history of mineral extraction dating back to the fourteenth century.  Further 
expertise developed over successive centuries, including the pottery known as 
Wedgbury-ware and, from the early eighteenth century until the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars, it had been a notable centre for firearms production.  The emergence of modern, 
metal-based manufacturing in the town was the direct consequence of a series of 
technological advances during the Industrial Revolution.  These included the 
development in the early nineteenth century of new processes for tube making 
pioneered by Cornelius Whitehouse and for axle manufacture conceived by a local 
Baptist Minister, the Reverend James Hardy.11  Ultimately, these changed the nature of 
production and relationships in the workplace, as semi-skilled and unskilled labour in 
factories and foundries replaced the apprentices and skilled artisans in smaller 
workshops.12  Even with unprecedented growth in the size of companies and greater 
mechanization and capital intensification, there was still the irregularity of employment 
that was an accepted feature of life for the working-class population of the area.13 
Founded in 1834, the Patent Shaft & Axletree Co. Ltd. would become 
Wednesbury’s largest firm, and by 1842, it had negotiated an exclusive contract to 
                                               
9
  Kelly’s Directory for Staffordshire, 1912, p. 448; SCHAS B/W/3/8-13 Borough of Wednesbury Year 
Books; SCHAS Ryder’s Annual, 1885-1918.  See Appendix 3, p. 277 for a table showing Wednesbury 
Borough Council’s political composition during the interval from 1913/14 to 1918/19. 
10
  SCHAS B/W/3/8-13 Borough of Wednesbury Year Books. 
11
  G.C. Allen, p. 91; J.F. Ede, p. 236. 
12
  G.J. Barnsby, Socialism in Birmingham and the Black Country, 1880-1939 (Wolverhampton: Integrated 
Press, 1998), p. 137.  See Appendix 6, Photograph 2, p. 281, which depicts some steel tube workers 
employed at the South Staffordshire Patent tube works during the early years of the twentieth century. 
13
  E. Hopkins, ‘Small Town Aristocrats of Labour and their Standard of Living, 1840-1914’, Economic 
History Review, 28 (1975), p. 233. 
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produce rolling stock for the country’s principal railway company, the London and 
North Western Railway.14  In 1867, Messrs Lloyds-Foster & Co., a Wednesbury 
company founded in 1818 by Samuel ‘Quaker’ Lloyd, acquired the Patent Shaft.  This 
venture combined the Patent Shaft’s Brunswick iron and steel works with Lloyds-
Foster’s Monway steel works and Old Park bridge yard, giving the new organization 
access to blast furnaces, rolling mills, a Bessemer steel plant, an axle and wheel works, 
a bridge and girder shop, and extensive collieries.  In a further amalgamation occurring 
in 1902, the three plants of the predecessor companies (although still collectively known 
as the Patent Shaft) became a part of the Metropolitan Railway Carriage, Wagon and 
Finance Company, which also had works at Smethwick and Saltley in Birmingham.15 
Considerable economic change occurred in the area between 1860 and 1914 as 
mining lost its pre-eminence, with the coal seams being exhausted or neglected through 
carelessness leading to flooding.16  Consequently, from 1865 to 1913, the total tonnage 
of coal extracted fell from nine million to three million tons.17  In the metal-based 
industries, many local firms faced growing competition.  Barker has pointed out that 
this was ‘not only abroad but also at home because of Britain’s unprotected market and 
the large fall in international transport costs’.18  With the declining demand for wrought 
iron tubes and popularity of seamless and weldless tubes, Langley noted the diminishing 
of ‘Wednesbury’s importance as the principal tube producing area in the country’.19  
Nevertheless, Wednesbury and the wider Black Country retained its separate identity 
from Birmingham, ‘the home of the assembly industries and the lighter trades’.20 
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  K. Beddoes and C & S Wheeler, Metro-Cammell: 150 Years of Craftsmanship (Huddersfield: Runpast 
Publishing, 1999), p. 95; J.F. Ede, pp. 243-245. 
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  F.W. Hackwood, Wednesbury Faces, Places and Industries (Wednesbury: Robert Ryder, 1897), p. 66;    
G.C. Allen, p. 358. 
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  M. Le Guillou, ‘Developments in the South Staffordshire Iron and Steel Industry, 1850-1913’ (Unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Keele, 1972), p. 1. 
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  T. Barker, ‘Workshop of the World, 1870-1914’, History Today, 44 (6) (1994), p. 30. 
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  S. Langley, p. 74. 
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  E. Taylor, ‘The Working Class Movement in the Black Country, 1863-1914’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, 
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2.3 The pre-war economic, political and social context 
 
Eric Taylor asserted that ‘the population and ethos of the Black Country remained 
overwhelmingly working class in the early years of the twentieth century’.21  
Verification should be sought therefore on whether this statement is justifiable for 
Wednesbury.  This is because, as Jose Harris observed, it is not only the distribution of 
property and the differentiation of types of employment that describe a town, ‘the 
organization of work, schools, housing, welfare, culture and recreation all conspired to 
compartmentalize British society on class lines’.22  Occupation and family provide a 
starting point for revealing ‘the patterns of income, values, advantages, and social 
behaviour which go to make up class’.23  To examine this, data extracted from the 1911 
Census Returns has been utilized and an assessment of Wednesbury conducted with 
regard to employment and the occupancy levels of property via a sampling exercise.24 
The geographic area of Wednesbury has been divided into six segments of 
approximately equal size.  With each of these six areas being representative of a distinct 
community and having its own identity, one street was selected that typified that area.  
The six streets are Church Hill, Foley Street, Meeting Street, Piercy Street, Ridding 
Lane and Russell Street, all of which have been highlighted in the map shown in 
Appendix 2.  With reference to the 1911 Census Enumeration Books, data was obtained 
from a sample of the properties situated on each of the streets.  Information was 
gathered from these households concerning the number of occupants per property in 
terms of gender, the type of employment undertaken by the residents, and whether they 
were classified for the purpose of the Census as being employed, self-employed or as 
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  Ibid., p. 35. 
22
  J. Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: Britain, 1870-1914 (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1994), p. 7. 
23
  A. Adonis and S. Pollard, A Class Act: The Myth of Britain’s Classless Society (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1997), p. 6. 
24
  Cd. 6259 1912-13 Census of England 1911: Area, families or separate occupiers and population,               
Vol. II Registration Areas, Command Papers (London: HMSO, 1914); Cd. 6343 1912-13 Census of 
England 1911: Area, families or separate occupiers and population, Vol. III Parliamentary Areas, 
Command Papers (London: HMSO, 1914).  See Appendix 2, pp. 270-276 for the map and tables of data 
that have been extracted from the 1911 Census Enumeration Books <http://www.Ancestry.co.uk.> 
[Accessed 12-16 December 2011]. 
37 
 
the employers of others.  From these samples a number of patterns emerged that 
enhance understanding of Wednesbury’s social class composition and structure. 
Firstly, the majority of occupants of Meeting Street, Piercy Street, Ridding Lane 
and Russell Street were engaged in manual employment, ranging from unskilled 
labouring to the skilled tasks that were undertaken by artisans; with Ridding Lane and 
Russell Street enjoying greater heterogeneity in terms of occupations.  Secondly, while 
Church Hill and Foley Street contained residents performing manual work, they lived 
alongside those who were self-employed and the employers of others.  Thirdly, the 
extent of property occupation was higher in Meeting Street, with residences typically 
accommodating at least six occupants, than it was in Church Hill, for example. 
This analysis of these six main communities provides a picture from which it is 
evident that the majority of Wednesbury’s working people earned their livelihoods 
mainly in the iron and steel industries.  Although a very small number were self-
employed or were the employers of others, most were manual workers, whether in 
unskilled labouring, semi-skilled or skilled occupations.  This supported David 
Cannadine’s view that ‘in terms of skills, status and income, there were still complex 
graduations, which carried over from the mid-Victorian era’.25  Notwithstanding the 
middle class, many of whom had migrated away from Wednesbury by 1914, most 
workers could not afford to reside far from their place of employment and this afforded 
some explanation for the expansion of the town’s population, consistent with the growth 
of the area’s manufacturing industry.  Invariably, rather than being owner-occupied, 
accommodation was mostly rented (often directly from an employer), and it would be 
either a small house or rooms within a larger property.  Typically, these would contain 
at least five occupants, with houses in multiple occupation, i.e. more than one family 
and/or lodgers sharing the property being a common arrangement.  Conditions in such 
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housing was frequently cramped and cold, if not squalid, with outside toilet facilities 
and water supplies that often became contaminated, leading to outbreaks of cholera and 
typhoid.  On the other hand, a positive aspect of such living conditions was that it could 
create an interdependence and reliance that strengthened bonds in the wider community. 
Benson asserted that a neighbourhood ‘usually comprised the street in which a 
family lived, together with those immediately surrounding it’, whereas a community 
was ‘an area and a group of people to which its members feel they belong’.26  Hence, a 
community was more than just the people who lived there; it was an outward expression 
of their attitudes, beliefs, employment, interests, social interactions and their pride in 
belonging.  As Bourke remarked, such ‘close knit communities enforced standards of 
behaviour and respectability and marked off hierarchies of status and authority’.27  This 
is what gave working-class communities their cohesion, structure and as Joyce noted the 
‘sense of shared perspective and reciprocal dependency’.28  Similarly, August argued 
that social class had grown ‘in a cumulative, aggregate way; neighbourhood, town, 
region and nation being gradually pieced together in the outlook of working people’.29  
Allowing for the complexities and contentions associated with attempts to define a 
working-class consciousness, and the various forms that it could take, these 
communities were held together by their ties of friendship, kinship and neighbourliness. 
It is noted by Stevenson that economic uncertainty meant that ‘life for the thirty 
per cent of the population which lived near or below the poverty line was a constant 
struggle to make ends meet’.30  This is important in terms of social class and the reports 
of Wednesbury’s Medical Officer of Health for the years 1913 and 1914 contain data, 
the interpretation of which allows for further insights into life in the town.31  
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Specifically, while Wednesbury’s overall population continued to rise, there was only a 
modest increase in the number of new houses constructed.  Deaths often resulted from 
respiratory or other conditions arising from a lifetime of hard manual work.  Infant 
mortality, and the noticeably high number of deaths recorded for children under five 
years of age (182 from the total of 497 in 1914, reflected the heavy toll of infectious 
diseases on those at risk as the result of living in overcrowded and insanitary conditions. 
The period 1870 to 1914 was notable for the emergence of a distinctive working-
class culture, which according to Stedman Jones emphasized ‘the distance of the 
working class from the classes above it and to articulate its position within an 
apparently permanent social hierarchy’.32  This was important because rather than 
assigning class position based on economic criteria alone, there was allowance for the 
activities of everyday life, including those institutions that supported it, such as the co-
operative, friendly and various types of self-help societies.  These were often active on a 
group basis, so that they could deal with the economic uncertainties with which the state 
was either unable or unwilling to assist.  August noted that these ‘cultural approaches 
have enriched the efforts made to understand the lives of working people’ and in this the 
popular press played an important role.33  In addition to local publications with a wider 
readership, such as the Express and Star, there were two newspapers printed in 
Wednesbury itself, namely the Midland Advertiser and the Wednesbury Herald.34 
Jonathon Rose supplied a pertinent reminder that the overwhelming majority of 
the working class ‘never wrote memoirs, never engaged in any serious political 
agitation, never became a government or trade union official?’35  For Wednesbury’s 
working-class women, leisure time was very limited and often an extension of their 
domestic responsibilities; whilst for men, it tended to be devoted to the public house, 
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working-men’s club and sporting activities.36  The cinema was still a novelty with, as 
Stedman Jones observed, the music hall remaining popular and serving as an effective 
yardstick of working-class opinion.  From the 1870s onwards, it was increasingly 
jingoistic, appealing to the working class’s Conservative-supporting elements.37  The 
manner in which the working class utilized its, albeit limited, leisure time was a matter 
of considerable unease for some middle-class social observers.  This was especially so, 
given the implications of this for the amount of time that could be available to be spent 
in the workplace, and working-class resistance to the reorganization of employment 
conventions to mechanize and undermine the independence of the labour force. 
Religion also shaped working-class life and in 1914 Wednesbury could claim six 
Anglican Churches, one Roman Catholic Church, and numerous Chapels representing 
the Baptist, Christian Brethren, Congregational, Primitive Methodist, United Methodist 
and Wesleyan Methodist varieties of non-conformity.38  Notwithstanding the tendency 
of the Anglican clergy to have Conservative sympathies and for non-conformists to 
favour Liberalism, the political and social dimensions of religion were more 
complicated.39  Efforts to engage with working-class communities took a number of 
forms, including patronage of cultural and social events and support for youth 
organizations, such as the Boy Scouts and the Boys Brigade, to inculcate the values 
believed necessary to make good citizens and reliable workers.  Moreover, by deflecting 
the attribution of guilt for the social conditions away from the bad employers and 
landlords and on to the improvidence of the habits of working-class life, as Eric Taylor 
argued, organized religion played its on part in ‘blunting the edge of class conflict’.40 
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Duncan Tanner remarked that local and national politics in the years preceding 
the First World War were ‘determined by a complex range of religious, material and 
ideological factors’.41  Economic considerations included growing competition from 
foreign companies and relative industrial decline thereby resulting in rising prices and 
falling real wages that purchased less in 1910 than had been the case in 1900.42  
Exposure of the pronounced inequalities and the growing gap between the rich and poor 
within Edwardian society coincided with a mounting belief in increased state 
intervention, and this prompted the more radical New Liberal inclined-element in the 
Asquith Government to curtail its former, minimalist, free-trade stance.43  However, its 
social and welfare reforms were not always popular with a working class expected to 
contribute more now in order to reap the benefits later on.44  As Michael Bentley 
observed, this was ‘so obviously aimed at improving the security of working-class 
people against sickness’ and yet it ‘provoked animosity from the very people it 
purported to protect’.45  Such steps also failed to ameliorate industrial unrest, as the 
workers struggled both to secure an income that could keep pace with rising prices and 
to win recognition for the trade unions that had assisted them in their efforts.46 
A multitude of non-economic factors, including past political traditions and 
religious denomination, influenced political allegiance and behaviour.  The latter years 
of the nineteenth century were the high watermark of British imperialism and, as Blanch 
argued, ‘patriotism and ideas of Britishness came to be used to justify the territorial 
expansion of England’.47  In 1914, the turmoil generated by militant suffragettes and 
those Ulstermen following Sir Edward Carson in defying Home Rule meant that all of 
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the political parties had to grapple with the issues of nationalism and patriotism.48  There 
was a constant barrage of patriotic propaganda, which was filtered into schools, Sunday 
schools and churches; it was also to be found in newspapers and works of literature, as 
well as the cinema and music hall.  Paul Ward pointed to an increased awareness of ‘the 
commercial and military threat posed to Britain’s established position by an ascendant 
Germany’.49  This gave the motivation for the formation of a number of patriotic 
pressure groups, which, by harnessing such popular sentiment, were able to campaign 
vigorously for an increase in the size of the Royal Navy’s Grant Fleet, for example. 
Jon Lawrence suggested that political beliefs are ‘assured to arise automatically 
from the objective economic and social interests if electors or from their (usually 
socially determined) character types’.50  The class identify that was shaped in the 
segregated working-class neighbourhoods, by ‘the growth of cultural homogeneity in 
the urban working class’ and by economic insecurity, was often ‘consciously 
respectable, law-abiding, even reactionary’.51  Despite a long-standing tradition of 
artisan radicalism, the respectable working class rejected revolutionary methods, such as 
the physical force Chartism of the 1840s, recognizing that its aims were best achieved 
by parliamentary means.52  However, whilst the radical tradition was not extinguished, 
the divisions and differences that fragmented its character prevented any particular party 
affiliation from taking hold.53  Howkins pointed out that the ‘working class was forming 
itself politically as a class at local level, at different rates and in different ways’.54 
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The two principal political parties continued to enjoy substantial support from 
Wednesbury’s working class in 1914, with the Conservatives being dominant, as 
reflected in their control of the Borough Council and the strength of local membership.  
Of the twelve seats on Wednesbury Borough Council, in 1913/14, the Conservatives 
held eight and the Liberals three, with an Independent Councillor holding the one other 
seat.  Wednesbury’s Conservative Club boasted 650 members and its Liberal Club had 
200 members.55  Indeed, those who valued the Empire, family, monarchy and the nation, 
who favoured tariffs over free trade, and were not averse to the existence of elites and 
social hierarchy, were drawn towards the Conservative cause.56  This tended to attract 
rather more Anglicans when compared with other denominations, although the Church 
of England did not impose a common line on their clergy.57  As Lawrence argued, the 
Conservative’s ‘deliberate identification with aspects of urban popular culture, such as 
the public house, football and racing, was intended to distinguish them from the moral 
reforming style of Liberal politics’.58  There was very significant female support for 
Conservatism too, principally via the activities of the Primrose League, and there is 
evidence to corroborate that this organization was active in Wednesbury.59 
The political realignment in Birmingham from the mid-1880s, when Joseph 
Chamberlain broke with the Liberal Party to make common cause with middle-class 
Conservatives resulted in Chamberlainite Liberal Unionists taking all of the seats in 
Birmingham and several constituencies in the Black Country at the 1892 general 
election.  Furthermore, as Peter Marsh noted, one of Chamberlain’s characteristics that 
left a deep and lasting impression on the electorate was ‘his concern for the wellbeing of 
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the working man’.60  This legacy continued to exert its powerful influence into the early 
years of the twentieth century and, as Christopher Green suggested, ‘the label Unionist 
seems to have helped here, allowing floating voters to overcome their reluctance to vote 
Conservative’.61  Liberal Unionism eventually merged with Conservatism until the point 
was reached when any real distinction became increasingly difficult to make.62 
Prior to the First World War, in the Black Country, the antipathy to be found 
between the typically Liberal-supporting employers and their workforces does offer 
some form of explanation for the declining fortunes of Liberalism and the continued 
electoral success of Conservatism.  Although, across the country, the Conservative Party 
began to lose some of its working-class support in the aftermath of the 1901 Taff Vale 
case, in the Black Country, this was not seriously affected until it began to be 
challenged by the emergence of the Labour Party.63  On many of the main social issues 
of the day, whilst the Liberals tended to be more socially progressive in their views than 
were the Conservatives, implementation of such policies was not always welcomed by a 
working class resentful of attempts to undermine its independence, especially when it 
affected the manner in which they derived their livelihood.  In overcoming the vagaries 
of fluctuating trade conditions and irregular employment, many earned livings as street 
traders, for example.64  Moreover, the Liberal Party’s attractiveness to the working-class 
was constrained by it being widely seen as ‘supported by business, professionals and 
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millionaires’.65  Furthermore, its stance in the field of industrial relations, including the 
1909 Osborne Judgement, and in several disputes during 1911-1913 where armed troops 
were called out, effectively began to erode the base of its working-class support.66 
Even at the level of municipal politics, few of the Conservative or Liberal 
associations were prepared to sponsor any aspiring working-class candidates, despite 
pressures from below for reform and the concerns being voiced of the repercussions of 
‘seeing the Labour Party win seats at their expense if they did not pass such measures’.67  
Consequently, such ambitious individuals now looked to fulfil their ambitions through 
membership of the trade unions and the recently formed Labour Party.  In the years after 
1910, Labour refined its policy stance and sought to broaden its electoral appeal yet 
further.68  Changing attitudes within the trade union movement made finance and an 
established network of potential supporters available, constituency organization was 
strengthened, and electoral support rose, although with substantial regional variation.69  
There was also a change in generational loyalties, with Michael Childs remarking that 
as ‘Labour grew...not only as the unions grew but as Labourites grew up’.70  The 
Osborne Judgement was tempered by legislation enacted as the Trade Union Act 1913, 
and ‘the structure of the workforce evidently did not obstruct the growth of a working-
class party or of unions which enrolled a significant fraction of the workforce’.71  
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Nevertheless, Labour remained the third party, sustaining the Liberals in office 
nationally in order to deny power to the Conservatives but, with the establishment of an 
ILP branch in Wednesbury during 1913, it had started to exert a presence locally.72 
In the case of a town such as Wednesbury, with its large working-class 
population, the issue of agency was of relevance, namely ‘to what extent, in what form 
and for what reasons, do workers become politically active and so affect historical 
developments?’73  It was the changing structure of local industry and movement from 
small workshops to larger productive units, combined with the increasing trade union 
membership of the respectable skilled workers of the Labour aristocracy, that the 
Labour Party began, as Pugh observed, to ‘deprive the Conservatives of their traditional 
hold over a section of the working class’.74  When Labour entered the local political 
contest for the first time, with two candidates standing for election to Wednesbury 
Borough Council in November 1913, the Wednesbury Herald alluded to trade union 
influence in the aftermath of the 1913 Black Country strike.  It reported that although 
they were narrowly defeated, the Labour candidates were carried shoulder-high through 
the streets as their supporters sang what had been the strike song, ‘Here we are again!’ 
No doubt the leaders of the great strike have got round them a body of 
men whom they have detached from Liberalism, and to a lesser degree 
from Unionism, men of the class who benefited from the settlement of 
the strike.75 
 
Locally, the Labour Party’s electoral breakthrough took a few more years to 
materialize fully since, as Tanner stated, ‘Conservative strength in the West Midlands 
stretched beyond Birmingham to include Black Country seats such as Wednesbury’.76  
Arguably, this was compounded by the electoral restrictions that required one year’s 
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residence at a property before eligibility was conferred, effectively excluding younger 
voters, lodgers and those who relocated regularly (although it excluded all such voters, 
regardless of their political allegiance).77  This was shown by the composition of 
Wednesbury Borough Council in 1914, with each of the Council’s four wards typically 
being held by two Conservative members and one Liberal or Independent.78 
Having regard to the town’s economic structure, according to the 1912 edition of 
Kelly’s Directory, ten of Wednesbury’s twenty principal employers were tube 
manufacturers; the other factories and foundries being engaged in the producing various 
castings, nuts and bolts, and valves.79  In that year, the town’s largest employer remained 
the Patent Shaft (now part of the Metropolitan Railway Carriage, Wagon and Finance 
Company).  Occupying 475 acres spread over three sites (Brunswick, Monway and Old 
Park), it had recently fulfilled the largest order then placed with a single firm by 
supplying the Great Central Railway with 6,500 freight wagons.80  Other commercial 
activity in the town was concentrated in the service industries, including 56 public 
houses, 66 beer shops, 64 grocers, 33 butchers and 98 other miscellaneous shops.  In 
addition to the small number of professionals, such as accountants, architects and 
solicitors, as required by a town of Wednesbury’s size, there were 15 hairdressers and 
17 pawnbrokers.81  The area’s two principal railway companies met the town’s 
transportation needs.82  The Great Western Railway offered travel to Birmingham and 
Wolverhampton; the London and North Western Railway ran services to Dudley and 
Walsall.  To facilitate the efficient handling of freight, there was an extensive network 
of exchange sidings with connections to the lines of both railway companies. 
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Black Country employers had traditionally used the sub-contracting system of 
middlemen known as ‘butties’ to recruit labour.  This practice was widely detested by 
workers who were vulnerable to exploitation, owing to the irregularity of employment 
and low wages, and in 1913, the wages of Wednesbury’s iron founders were typically 
between 33 and 38 shillings per week.83  This, and the often poor relations between 
employers and their workforce began to change, however, with the introduction of new 
machinery and working methods into factories and foundries requiring greater numbers 
of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, who were necessary for making the efficiency 
gains essential when competing against both domestic and foreign competitors.84 
Initially limited locally, the increased assertiveness of trade unionism added to 
what Keith Laybourn described as ‘an atmosphere of change and which altered the 
balance of relationships within the trade union movement and between unions, 
employers and government’.85  Nationally, total union membership rose from 2,513,000 
in 1907 to 4,415,000 by 1914, with 719,000 members being enrolled in 1913 alone.86  
Whilst not reversing the 1909 Osborne Judgement, the Trade Union Act 1913 had 
permitted the unions to raise political funds provided these remained separated from 
member contributions for general and industrial purposes; members thereby being able 
to contract-out of making political contributions.87  In both ideological and sociological 
terms, this bottom-up organizational expansion began to challenge forces that had 
constrained the working class since the demise of Chartism in the 1850s.  Henry Pelling 
observed that this included ‘the traditions of laissez-faire Liberalism combined with the 
union leaders’ rooted hostility to any erosion of their voluntary and extra-legal status’.88 
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The employers disliked the ensuing competition for day-to-day control and 
power in the workplace that was now being advanced by union representatives and, 
when met by this growing confidence in their formerly compliant workers, ‘quickened 
and intensified their attempts aggressively and unilaterally to exert control over 
workplace matters’.89  Yet even when making an allowance for the emergence during 
the latter years of the nineteenth century of the ‘New Unionism’ intended to broaden the 
movement’s appeal by recruiting from the ranks of the unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers, British trade unionism had enjoyed a growth in the number of its members and 
its popular standing that was less than smooth.  This was to change, especially during 
the period from 1911 to 1914, when unprecedented industrial militancy contributed 
acutely to a changing climate in industrial relations, and these years have subsequently 
become known as the ‘Great Unrest’.  Prior to this, the maximum number of strikes had 
been no more than five hundred per year but in 1911, there were 872.  This rose to a 
maximum of 1,459 in 1913 and, by August 1914, it looked highly probable that even 
this figure might be surpassed as 972 disputes had already been staged.90  Furthermore, 
according to the official statistics, as provided by the Board of Trade’s Labour 
Department, the number of days of production that were lost during industrial action, 
and which had stood at 2,150,000 in 1907, had spiralled to 40,890,000 by 1912.91 
A number of factors were to make their contribution to what Eric Hobsbawm 
has described as ‘flaring bushfires of labour unrest’.92  These included the falling growth 
of productivity and adverse trading conditions, inequality and the failure of wages to 
keep pace with climbing inflation, and numerous accumulated grievances over working 
conditions, all of which gained significance during a period when unemployment was 
historically low.  Increasing consciousness resulted in not only ‘the respectable’ skilled 
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workers joining the new general unions; the semi-skilled and unskilled workers in the 
previously unorganized trades and industries were also being recruited.  These unions 
developed at a much faster rate than the rest of the labour movement and foremost 
amongst them was the Workers’ Union, which was founded on 1 May 1898 for these 
traditionally neglected groups.  During its earliest years, advancement was modest 
though progress occurred, as it assumed an increasingly prominent role in industrial 
relations.  Membership in 1911 had comprised 18,000 in 111 branches, although by 
1914 this grew to 143,000 in 567 branches, with many women joining its ranks.93 
As trade unionism’s frontiers extended, syndicalism (derived from syndic, the 
French word for a trade union) achieved some prominence.  This doctrine advocated the 
abandonment of the quest for political power by parliamentary means; instead, control 
should stem from the workers taking control of production.  This would be achieved by 
direct action in each industry, culminating in a general strike, and described as scientific 
trade unionism, as envisaged in the 1912 pamphlet, The Miners’ Next Step.94  
Syndicalism carried an appeal to workers who were dissatisfied with the Labour Party’s 
performance and progress or, as Meacham suggested, to those members of the working 
class ‘who had no sympathy for the bureaucratic socialism of the Fabian stripe’.95 
As Pugh argued, ‘the culmination of this trend came with the Triple Alliance of 
miners, railwaymen and transport workers’ that came into existence in early 1914.96  
Potentially, this could have been a step closer to the adoption of syndicalism by a major 
portion of the British labour movement but, as Henry Pelling related, most of the trade 
unionists ‘simply looked upon it as a means of strengthening their respective bargaining 
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positions’.97  The three trade unions to be involved in this arrangement were the Miners 
Federation of Great Britain, the National Union of Railwaymen and the National 
Transport Workers’ Federation (an association of dockers, seamen, tramwaymen and 
road vehicle workers).  If, as was believed at the time, joint action was planned for the 
autumn of 1914, which could have made it the most serious industrial relations episode 
since the 1842 Chartist general strike, then it was averted by the outbreak of war.  
Syndicalism remained a minority creed, and the trade unions taking action during these 
years did so for essentially pragmatic motives, not as the agents of ‘a movement 
dedicated to destroy capitalism through revolutionary industrial class struggle’.98  Yet, 
the class-consciousness and political motivation of the working class would 
undoubtedly have been influenced when seeking redress from stubborn employers. 
 
2.4 Wednesbury and the 1913 Black Country strike 
 
Between May and July 1913, the Black Country experienced what C.L. Staples and    
W. Staples described as ‘a series of strikes, meetings, marches, and demonstrations 
initiated by largely young, unskilled male and female labourers and their supporters’.99  
At the lowest level of the area’s industrial hierarchy, these were the so-called Bottom 
Dogs (similar to Under Dogs), the local slang term for the unskilled workers employed 
to perform the dirtiest and hardest jobs, such as tending the furnaces and carrying out 
the maintenance work in the Black Country’s manufacturing factories and foundries.  It 
is contended that from the available evidence, the epicentre of this industrial action is 
identifiable as Wednesbury, with the origin of the dispute being traceable to the second 
week of May in that year.  This was when 200 employees of the Old Patent tube works 
of John Russell & Co. Ltd. commenced what began as an unofficial strike in support of 
a claim to raise the minimum wage of the unskilled workers to 23s. per week. 
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It is important to point out that the explanation given by John Ede has caused 
some confusion in relation to this strike’s origins, which, he stated ‘beginning in 
Wednesbury at the Old Crown tube works of John Russell & Co. Ltd., spread to all the 
iron trades and throughout the Black Country’.  This is erroneous, as the Crown tube 
works was controlled by the Wednesbury firm of James Russell & Sons Ltd., whereas 
the company responsible for the Old Patent tube works were John Russell & Co. Ltd.100 
An earlier dispute, the 1910 strike for a minimum wage by the women chain-
makers of Cradley Heath, organized by Mary Macarthur, Julia Varley, Thomas Sitch 
and Charles Sitch, has often been seen as one of the most prominent actions by the 
working class of the Black Country during the pre-war period and it has deservedly 
merited attention.101  Yet, by its conclusion in the summer of 1913, thousands of both 
male and female workers had participated enthusiastically in the Black Country strike, 
with many more across the wider community offering their support.  According to the 
official appointed by the Liberal Government to settle the dispute, the Board of Trade’s 
Chief Industrial Commissioner, Sir George (later Lord) Askwith, large sections of the 
industry throughout the area were affected and eventually this came to involve: 
50,000 operatives in boiler and bridge works, metal-rolling mills, tube 
works, railway carriage and wagon works, nut and bolt works, and other 
allied trades, and thousands of people indirectly in various industries.102 
 
The specific root of the trouble was attributable to discontent arising from the 
processes of technological change and the factory system that required numerous low-
paid, semi-skilled and unskilled workers.  Traditionally employed in workshops 
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overseen by paternalistic owners, few of these men and women were unionized at the 
outbreak of the strike.  Moreover, there was the issue of their suitability for membership 
of organizations that hitherto were for skilled male workers alone, such as the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) or the Midland Counties Trade Federation 
(MCTF).103  These trade unions were elements of the powerful local labour aristocracy 
and, as Trevor Lummis has indicated, they had ‘members of a very particular kind, 
concerned with ensuring their own security’.104  Consequently, the majority of the 
workforce was unprotected from the intensification due to mechanization and the 
sizeable differential in pay and conditions relative to their skilled colleagues. 
When compared with the wages available elsewhere, the Black Country’s 
workers were undoubtedly the victims of exploitation.  The most contentious 
comparison was with Birmingham’s unskilled male labourers, paid a minimum of 23s. 
and the women 12s., whilst their Black Country counterparts typically received 18s. for 
men and 10s. for women, for a 54-hour working week at a time when the weekly rent 
for a four-roomed house was 4s.105  Putting this into context, Benjamin Seebohm 
Rowntree’s 1901 study of living conditions in York, Poverty: A Study of Town Life 
calculated that for a family consisting of a man, woman and three children, the 
minimum weekly earnings required to prevent absolute poverty was 21s. 8d.106 
The dispute commenced in Wednesbury at midday on Friday, 9 May 1913 when, 
without giving notice to their firm, 200 employees of John Russell & Co. Ltd. launched 
a strike for increased pay.  To register their demands with the firm, they marched to its 
headquarters, which was based at the Alma tube works in Pleck Road, Walsall.107  Upon 
receipt of the workers’ demands for a ten per cent increase in piecework rates and a ten 
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per cent increase for day workers earning up to 25s. the company offered to raise wages 
to 20s.  It refused to make any further concessions.108  On 13 May, William Adamson 
(the South Staffordshire Organizer of the Workers’ Union) addressed a mass meeting in 
Wednesbury’s Market Place and encouraged these labourers to join the union.  He 
quickly got to the heart-of-the-matter, stating ‘what the men in Birmingham had got, 
they in Wednesbury could get’.109  A further gathering occurred at Wednesbury’s High 
Bullen, near to the town centre, on 16 May.  Following this, a procession to Walsall 
progressed through the streets with participants singing a 1910 music hall favourite that 
became the song of the strike, Fall in and Follow me.110  They also sang Land of Hope 
and Glory and Rule Britannia, emphasizing the line ‘Britons never will be slaves’, 
demonstrating to everyone their inherent patriotism even during a strike action. 
The next day, the employees of one of the foremost manufacturers in the 
vicinity, Wednesbury’s James Russell & Sons Crown tube works, added their backing 
so that there were more than 1,400 Wednesbury men and women on strike.  On 22 May, 
a visit to Globe tube works of John Spencer Ltd., Wednesbury, took place and a 
resolution of this firm’s employees was passed giving unanimous agreement to joining 
the strike.  Following directly from this, over 2,000 strikers including those from the 
three John Russell factories now affected by the dispute (the Alma, Cyclops and the Old 
Patent works), marched to Tipton, where employees from the firm of Foster Bros. and 
the Junction works of Job Edwards were persuaded to make common cause.111 
The Wednesbury strike committee attended a meeting with the town’s Mayor, 
Alderman A.E. Pritchard, held on 17 May 1913.  A prominent and well-connected local 
Conservative and a member of the Wednesbury Borough Council from 1886, Pritchard 
was also a familiar figure on the magistrate’s bench, the proprietor of the South 
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Staffordshire Patent tube works, and the brother of the Reverend Lorenzo Alfred 
Pritchard, the vicar of St. Bartholomew’s, Wednesbury’s parish church.  In an attempt 
to quash rumours of syndicalist sympathies, a public reassurance that revolutionary 
methods were not being advocated was offered by the strike committee’s Chairman, 
Edward ‘Teddy’ Williams, who was one of Wednesbury’ foremost trade union leaders 
of the period.112  Williams added a further comment to give some emphasis that ‘the 
strike was not being fought on personalities but on the principle of a living wage’.113 
The harsh economic reality of their predicament could literally have meant the 
humiliation and stigma of the workhouse for many of the strikers and their families 
should their incomes decrease any further.114  This was underlined by Teddy Williams’ 
statement that ‘the employers would have them believe that if they did not return, the 
only thing that would happen to them was the parish or starvation’.115  Possibly mindful 
of the value of working-class endorsement at a general election likely to be held in 
1914/15, and in a constituency with a composition such as Wednesbury’s, this was a 
critical consideration, the Conservative MP, John Norton Griffiths, sent a donation of £5 
to the relief fund established for the welfare of the strikers’ families.116  The Midland 
Counties Express published on 24 May imparted the concessionary observation: 
There is not the slightest doubt...that the men have taken up the matter 
in a spirited manner.  They have the support of trade unions, while 
many people in the town are of the opinion that the men are justified in 
asking for an increase in their present wages.117 
 
On 27 May, deputations left Wednesbury with the intention of bringing workers 
from the other towns out on strike.  They were successful at Halesowen (Coombs Wood 
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works of Stewarts & Lloyds Ltd.), West Bromwich (Victoria and Excelsior works and 
at J. Brockhouse & Co. Ltd.), Wednesfield (Weldless Tube) and Wolverhampton (John 
Brothertons, the New Brothertons Tube, Stella Conduit of Bradley, and two of the 
Lewis works).  Having participated at the behest of their colleagues elsewhere in the 
Metropolitan Railway Carriage, Wagon & Finance Company, the workers at the three 
Wednesbury plants were advised that management had agreed to the rate of 23s.118 
In excess of 400 women workers and the wives of strikers met at Kings Hill, 
Wednesbury on 30 May to receive a talk from Julia Varley, the Workers’ Union 
Women’s Organizer.119  She told her audience that the fight was not confined to the men, 
adding ‘it was always the women that had to suffer through low wages’.120  It was 
intended that women workers aged 21 years and above should have not less than 12s. 
per week, which was the rate paid to the women in Birmingham.  Over 200 female 
employees from the Darlaston firm of the Steel Nut and Joseph Hampton Co. Ltd. 
subsequently left their place of work to parade through the streets of Wednesbury, 
signalling their approval of the wider action.  At a time when many working-class 
women were oppressed and subject to social control, this was a remarkable act of 
defiance.  This procession also included a conveyance containing children, some of 
whom were carrying placards that had the slogan, ‘We can’t help it, please help us’.121 
The Express and Star of 31 May reported that ‘a sensation was caused in 
Wednesbury today by the closure of the Old Park works and the other departments of 
the Patent Shaft & Axletree Co. Ltd.  This arose from the revelation that the stated 
concession by the parent Metropolitan Company to pay the 23s. was happening in an 
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arbitrary fashion, with particular groups, namely older workers, being discriminated 
against through exclusion from the pay increase.  On the same day, the Wednesbury 
Herald referred to the way in which the strike was now affecting other industries in the 
area.  It carried the comments of Mr Bayley of the Moulders’ Union that with reference 
to the 23s. claimed, the amount being sought ‘was about as much as some employers 
would spend upon a pair of dancing slippers for their wives to go to a ball’.122 
A mass meeting was convened in Wednesbury’s Market Place on 1 June to 
receive speeches from Julia Varley and Charles Duncan, the Labour Member of 
Parliament for Barrow-in-Furness.  Before entering national politics, Duncan had been 
an active trade unionist, initially with the ASE and then with the Workers’ Union, 
serving as President at its formation and subsequently as its Secretary, a position that he 
occupied until it was absorbed into the Transport & General Workers’ Union in 1922.123  
Julia Varley delivered an inspiring speech, with her heartfelt contribution being to point 
out that ‘she realized perhaps more than the men did that the present strike was a 
woman’s matter and would not be complete unless the women were taken into it’.124 
Ten of Wednesbury’s largest firms were now affected by the rapidly spreading 
action and the Wednesbury Herald estimated that 25,530 of the Black Country’s 
workforce were now out on strike.  This included men and women from Blackheath, 
Darlaston, Ettingshall, Great Bridge, Handsworth, Netherton, Oldbury, Smethwick, 
Walsall, Wednesbury, Wednesfield, West Bromwich, Willenhall and Wolverhampton. 125  
The Manchester Guardian of 2 June confirmed that the Workers’ Union had sought to 
raise the profile further still by issuing a manifesto with the title, The Fight for the 
Bottom Dog.126  This document described the dispute in graphic terms as ‘the greatest 
battle the sweated, starvation-suffering, underpaid, underfed workers have ever engaged 
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in’.  On 6 June, John Norton Griffiths MP made a further generous donation of £20 for 
the relief of those local working-class families now suffering the consequences of 
severe financial hardship.  Wednesbury’s Mayor had also established an appeal fund 
with the same intention.127  However, a contrary viewpoint was to be taken at the annual 
meeting of the Board of the Metropolitan Railway Carriage, Wagon & Finance 
Company, which would take place on 4 June 1913, with the Directors expressing 
unrestrained criticism of the new diplomacy now being practiced by the trade unions.  
This was articulated publicly by Frank Dudley Docker who, in addition to being the 
founding Chairman of the Metropolitan, also held a Directorship of the Birmingham 
Small Arms (BSA) Company.  In his opinion, this was a most unwelcome innovation 
that had resulted in a strike ‘instituted without rhyme or reason, in defiance of 
agreements, forced on them by gross intimidation, the beginning of a reign of terror’.128 
Having had a limited involvement to this point, the skilled workers began to 
demonstrate some tangible solidarity with their semi- and unskilled colleagues so that, 
by 9 June in excess of 30,000 workers had joined the strike as it continued to spread 
throughout the Black Country.129  One of the leading trade unionist of the period, the 
Vice-President of the Workers’ Union, Tom Mann, made his first visit to Wednesbury 
on 10 June.  Earlier that year, in March 1913, in a pamphlet entitled The Labourer’s 
Minimum Wage, Mann had made an almost prophetic and direct reference to the Black 
Country, commenting that the rates of pay in the area ‘are awful to think of, and in some 
districts near West Bromwich, the pay of the women is a hideous crime’.130  He 
addressed a large open-air meeting held in Wednesbury’s Market Place, stating that for 
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some 35 years he had been trying to show working people the advantages of 
organization and nothing had previously taken place in the Black Country that had been 
so encouraging to him.  Asserting that there could be no faith in the ability of 
Parliament to settle the differences between capital and labour, the remedy lay with the 
workers themselves.  He urged the people to stand firm and be loyal, and warned that 
those still working were betraying their class and that the stamp of dishonour would be 
upon them.  Calling upon all present to continue their struggle, he received a unanimous 
affirmative response.  Another speaker, a Mr Parker, publicly disputed the reporting of 
the strike that had been given in the Wednesbury Herald, which was that the workers 
were being unwittingly exploited by socialists and syndicalists.  He told the gathering 
that ‘the workers had come out on their own accord.  They had not been exploited by 
anyone.  It was on their own initiative that the Workers’ Union had come to their aid’.131 
The first conference between the representatives of the employers and the trade 
unions occurred on 20-21 June 1913.  Despite discussion of many proposals, agreement 
proved unachievable.  The workers were determined to stand firm, so that a newspaper 
as ardently pro-employer and critical of organized labour as the Wednesbury Herald 
conceded that ‘the martial spirit of the metal workers has been roused’.132  The proposal 
advanced by the employers for a minimum weekly wage of 21s. was to be put to a ballot 
on 27 June, before which more meetings were held with speakers roundly denouncing 
the offer as idiotic and insulting.133  Throughout the week more Black Country towns 
and firms, including Darlaston (Messrs Keay Ltd., Rubery Owen’s Victoria works and 
J. Garrington & Sons), Great Bridge (Messrs Norton and Hardy) and Tipton (Horsley 
Iron Company) received visits from parades of striking men and women with the aim of 
encouraging more workers to join the movement.  The Times reported that at Darlaston, 
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the nut and bolt industry had been brought to a standstill with 4,000 workers from that 
town now being involved in the strike.134  When held on 27 June, the outcome of the 
secret ballot was that the employers’ terms were rejected by an overwhelming majority 
of nearly five to one.135  As the strike moved into its sixth week, William Adamson of 
the Workers’ Union was quoted in the Express and Star on 1 July as saying that: 
He was beginning to wonder if the employers of labour had any 
conscience, or else they would have been impressed by men and women 
standing out for so long for the betterment of their conditions.136 
 
Tom Mann returned to Wednesbury on 3 July and, speaking in the town’s 
Market Place, congratulated the strikers on the demonstration of their solidarity.  He 
reflected on previous disputes where the working class had accepted the low pay and 
conditions they were offered, asserting that for the workers their poverty was the direct 
outcome of robbery by the rich.137  Many companies affected by the dispute were non-
federated, rendering them ineligible for membership of the Engineering Employers’ 
Federation (EEF).138  To strengthen collective resistance to the strike, on 14 June 1913 
several of these firms established a new organization, the Midland Employers’ 
Federation (MEF), with Harris Spencer of Wednesbury’s Globe tube works as President 
and Arthur Warne Browne of the Metropolitan Railway Carriage, Wagon & Finance 
Company as Secretary.139  In accordance with its pronounced anti-trade union stance, the 
MEF maintained that negotiations should not occur while the dispute was being 
continued by the strikers.140  When responding on this point to Warne Browne, however, 
the local trade unionists took a similar view to that of Tom Mann, saying that ‘it only 
shows how little the employers know of the conditions of life and the cost of living’.141 
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The dispute’s settlement was hastened by the arrival on 2 July 1913 of the Board 
of Trade’s Chief Industrial Commissioner, Sir George Askwith.142  In his memoirs 
published in 1921, Askwith alluded to the circumstances that prompted his intervention, 
because ‘in spite of the activities of relief agencies, distress among the families of the 
strikers became increasingly acute’.143  Furthermore, several major contracts had gone to 
other districts and even to foreign competitors (including some from Germany), which 
had vied for orders that would otherwise have been fulfilled in the Black Country.  For 
the purposes of conducting negotiations, the representatives of the parties assembled in 
separate Birmingham hotels, with the employers directed by Arthur Warne Browne and 
the trade unions by the Workers’ Union Birmingham Organizer, John Beard.144 
Askwith recorded his initial impressions of a lack of receptivity, which was soon 
confirmed to him by the attitude of the employers’ representatives.  Finding their terms 
ambiguous, and that they themselves were unclear over the interpretation, he informed 
them that ‘you are not agreed on the meaning of your own clauses.  I can convey no 
unanimous explanation’.145  However, by this stage, reports were also being received 
that the leaders of organized labour had declared their intention to disrupt all works that 
were connected with the MEF, and which were still not prepared to pay their workers 
the 23s.  As the 7 July issue of The Times conveyed to its national readership, some 
Black Country firms had already accepted the workers’ demands ahead of a settlement 
being attained, and this included several of the Wednesbury firms involved, such as the 
Hope Patent tube works of James McDougall Ltd. and Samuel Platt Ltd.  
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Understandably, this development placed even greater pressure on those companies that 
were still attempting to hold out against the wage demands of their workforces.146 
Finally, on 7 July 1913, a draft agreement was reached by the parties.  This 
provided for the payment of 23s. and 12s. respectively to those men and women in the 
Birmingham district, as this included Oldbury and Smethwick.  In the Black Country, 
the men would be paid a minimum of 22s. which would increase within six months to 
achieve parity with the Birmingham rate, and similarly for the women workers.  There 
was to be full trade union recognition and, in order for there to be no victimization, all 
of those who had been embroiled in the dispute were to be reinstated and to experience 
no recriminations for their actions.  There was still some dissatisfaction, however, 
particularly amongst the skilled and semi-skilled workers, so that the agreement’s 
ratification had to be deferred pending the organization of a further ballot.147 
Prior to this, another meeting was staged in Wednesbury Market Place on 9 July, 
when the benefit accruing to all from the increase in the piece rate was communicated to 
those that were assembled there.  John Beard underlined that the ‘unions were 
democratic in their character and the members themselves must make or refuse to make 
an agreement’.148  The vote took place on 11 July and the outcome favoured acceptance 
of the settlement and a resumption of work by a majority of over three to one.  The 
agreement was concluded by the representatives of the employers and of the trade 
unions, and this included John Beard and Julia Varley.  Within this document, there was 
also a provision made for the avoidance of future disputes.  In the Workers’ Union 
Annual Report and Accounts for 1913, Beard even paid them the compliment that ‘as 
far as the Midland Employers’ Federation is concerned, we have hardly had a 
complaint, and when a case has cropped up it has been dealt with satisfactorily’.149 
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After the declaration of the result of the ballot, the Minimum Wage Council 
disseminated their manifesto.  This document was published in its entirety in the 
Wednesbury Herald on 19 July 1913 and the key extract is reproduced as follows: 
Fellow Workers – 
 
You have decided to accept the terms agreed upon between the Midland 
Employers’ Federation and your representatives after prolonged 
conference. 
 
You are alive to the fact that the terms won do not concede the whole of 
the demands made, nevertheless the 23s. for the Bottom Dog is 
conceded, and we hope and believe that an understanding has been 
arrived at whereby the other demands can be consolidated and dealt 
with in a way never before possible. 
 
We congratulate you on the splendid spirit of solidarity and self-denial 
shown throughout this trying time and desire to emphasise the fact that 
this has been possible by reason of the improved organization of the 
men in all departments. 
 
We earnestly believe that such conditions can be avoided in future by 
perfect organization.  Let those who have taken up trade unionism be 
staunch and earnest members and let every non-unionist worker 
affected by these disputes join his union without delay. 
 
It is our duty to request all men to return to their employment as soon as 
the various works can be got ready.150 
 
When assessing the attitudes of the Black Country’s working class to trade 
unionism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, Eric Taylor asserted 
that it was ‘distinguished chiefly by characteristics of insularity and intellectual 
submissiveness’.151  Furthermore, a local engineering union official had commented that 
‘the Black Country temperament does not incline towards organization; several people 
have broken their hearts over fruitless labour for the bringing together of the workers 
into the various unions’.152  Hence, at the outbreak of the 1913 dispute, few of the area’s 
workers were trade union members.  Politically, as indicated by the election of the 
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Conservative candidate, John Norton Griffiths, in both of the general elections of 1910, 
if not overtly Conservative, many of the working class were so by instinct. 
This began to change with the assistance of union officials, such as John Beard 
and Julia Varley, who were working to establish a foothold in the industrial Midlands 
by developing a campaign for a minimum wage.153  Building on the foundations of Tom 
Mann’s publications and The Miners’ Next Step, this groundwork had the effect of 
revitalizing the more receptive members of the working class.  In the longer term, it 
began to minimize those constraints retarding the growth of a labour movement whose 
national leaders were perceived to have become increasingly isolated from its local 
union membership and hesitant in pressing for improvements for the working class. 
Even though union officials offered strikers their energetic support, some local 
leaders had discovered a sense of independence.  Moreover, they became increasingly 
motivated to take matters beyond controlled militancy, with physical violence erupting 
when firms employed blackleg labour.  In managing the challenges posed by workers 
influenced by syndicalist ideas, ‘the official union leaders had to run very fast to keep 
up with their members’.154  Any gap between the union leadership and the rank-and-file 
was off set against the workers’ sense of grievance and, as Bob Holton has argued, this 
‘helped the organized movement to influence strike policy and make new recruits’.155 
The 1913 strike was an opportunity for the trade unions, and especially those 
representing the unskilled workers, to make progress locally.  The initial step was taken 
by the Workers’ Union, whose local officials were the ones that in the first instance had 
persuaded the striking labourers of John Russell’s Old Patent tube works to modify their 
claim, bringing it into line with the unions’ own demands.156  John Beard created and 
chaired a Minimum Wage Council with its headquarters based at the Old Park Hotel in 
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Darlaston Road, Wednesbury, to co-ordinate liaison with trades councils, strike 
committees and other unions participating in the strike, including the Birmingham Gas 
Workers, the National Union of Gas Workers and the National Federation of Women 
Workers.  This body published the leaflet The Bottom Dog’s Struggle for Betterment, 
which articulated the striker’s demands and sought support from all workers.157 
As the strike movement gathered momentum, various events seeking support 
from the wider community were held, including a rally in West Bromwich.  This was 
attended by Ben Tillett, a founder member of the Independent Labour Party and from 
1917 the Labour MP for Salford North.158  Efforts were made to spread the strike to 
other towns by secondary action and the impact of the strike on the local communities 
was immense.159  As so few of the workers taking industrial action had been paid-up 
trade union members prior to the commencement of the strike, most were ineligible for 
financial benefits such as strike pay.  Without any source of income, many soon found 
the situation of themselves and their families to be acute, and ‘money had to be raised to 
feed them and their families since the cupboards would be bare within a week’.160  In a 
parliamentary question to the Prime Minister, John Norton Griffiths MP referred to 
thousands of children being on the verge of starvation and pressed the Government to 
take urgent steps to ensure that parents should receive insurance benefit.  Asquith’s 
response was that he would make enquiries to see what could be done.  In the same 
debate, the Labour Party Member for Merthyr Tydfil, James Keir Hardie, suggested that 
the schoolchildren ought to receive free meals.161  Norton Griffiths raised similar points 
with the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 9 June 1913.  The response of the 
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Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, John Mackinnon Robertson MP, a 
former journalist and staunch advocate of free trade, was that workers who were parties 
to the dispute were disqualified from receiving aid as long as the stoppage continued.162 
Public contributions to relief funds allowed for the payment of a shilling per 
week to the unmarried, two shillings to married couples, and a further shilling for their 
children.163  Soup kitchens became operational and gifts of food made by shopkeepers 
and trades people not normally expected to have been sympathetic to such a cause.164  
The Tipton Herald reported on 31 May 1913 that the proceeds from performances at 
two of Wednesbury’s theatres, the Palace Theatre and the Hippodrome, had been 
donated to the relief funds165.  On 14 June, the same newspaper reported that Mr White, 
a butcher of Union Street, Wednesbury, had provided at his own expense a dinner for 
the strikers at Wednesbury’s Town Hall, with over 450 people attending.166  Collections 
began, with the Manchester Guardian recording that ‘hundreds of men and women 
were out with collecting boxes’ and barrel organs touring the streets and benefit 
concerts were held to show solidarity, such was the sympathy of the public towards the 
strikers.167  The records of the strike committee in Walsall indicate that £764 5s. 6d. was 
raised in this way, with concerts at Her Majesty’s Theatre contributing £33 1s. 3d.168 
Large groups of striking workers set out to take their message beyond the Black 
Country and to gain publicity and enlist sympathy for their cause, with deputations 
walking towards London, Glasgow and South Wales, where it is recorded that they were 
greeted enthusiastically.  They carried banners with such slogans as Blessed are the 
piece workers, In the midst of life we are in debt and Get everything cheap, especially 
labour. Those walking to London converged on Trafalgar Square on 10 July, and local 
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and national newspapers describe the demonstration that took place at Marble Arch 
attended by Tom Mann, and the Labour MPs, George Lansbury and Will Thorne.169 
However, there were also those who fundamentally disagreed with the dispute 
and the tactics employed by the strikers.170  Although the majority of the marches were 
peaceful, a small number ended in disturbance and violence.  This happened at 
Walsall’s Talbot-Stead works on 11 and 16 June when police and strikers came into 
conflict as crowds exceeding 3,000 surrounded the premises calling on the men inside to 
come out.  The Manchester Guardian reported that the managing director attempted to 
speak to the strikers, ‘but had to retreat before a shower of missiles’ and that mounted 
police then arrived and charged the crowd.171  Similar scenes occurred in Darlaston on 
24 June, when the Atlas works of F.W. Cotterill Ltd. and Messrs R.C. & J. Keay Ltd. 
received visits from strikers believed to have come from Wednesbury.  The owners of 
both firms alleged that their workers were intimidated and that the protection afforded 
by the Staffordshire Constabulary being inadequate, rioting was likely to follow  This 
point was made in telegrams and letters sent to the Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith, by 
Cotterills and others.172  On 30 June, a serious disturbance occurred at the Etruria works 
in Bilston resulting in the arrest of the Wednesbury strike leader Teddy Williams, who 
was subsequently charged with incitement to riot.  Williams appeared at the Bilston 
Police Court on 4 July wearing a red and white rosette and accompanied by his 
supporters.  He was bound over for six months with a personal surety of £50.173 
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The Bishop of Birmingham, Henry Wakefield, took an interest in the dispute, 
expressing his hope that a serious effort would be made to arrive at a settlement. 174  
Locally, another churchman became the source of considerable antagonism, however.  
The Reverend Lorenzo Alfred Pritchard was the Vicar of St. Bartholomew’s, the parish 
church Wednesbury, and brother of the Mayor, Alderman A.E. Pritchard.  He publicly 
told the wives of some of the men involved in the strike that 18s. a week was enough for 
any labourer, before giving further offence by instructing the women that they should 
put on trousers and go to work in place of their men.  It then became known that the 
theme of his next sermon was be taken from the Gospel of St. Luke, The labourer is 
worthy of his hire.  Consequently, the Police had to intervene on 29 June when a crowd 
of 250 angry protesters ‘went to the church on Sunday morning and said to him that 
they would fetch him out and tell him to feed the body never mind the soul’.175 
The strike had a number of important consequences and implications.  Its 
immediate outcome was to raise the wages of unskilled men from 18s. to 23s. per week, 
thereby lifting a considerable number of the area’s families out of a life of unrelenting 
penury.  Whilst this settlement could not be described as overly generous, it established 
a floor below which the workers could expect that their wages would not fall. 176  The 
area’s working-class were able to purchase life’s necessities and, as Barnsby 
commented, the ‘social effects of having control over their lives and the lives of their 
families brought new attitudes of confidence and self-respect’.177  Although it did not 
have the levels of outright confrontation with the authorities and employers seen in 
other disputes, such as those in Liverpool and Llanelli, South Wales, in 1911, the impact 
and importance of the Black Country strike should not be discounted; nor should the 
influence of the national figures who visited the area.  Its outcome must be attributed to 
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the genuine solidarity of the participants, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, 
coupled with the tenacity of the trade union officials John Beard and Julia Varley, who 
persuaded these men and women, that their cause was just and worthwhile.  This was 
reinforced by the visits of national personalities in the labour movement, which did 
much to bolster the spirits of those workers then on strike.  By the autumn of 1913, such 
was the legacy of the Black Country strike that Birmingham and the Black Country 
accounted for one quarter of the total national membership of the Workers’ Union.178 
John Breuilly has argued that the emergence of the Labour Party during the first 
decade of the twentieth century should be connected with the rise to prominence of what 
he termed as the ‘new, non-aristocratic working-class groups’ and described as the 
‘more general trades unions compared with those of the 1850-90 period’.179  Although 
the relationship between industrial agitation, trade union membership and working-class 
politics is far from being axiomatic, the evidence that the people of Wednesbury’s 
working-class community and of the wider Black Country had drawn their own lessons 
from the events of the summer of 1913 is certainly compelling.  Through the experience 
of the Black Country strike, and the outcomes that were achieved, they had gained at 
first hand an appreciation of just how effective the local labour movement could be in 
endowing them with real influence, power and effective strategies that they could use to 
gain improvements in their living conditions and in the workplace.180  Henceforth, it 
could be seen that ‘by a combination of organization in the country and the application 
of steady pressure in Parliament by Members of both the Liberal and Labour MPs, it 
was now possible to use the power of the state to the advantage of the working men’.181 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter’s intention has been to provide an overview of Wednesbury as it was in 
1914 because, as Jay Winter has argued, ‘to evaluate the effects of the First World War, 
we must look at British society on the eve of the conflict’.182  Assessment of the primary 
sources, and particularly of the 1911 Census returns, has demonstrated that Wednesbury 
was a town with a sizeable and vibrant working-class community, the majority of whom 
were employed as skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled workers in the metal-based 
manufacturing industries that was firmly established in the area during the nineteenth 
century.  This provided an economic environment that was conducive to the 
development of a political and social infrastructure, which, in turn, was receptive to the 
emergence of strong localities and close-knit neighbourhoods, each having their own 
distinct culture and a set of shared community values, providing strength in adversity. 
Yet working people did not necessarily think about themselves and their lives 
exclusively in terms of their social class.  Identification was multi-faceted and occurred 
because of employment, gender, locality, political opinions, religious beliefs and 
notions about respectability, together with numerous other influences.  Social conditions 
were shaped by these experiences and outlooks, and frequently required negotiation and 
self-help strategies to deal with the complexities of authority and to combat inequality.  
Indeed, it was the prevailing social structure and a person’s location within it that would 
determine the conditions of their life, and whether this would be a matter of sheer 
endurance or enjoyment.  Even within the working class, a hierarchy existed.  At the top 
of this structure were those members of the respectable working class, typically the 
skilled workers, known as the aristocrats of labour.  They were followed by the semi-
skilled and unskilled workers, with the latter (known in the Black Country as the 
‘Bottom dogs’) carrying out the harshly exhausting manual labour.  Finally, at the base 
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of this construct were those people who belonged to what were known as the rough 
elements or the residuum, only able to get work intermittently and then only of the 
lowest kind of labouring.  They were frequently unemployed and in the worst cases 
dependent upon the Poor Law.  The consequence of this was that life was very 
forcefully constrained for the working people of the Black Country in Edwardian 
Britain, with the fall from working-class respectability to the workhouse being all too 
common during changing economic circumstances, whether due to a trade downturn or 
the replacement or eradication by new technology of a particular type of employment. 
Although tending to be somewhat conservative in outlook, if not indifferent to 
formal politics and the leading political parties, many of Wednesbury’s working class 
had taken a vigorous position or supported those involved in the large-scale trade 
dispute occurring in the Black Country during 1913.  Commencing in Wednesbury, this 
action quickly spread to concern a considerable part of the manufacturing industries 
across the area, thereby demonstrating the substantial benefits of collective action and 
solidarity.  When reflecting on this, John Beard of the Workers’ Union, and one of the 
strike’s principal leaders, wrote of the Black Country in January 1914 that ‘there was no 
other district in the country where a minimum wage had been fixed by trade unionism’.  
He said of the people of Wednesbury that they ‘had fought, they had led the way, and in 
years to come they would be proud of the part they played in this struggle’.183  For his 
involvement in the settling of this matter, Sir George Askwith viewed this strike and its 
ultimate resolution as ‘a blessing in disguise, because it provided methods of dealing 
with difficulties which proved of service during the war’.184  The implications of this for 
industrial relations during the First World War and the further associated themes will be 
assessed and discussed in detail in the following chapters of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3:  WAR AND THE MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
On 4 August 1914, Great Britain entered into a general European war for the first time 
in ninety-nine years.  The Cabinet, which had been preoccupied with preventing a civil 
war in Ireland, viewed the assassination on 28 June 1914 of the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand of Austria and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, as having 
consequences that were best resolved by reliance on international diplomacy.  It was 
altogether unprepared for the rapid transformation of the July crisis into a conflict that 
would soon become a worldwide struggle of an unparalleled magnitude.  Any desire by 
the British public for war being largely absent at this point, as Bourne has suggested, a 
fundamental consideration was ‘the disastrous German decision to violate Belgian 
neutrality, in the wake of which anti-war agitation disappeared overnight’.1  The 
essential concern became the organization of the war effort and the allocation, 
distribution and utilization of the nation’s scarce resources.  This was articulated by 
Keith Grieves in the question, ‘to what extent, and for how long, could manpower be 
provided in order to maintain the armies in the field, vital war production and the export 
trade in the prolonged war of military and economic attrition against Germany?’2 
Industrialized warfare would eventually necessitate the effective mobilization of 
much of British society.  In 1914, this was quite unimaginable, as were the grave 
implications for the millions of British men and their families, together with those in the 
wider British Empire that would become involved.  Yet during the next four years, they 
would experience such developments and innovations as national registration, military 
conscription, and the establishment of a Ministry of National Service.3  As Peter 
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Simkins has conveyed, ‘the army of 1914-18 was the largest and most complex single 
organization created by the British nation up to that time’.4  The rate at which these men 
volunteered, in what W.J. Reader described as ‘one of the most extraordinary mass 
movements in history,’ was remarkable, with 2,466,719 joining up before conscription 
was introduced.5  The British people traditionally inclined towards maintaining an anti-
militarist outlook, so that before the war comparatively few of these men would have 
even contemplated the thought of long-term enlistment with the armed forces. 
The images of the large crowds of people seemingly welcoming the news of the 
outbreak of war and of men enlisting in such vast numbers have long shaped popular 
perceptions of the First World War.  They have also influenced earlier generations of 
commentators, with military historians focusing on the logistical and tactical issues for 
the armed forces and social historians assessing social class and the extent of cultural 
change.  David Silbey remarked that ‘both have treated the Rush to the Colours as a 
single occurrence, consisting of a mob of men driven to volunteer by either 
overwhelming passion or social control, a ‘herd’ whose ‘instinct’ it was to enlist’.6  This 
has been increasingly challenged by deeper and more insightful evaluations, moving 
away from the singular motivation of an emotional or irrational patriotism that has 
allowed inconvenient aspects to be minimized or ignored.  For instance, and as related 
in Chapter 2, the working class had experienced the consequences of economic 
recession and, as in the case of the 1913 Black Country strike, they had sought redress.  
Nicholas Mansfield has pointed to those men who ‘saw no incongruity in being active 
trade unionists with volunteering for the armed forces.  Yet this contradictory behaviour 
continues to puzzle researchers into working-class life in the twentieth-century’.7 
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A crucial contribution to the debate has been volunteered by Adrian Gregory and 
his three propositions.8  Firstly, that reaction to the outbreak of the hostilities was not 
one of universal, unthinking enthusiasm.  Secondly, that the war was not necessarily 
seen as being inevitable or universally welcomed.  Thirdly, that volunteering was a 
more layered experience than a straightforward rush to the colours.  Catriona Pennell 
has sought to ‘set aside the mythology and establish the genuine nature of responses to 
the outbreak of war in 1914 across the United Kingdom’.9  This has been achieved 
through examination of public opinion and how this was transformed over three distinct 
phases, namely the initial war crisis and aftermath, a second phase of confusion and 
disorder and a third phase by September 1914 in which a ‘war culture was in place’.10 
This Chapter is comprised of sections that aim to deal with three main themes 
that are grounded in the very nature of such a comprehensive local study.  It is 
contended that these are of importance because, as Helen McCartney pointed out, 
Britain ‘was a decentralized nation in 1914 and the horizons of her citizens were 
profoundly local, it is also important to view war experience from a local perspective’.11  
There will be an examination of the reaction to the outbreak of the war with a focus on 
Wednesbury, investigating how this event affected in particular the town’s working-
class community.  The necessity of mobilizing manpower and the transition from 
voluntary recruitment to conscription, via the Derby Scheme, will be reviewed, as will 
evidence of Wednesbury’s receptivity to the call to arms.  A decisive aspect is the 
recruitment to the military formation that had the closest connection to the town, 
namely the Fifth Battalion of the South Staffordshire Regiment, that being a part-time 
Territorial Force unit.  Therefore, the final component will explore the relationship 
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between this battalion and the community from which it tended to be recruited, in a 
dynamic that was essential to the war effort both on the front line and at home. 
 
3.2 Wednesbury and the outbreak of the war 
 
On 28 June 1914, the heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and his wife were 
assassinated at Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Young Bosnia 
revolutionary movement.12  Princip’s actions that day set in motion the chain of events 
that eventually brought Europe and the world to war.13  British interest in the diplomatic 
overtures grew as the crisis unfolded and the first reference to be found in the local 
press occurred in the Wednesbury Herald article ‘Austrian Heir Assassinated: A 
Student’s Crime’ on 4 July 1914.  This piece alluded to disturbances in Sarajevo with 
the military being called in to re-establish order although it did not consider the wider 
implications.14  Indeed, the possibility of civil war breaking out between Ireland’s 
sectarian factions was judged a much greater danger, particularly by those sitting in the 
Asquith Cabinet.  As Beckett noted, not only did the public have ‘little time to react to 
events’ it was the case that ‘the public had little influence on the decisions taken, and 
war, when it came, was the result of diplomatic steps (or failures)’.15  The point when 
Britain’s entry into a conflict began to appear likely arrived with Germany’s invasion of 
Belgium.  Pennell stated that ‘the obligation to France under the Triple Entente divided 
government and country but Belgium was another matter’.16  Pragmatic consideration of 
Belgium’s strategic location, and how the loss of its coastline to a hostile power could 
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compromise Royal Navy dominance of the North Sea, was fundamental.  At 12 noon on 
4 August, the momentous intelligence concerning Belgium’s predicament reached the 
Cabinet and a time-limited ultimatum issued to expire at 11 pm, British time (Midnight 
in Berlin), was then forwarded to the German Government.  On 8 August 1914, the 
official statement from the Foreign Office was reproduced in the Wednesbury Herald. 
Owing to the summary rejection by the German Government of the 
request made by His Majesty’s Government for the assurance that the 
neutrality of Belgium would be respected, His Majesty’s Ambassador in 
Berlin has received his passport.  His Majesty’s Government have 
declared to the German Government that a state of war exists between 
Great Britain and Germany as from 11 pm on August 4.17 
 
Together with the depiction of an idyllic Edwardian era abruptly terminated, the 
perception that the British, French and German peoples greeted the outbreak of war 
enthusiastically, jubilantly and universally has entrenched itself in popular imagery and 
been taken as evidence of national willingness to fight.  Reader described war as an 
accepted part of life, with it being ‘difficult to maintain that the national mood was 
altogether peaceful’.18  Marwick stated ‘British society in 1914 was strongly jingoistic 
and showed marked enthusiasm for the outbreak of war’.19  However, recent scholarship 
has attempted to dispel any myths of universal war enthusiasm and several historians 
point to enthusiastic scenes occurring in large cities where men flocked to enlist, adding 
that reaction in the other urban and rural areas was rather restrained.20  Gregory argued 
that the existence of any ambivalence or dissent ‘might back the narrative drama of the 
idea of enthusiasm but has the benefit of reflecting the typical reaction of the British’. 21 
Pennell has quoted Alfred Woodcock’s recollection of the crowds blocking Walsall’s 
streets on 4 August ‘but does not describe them as loud, enthusiastic or celebratory’. 22 
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The emphasis being placed on events by the local press was variable.  The 
Express and Star of 6 August 1914 included an article ‘Practical Patriotism: How to be 
helpful in wartime’ setting out things to do and to be avoided.23  It counselled people to 
‘Keep your heads.  Be calm. Go about your business quietly and soberly’.  The hoarding 
of goods, thereby inducing artificial scarcity, was a matter of concern highlighted by the 
Wednesbury Herald on 8 August, and a Home Office statement on the matter was 
cited.24  Similarly, the Midland Counties Express issued a dramatic warning that the 
enemy was at the gate and ‘immense demands will be made upon the patriotism of 
every Britisher’.  To this was added, ‘the crisis calls for the exercise of all the best 
British qualities and I do not think there is any fear of disappointment on that score’.25 
These sentiments were typical of the countless calls during the duration of the 
war made in the name of duty and honour, love of one’s country, loyalty to King and 
Country, and of patriotism.  Cunningham related the sense that ‘there can be few more 
obviously patriotic acts than to volunteer to defend one’s country against invasion’. 26  
Yet to comprehend what was meant by those making such entreaties and, equally, what 
was understood by the different social classes and sections of the population when 
responding to them has been a matter of interpretation and complexity.  It is shaped by 
the questions of what and for whom the actual fighting was being done, by notions of 
citizenship, identity, liberty and other beliefs and values held, and the desired outcomes 
to be achieved.  For most people, this exceeded the simplistic acceptance of my country, 
right or wrong.  It remains problematic, however, because what people said publicly and 
what they genuinely felt may have differed given the pressures from peers and society 
in general.  Nevertheless, it must be tackled if a better appreciation of the motivations of 
the men and women affected by the First World War are to be better understood. 
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The prestige of the Empire was important to people’s thinking because it 
boosted their sense of self-worth and confidence in a nation to which they felt they 
belonged.  Reinforcing this was imperialistic and nationalist literature and propaganda 
that was allied to militarism, although this had at its foundation the voluntary principle 
that eschewed the conscription practised on the continent of Europe.  In interpreting this 
in the context of the First World War, Summers has argued that there had been 
insufficient understanding of ‘the social, political and cultural basis of British patriotism 
as it was manifest at this particular moment in history’.27  Mansfield echoed this 
assessment, relating it to agricultural workers, with an interpretation of local patriotism 
fusing wartime militarism, parochialism and a sense of loyalty to the nation.28  As 
suggested in Chapter 2, the years preceding 1914 were noteworthy for some of the most 
uncompromising industrial and social unrest since the 1840s and, as Silbey commented, 
‘radical groups, including working-class groups, throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, created their own patriotism, counter to the government’s 
definition.  That this continued even into the First World War seems indubitable’.29 
It has been argued by historians including Patrick Joyce, Gareth Stedman Jones 
and Bernard Waites that patriotism had become deeply embedded in working-class 
culture by the end of the nineteenth century.  This is also prominent in John Hartigan’s 
study of volunteering in Birmingham during the First World War, with the suggestion 
that working-class patriotism was defensive rather than aggressive, rarely being outright 
jingoism, tempered by belief in values of fair play and independence.30  Patriotic 
feelings, and especially those of the working class, were culturally, historically and 
politically formed during the nineteenth century, and Paul Ward noted the movement 
away from what may be termed radical patriotism, namely the ‘political uses to which 
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love of country can be put by those who do not accept the government or state as 
synonymous with nation’.  He also advanced the notion of social patriotism, or an 
inwardly focused patriotism, as one that was orientated towards domestic social reform 
and implied a kind of new and improved Britain.  Social patriots’ acceptance of the state 
as legitimate meant that the working class were not excluded and, pragmatically, could 
increasingly accept and identify with the cause of the nation as a whole.31  R.L. Nelson’s 
research has also taken account of the fragmentation and weakening of the anti-state 
radical patriotism and its succession by a ‘cross-class allegiance to the state and its elite 
rulers’ that he considered to be closer to a conservative definition of patriotism.32 
In 1914, Germany’s aggressive actions in violating the rights of neutral countries 
and attacking Britain’s allies meant that unless defeated by military means, Britain’s 
independence and standing in the world would be threatened.  This was a war to defend 
honour, liberty and democratic rights during which, as Pennell indicated, ‘the 
commitment of ordinary people to the British cause was reflected in this behaviour.  A 
new social order was established in 1914 based on voluntarism, self-sacrifice and 
equality of sacrifice’.  Hence, ‘hundreds of thousands of Britons considered it their duty 
to enlist..., while hosts of others took it upon themselves to train as nurses, collect funds 
for war relief’.33  This was consistent with the sentiments expressed by Wednesbury’s 
Mayor, Councillor Nat Bishop, in a speech that he made on 8 August 1914. 
It is scarcely necessary in this hour of national peril to appeal to the 
loyalty of the inhabitants of the Borough of Wednesbury.  Sufficient 
evidence is already to hand to convince the most peace-loving subjects 
that the war being waged against Germany is a righteous war.34 
 
Later during that month, the Mayor pronounced ‘I feel I can rely on 
Wednesbury’s sons to wake up to this great emergency and see that they are not lacking 
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in their duty’.  This sentiment was matched by the local Member of Parliament, John 
Norton Griffiths, who was ‘quite sure of one thing, that the men of the Black Country 
would make good their proud history...and come forward to do their duty’.35 
This statement typified those made in the earliest days to convince the British 
people of the war’s necessity.  Often these were articulated by leading members of the 
local community, typically politicians, industrialists, clergymen and officers from the 
County Regiment, at meetings and rallies.  Indeed, few religious leaders ‘voiced any 
opposition to the Great War once it had broken out.  The invasion of Belgium had 
particularly shocked and united Christian opinion in Britain’.36  One Wednesbury 
clergyman who was more vocal was Father J.F. Piris of St. Mary’s Catholic Church.  At 
a public meeting on 12 September 1914, he stated, ‘we are engaged in a fight of right 
against might, defence against defiance, protection against barbarism, honour against 
treachery, justice against gross injustice’.37  Subsequently published in the Wednesbury 
Herald, he wrote to the Mayor of Wednesbury commending the appeal on behalf of 
Belgian refugees, stating that this ‘was the admiration of the town, and speaking for the 
Catholics of Wednesbury, I feel you all merit the expression of most sincere gratitude’.38 
An interesting perspective was provided in an article, Municipal Patriotism: A 
Timely Suggestion by another noted Wednesbury figure, F.W. Hackwood.39  He urged 
Wednesbury’s Council, as a matter of patriotic duty, to undertake the long deferred 
housing scheme to provide continued employment.  Hackwood argued that ‘the 
municipality which keeps the wheels of industry within its own area running most 
briskly and regularly will have rendered the highest duty to that state in this time of 
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stress’.40  Hackwood’s recommendation might appear curious, excepting that one of the 
paramount fears at the outset of the hostilities was that there would be a financial crisis.  
On 5 September 1914, the Wednesbury Herald enquired, ‘What service can I render in 
the present crisis?’ before opining, ‘we shall all sooner or later have to put our shoulder 
to the wheel... to cope with the distress that always follows in the wake of war.’41  
In terms of working-class attitudes during August and September 1914, 
elsewhere in British society questions were asked over their patriotic feelings and 
willingness to enlist and serve with the armed forces.  Reader noted an uneasiness 
amongst middle-class recruiters when approaching men of the working class that was 
‘hardly surprising in view of the sour state of labour relations before the war in several 
of the country’s important industries’.42  The availability of information from a range of 
newspapers and periodicals allowed working people to formulate their own view of the 
world as they saw it.43  Hence, ‘the vision of British glory and power existed for many in 
the middle of the squalor and poverty of their everyday lives’.44  Moreover, for many the 
military was still the last refuge of the unemployed or the criminal and few families 
approved of their sons joining its ranks.  As Nelson conveyed it, ‘being a soldier had 
long been frowned upon by the working classes as the lowest of occupations, and 
nothing could be worse for the reputation of lower-class parents than to have their 
daughter run off with a Tommy’.45  The First World War largely removed this prejudice, 
so that disapproval became reserved for young men not in uniform.  Frequently, 
families in which more than one son had enlisted were used as patriotic examples in 
order to shame those whose sons had not volunteered.  This was a war during which the 
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status of women in society would change; for some this would be temporary and others 
permanently.  A social phenomenon that had its first occurrence at Deal in Kent was 
young women giving out white feathers to young men, mostly complete strangers, 
whom were out in public and who were not wearing military uniform.  It was originally 
reported in The Times that the first to receive this implied token of cowardice were the 
‘young men found lolling on the beach and promenades.’46  Originating from a 
suggestion by Penrose Fitzgerald, an elderly retired Admiral, this practice spread across 
the country, continuing even after the introduction of conscription.  As Gullace noted, it 
created ‘one of the most persistent memories of the home front during the war’. 47 
Popular reaction to events was given via newspapers, which offered commentary 
on public behaviour and opinion.48  Until late July 1914, as noted by Beckett, ‘there was 
no noticeable sense of the impending crisis’.49  Few newspapers offered explicit 
opinions but Liberal newspapers such as the Daily News and Manchester Guardian 
were against war (remaining so until 4 August 1914), as was the Labour Leader; the 
Conservative press followed an anti-German line, however.  Nick Beeching’s 
assessment was ‘that the provincial press took a sober and critical view of the imminent 
outbreak of hostilities’.50  Reactions to the outbreak of war differed from later responses, 
with opinion changing daily if not hourly, and ‘the public were not as naive about the 
consequences of the war as is often imagined’ has been identified by Gregory.51  The 
critical juncture may be identified in the days following the retreat from Mons, albeit 
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through articles that were days and sometimes a week after the event.  The coverage of 
this in the Express and Star is cited by Gower, noting the printing of a special Sunday 
edition that referred to ‘masterly generalship’.52  At this time, news of the German 
atrocities committed in Belgium began to filter through, firstly in the national press and 
then in provincial and local publications.  The destruction of the city and libraries of 
Louvain was recorded by The Times on 29 August 1914.  In the days that followed, the 
calls for men intensified and references to rolls of honour appeared in the local press, 
detailing the names of those who had volunteered.53  As described in the following 
pages, there were frequent meetings and rallies in Wednesbury, usually at the Town 
Hall, with reports emphasizing that these were enthusiastic and well-attended events. 
 
3.3 Manpower – from voluntarism to conscription 
 
It has been asserted by Wilson that ‘nothing revealed the British people’s commitment 
to the war better than the way in which so many of the country’s young men 
volunteered for military service.  There was no inevitability about this’.54  In contrast to 
the other European nations and their conscript armies, and encouraged by its naval 
strength, Britain depended upon a small, well-trained and professional army that was 
recruited on a voluntary basis.  On 4 August 1914, this comprised 247,432 officers and 
men (not including reservists), with a substantial number engaged in policing the British 
Empire.55  The mobilization of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), comprising four 
infantry divisions and a cavalry division, began on 5 August 1914 and the first troops 
arriving in France two days later.56  Despite gallantry in its first encounters, the BEF 
could not match a much larger German army that was augmented by abundant reserves. 
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The newly appointed Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, 
realized that the war would not be over quickly, that it would be difficult to expand the 
BEF under existing arrangements, and that this carried profound consequences for 
Britain’s prosecution of the war.  As Reader remarked, this was ‘clean against the 
accepted opinion of the day, even at the highest levels’.57  Kitchener prevailed upon the 
Cabinet for an increase in the size of the army to a million men, the first time this had 
ever been contemplated.  Authorization for an increase in recruitment to the regular 
army to 500,000 by 31 March 1915 was granted by Parliament on 5 August 1914 and 
two days later Kitchener appealed for his first 100,000 volunteers, with his Call to Arms 
appearing in the Wednesbury Herald on 8 August 1914.58  On 22 August 1914, in a 
meeting at Wednesbury Town Hall, Colonel T.F. Hickman, MP, confirmed that he had 
been entrusted with establishing a new battalion of the South Staffordshire Regiment.  
Over 200 men now volunteered to join this unit and it recorded that ‘the next day the 
Mayor of Wednesbury personally conducted them to Wolverhampton en route to 
Whittington Barracks, Lichfield’.59  Hundreds of similar meetings and rallies were held 
across the country and a call for a further 100,000 men was made on 28 August 1914.60 
This had been preceded by the publication on 25 August of the Belgian Official 
Report on Germany’s actions and atrocities.  On the same day, The Times published its 
Mons Despatch, ‘presenting the battle as a heroic defeat, it ended with an appeal for 
more men to join up’.61  This coincided with the creation a civilian patriotic initiative, 
the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, with representatives from all the political 
parties utilizing constituency organization and local knowledge because Britain did not 
                                               
57
  W.J. Reader, p. 105. 
58
  Estimate of the Additional Number of Men required in the year ending 31 March 1915 in consequence of 
the war in Europe, House of Commons Papers (London: HMSO, 1915); Wednesbury Herald, 8 August 
1914.  The terms that were offered to these volunteers were the same as those of the pre-war regulars, 
namely for men aged between 19 and 30 years to serve for three years or for the duration of the war. 
59
  Wednesbury Herald, 22 August 1914. 
60
  See Appendix 6, Photographs 33-35, pp. 297-298.  Photographs of groups of Wednesbury’s soldiers. 
61
  The Times, 25 August 1914; A. Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War,            
p. 32. 
85 
 
have a national system of recruitment and the existing machinery was now 
overwhelmed.  Osborne made the case that it was the voluntary recruiting movement 
that ‘saved the military authorities from a manpower disaster in the autumn of 1914’ by 
bringing ‘to recruitment a pervasive civilian flavour of freshness, expedience, 
innovation, and pride of participation’.62  In a parliamentary reply to the Wednesbury 
MP, John Norton Griffiths, Prime Minister Asquith indicated on 26 August 1914 that he 
hoped the ‘most excellent service...rendered by MPs and local political organizations in 
arousing attention to the need for recruits...may be carried on in a much more extended 
scale in future’.63  Such a meeting occurred in Wednesbury in early September 1914 
when speeches were made by Captain J. Lees, Father J.F. Piris and Mr S.M. Slater.  
Alderman J.A. Kilvert, ‘a living echo of the Crimean War’ was also present.  Mr Slater 
made a commitment on behalf of his firm, stating ‘every man who was equal to the task 
and had no kind of claim at home should be given the facilities to join’ and he ‘intended 
to make it clear that their places would be kept for them when they returned home’.64 
It is undeniable that the emotions underpinning volunteering were complex and 
varied, and ‘early in the war, there would have been little awareness of what volunteers 
might experience’.65  Recent work has focused on the end of August 1914, since 
‘following the publication of the news from Mons, 174,901 men enlisted.’  Moreover, 
‘far from signing up in a burst of enthusiasm at the outbreak of war, the largest single 
component of volunteers enlisted at exactly the moment when the war turned serious’. 66  
Pennell distinguished between what she categorizes as being ‘pull’ factors, namely 
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excitement, feelings of adventure, the desire to be with friends, pride in one’s country, 
and the ‘push’ factors, for example, guilt, pressure from employers and from women.  
That there was manifest reaction that surpassed naive patriotism has been contemplated 
by Simkins, recognizing a more considered, pragmatic approach, particularly from 
married men who ‘needed time to settle their affairs and make sure their families would 
be cared for before joining the army, no matter how patriotic they may have been’.67 
Throughout September 1914, onwards into 1915, the local newspapers featured 
further recruiting meetings and rallies in their coverage of events.68  There was reference 
in the Wednesbury Herald of 5 September 1914 to the town’s Roll of Honour.  In 
addition to the regular army, reservists and territorial recruits, mention is made of the 
‘goodly company of time-expired soldiers and civilians who have volunteered their 
help’ and a record of these Boer War veterans is supplied.69  On the anniversary of the 
outbreak of the war, the Wednesbury Herald confirmed that some 3,000 townsmen had 
responded to the call of King and Country, declaring that ‘Wednesbury men were 
willing to step forward and take their share in the dangers and perils of the time’. 70 
Nationally, a diminishing number of volunteers became noticeable during early 
1915, however, reinforcing an increasingly supposed conviction that young, single men 
were not making themselves available in the numbers anticipated.  Sven Müller cited a 
Daily Mail editorial from 6 July 1915 that voluntarism took the ‘pick of the nation, 
places them in the firing line, and sacrifices them there that the coward and shirker may 
live at ease’.71  The first stage in what would become the path to conscription was 
compilation of a National Register to assist the computation of the nation’s available 
manpower.  Prepared by the President of the Local Government Board, Walter Long, 
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the National Register Act received the Royal Assent on 15 July 1915 and the gathering 
of information occurred on 15 August when all persons aged between 15 and 65 years 
were obliged to register the particulars of their birth, family, occupation and the skills 
they possessed.  The first personal identity cards were introduced, together with the 
concept of ‘starred’ jobs held by those deemed indispensible to the war effort. 
As soon as the registration had been completed, ways in which the information 
gathered could be utilized to increase voluntary enlistment were sought, not least to 
relieve the pressure at the front line.  The next step was the appointment on 5 October 
1915 of Edward Stanley, 17
th
 Earl of Derby, as Director-General of Recruiting.72  As 
Roy Douglas has observed, at Derby’s ‘own request he was unpaid; he held no military 
rank and was responsible to Earl Kitchener, Secretary of State for War’.73  The 
announcement of what became known as the Derby Scheme occurred on 21 October 
1915.  It has subsequently been viewed either as a last attempt to preserve the voluntary 
system or as prelude to conscription.  Particularly damning were Marwick’s comments 
that it was ‘one of those shotgun weddings between the fair maid of Liberalism and the 
ogre of Tory militarism’ and that it ‘was a gigantic engine of fraud and moral 
blackmail’.74  In considering the political objections to conscription from many in the 
Labour and Liberal Parties, Silbey has argued that the scheme ‘served as a public 
spectacle to assure the supposedly restive working class that the volunteer system was 
given every chance’.75  Labour was enthusiastic in its support of the scheme in the hope 
that it would forestall conscription because, as Reader, added ‘there was a feeling that 
conscription would be the rich man’s dodge to make the poor man’s son serve’.76 
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The Derby Scheme entailed using the National Register to personally canvass 
every man aged between 18 and 41 years, to ask them to attest to pledge themselves to 
join up when called for, thereby avoiding the disgrace of conscription.77  They could 
also volunteer for immediate service should they wish to do so.  Those involved in 
essential war work would be granted an exemption and, from 19 November 1915, 
tribunals were established to consider such cases.  On this basis, men were categorized 
into 46 groups.  Groups 1 – 23 being single men, with group 1 being 18 year-olds and 
group 23 being 40 year-olds; groups 24 to 46 were married men, with group 24 being 18 
year-olds and group 46 being 40 year-olds.  Each group would in turn become available 
for military service, though married men would not be called until no single men 
remained to do so; a pledge being made by Asquith on 11 November 1915.78  Although 
men were not compelled to attest, considerable pressure was applied for them to do so 
through door-to-door canvassing and giving those who had attested an armband to wear 
to offer them protection from accusations of shirking.  Waites related accounts from the 
West Midlands of workers being compelled to attest under duress by workmates, with 
non-attested  men ‘being deprived of their shoes and stockings, placed in wheelbarrows 
and driven in mock military procession to the Recruiting Officer’s table’.79 
On 30 October 1915, the Wednesbury Herald outlined the scheme’s arrangement 
locally via a recruiting committee and the establishment of tribunals.  This reiterated the 
King’s appeal to ‘men of all classes to volunteer under Lord Derby’s scheme’ and by 
doing so ‘avoid a defeat that ‘would mean the degradation of every Briton to a position 
of vassalage’.80  The scheme’s deadline was originally set for 30 November 1915 then 
extended several times before finally concluding on 15 December.  As this date 
approached, there were frequent comparisons in the local press to the opening weeks of 
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the war, with recruiting offices being inundated with men.81  There are accounts of this 
happening in Wednesbury, with recruiting sergeants and voluntary assistants working 
into the early hours to meet the demands of the men queuing to attest.  A great rush was 
reported of young men showing ‘that their hearts were in the right place after all’. 82  In 
the New Year, the Midland Advertiser confirmed that the first recruits under the group 
system had now departed from Wednesbury and proceeded to their training camps.83  
Lord Derby published his report on recruitment on 20 December 1915.84  With 
2,182,178 men not attesting (nearly 50 per cent of single men and 40 per cent of 
married men), any optimism for the scheme rectifying faltering voluntary recruitment 
was misplaced.  However, Grieves has asserted that the demand for 35,000 men per 
week ‘was a grossly inflated target which any system in an industrial society after 
sixteen months of war was unable to meet’.85  Simkins contended that Lord Derby’s 
report ‘effectively removed the last major obstacle to compulsory military service’.86 
By the end of 1915, it was increasingly apparent that the existing arrangements 
were incapable of accommodating the ever-increasing manpower requirements of the 
armed forces.  As recruitment faltered, there was concerted debate on the advantages of 
conscription.  The sense of frustration that shirkers were nevertheless avoiding their 
duty was captured in a statement by Wednesbury’s MP, John Norton Griffiths. 
On the question of conscription, as a soldier I prefer not to express an 
opinion, but as a Member of the House of Commons we simply want a 
plain declaration from the Army and Navy setting forth what numbers 
they want and will require, and for the Government to state if they can 
supply these needs on our present system.87 
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This was supported by most Conservatives and some Liberals.  Resistance to 
conscription came principally from three groups, namely the majority of the Liberal 
Party, organized labour, and religious and pacifist associations.  Liberals believed that 
‘the state was merely entitled to request its citizens to do their military service, but not 
to compel them, since coercion was incompatible with the principles of freedom and 
democracy’.88  Feeling in the Labour Party and the trade unions was that whilst 
conscription might address concerns about equality of sacrifice, it could lead to 
industrial conscription, with labour being directed to work under army pay and 
discipline, losing all concessions and agreements fought for during years of negotiation. 
The Military Service Bill proposed to treat all single men as if they had attested 
and it was introduced to the House of Commons by Asquith on 5 January 1916.  At its 
first reading, there were 403 votes for the Bill, 105 against and 160 abstentions.  
Reports on the debates appeared in the local press, with John Norton Griffiths telling the 
House that ‘if they did not pass this Bill they would have no opportunity of winning the 
war’.  The Midland Counties Express praised ‘a stimulating speech, typical of Empire 
Jack, and reflecting the spirit of the men in the trenches’.89  At the third and final 
reading, there was opposition from only 38 MPs (31 Liberals, six Labour and one Irish 
Member) and the Military Service Act received the Royal Assent on 27 January1916.90 
Henceforth, conscription applied to men aged between 18 and 41 years, who 
were unmarried or were widowers without children or dependants.  Those who had 
attested or volunteered through the Derby Scheme were called up in parallel with these 
conscripts.  The results were disappointing and did not reveal the multitude of men 
believed to be shirking their duty.  The number of men enlisted between February and 
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April 1916 was 203,230, which was less than the equivalent period under the Derby 
Scheme.91  Conscription immediately halted voluntary recruitment yet, as A.J.P. Taylor 
asserted, ‘the compulsory system, far from bringing more men into the army, kept them 
out of it’.92  On 7 March 1916, the Army Estimates for 1916/17 were published, 
indicating a net estimate of 4 million men.93  Furthermore, the planning for the 1916 
Somme offensive added to the pressures of filling the places of men already killed, 
wounded or incapacitated.  A Bill for a second Military Service Act was presented to 
the House of Commons on 25 April to extend conscription to married men on the same 
terms as those compelled to serve under the first Act.  On the same day, Andrew Bonar 
Law and Lord Kitchener met with principal trade unionists and Labour leaders to 
discuss the need to rescind Asquith’s pledge that conscription would not be extended.94 
Notable though the ‘willing acceptance of the majority of opinion that 
conscription was the appropriate means to fill the ranks of the armed forces’, the actual 
results were still disappointing.  Consequently, in September, action began to be taken 
to conscript the supposedly large number of men who had hitherto evaded military 
service.  The Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald explained that visits to public 
houses in the area were being organized ‘and a search made for possible shirkers, but 
without avail’.  It expressed with pride, ‘it is perhaps due to Wednesbury’s honour 
today that in this respect it is remarkably clean’.95  The Army Estimates for 1917/18 and 
1918/19 both featured net estimates of 5 million men.96  A third Military Service Act 
was introduced during April 1917 that facilitated the comb-out from manufacturing and 
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a re-examination of those men formerly rejected on health-related grounds.  As Bourne 
has asserted, ‘it is difficult to imagine that conscription would have been introduced 
with such little public dissent unless voluntary methods had been tried first’.97 
Even in the first months of the war, it was noticeable that there were local and 
regional variations since recruitment ‘was not necessarily a uniform phenomenon across 
the nation’.98  There was a discernible pattern with certain industries, such as 
engineering and mining, supplying more men than agriculture, and urban men were 
more inclined to enlist than their rural counterparts were.99  Men were left behind and 
there was an expectation that conscription would reveal the shirkers but an important 
distinction must be made between recruitment and enlistment.  This is because having 
been targeted by recruiting campaigns and subjected to bullying and cajoling, many 
were unable to fulfil the physical requirements owing to poverty and ill health.  Silbey 
stated that ‘the rate of medical rejection among working-class men seems to have been 
about three times the rate for middle and upper-class men’.100  Factors causing some 
(and especially married) men to be hesitant were financial uncertainty and the 
inefficient system for paying separation allowances to dependants.  This indicated ‘that 
they were not swept along by emotion, but were more calculating in their decision’.101 
On 10 November 1915, the Local Government Board established a system of 
local tribunals to hear appears made for exemption from attestation under the Derby 
Scheme.  This could be granted on a number of grounds, including a man’s employment 
in important war work; the prospect of serious financial hardship to dependants; ill 
health or infirmity; and conscientious objection.102  Three categories of exemption could 
be granted, namely absolute exemption, exempt combative duties, and condition 
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exemption for a specified period.  Absolute exemption was discouraged and eventually 
removed.103  Tribunal members tended to be prominent members of local society, 
typically local councillors, clergymen and professionals who had volunteered for the 
role.  The purpose of these bodies was modified by the Military Service Act 1916 and, 
thereafter, they determined whether appellants should be conscripted.  Although some 
records have survived, including reports published in the local press, Adrian Faber 
noted that in many cases, ‘unfortunately, they are not comprehensive or complete’.104 
The official notice publicizing the creation of the local tribunal for Wednesbury 
under the Military Service Act 1916 appeared in the Midland Advertiser on 26 February 
1916.105  Reviewing local newspapers has uncovered only one report of this tribunal’s 
proceedings, in the Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald on 16 September 1917.  
Chaired by Dr W.C. Garman, Wednesbury’s Medical Officer of Health, and attended by 
the Mayor, Councillor W. Warner, this considered the case of Leonard Geoffrey 
Johnson BA, aged 22 years of 2 Gospel Oak Villas, Gospel Oak Road, Tipton.  Charged 
with being an absentee under the Military Service Act, in his defence Johnson stated his 
willingness to do agricultural work.  Given that many tribunals were wholly 
unsympathetic, he thanked the tribunal for their fair consideration, remarking ‘in some 
parts the magistrates had been very severe on conscientious objectors but they could not 
say that about Wednesbury’.  The tribunal’s decision was to fine Johnson 40s., 
following which he was escorted to Lichfield barracks for conscription to the army.106 
By 1916, Asquith’s administration was facing the problem of determining the 
most effective allocation of resources between the military and industry, for it was 
essential ‘to strike a balance between military and economic activity which would fend 
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off bankruptcy until the war could be won’.107  Men were needed to replace those lost to 
death, wounding or incapacity at the front line.  Silbey highlighted the highest ‘wastage’ 
rate occurring in April 1915, when 33,527 men were lost, and that the average for the 
voluntary enlistment period was 23,227.108  Furthermore, planning for the offensives of 
1916 and thereafter, necessitated immense numbers of men, exceeding this replacement 
rate.  To provide such a large force with the equipment, ordnance and services they 
required had implications though, and Grieves commented that ‘very little thought had 
been given to the impact of such a large withdrawal of labour on the economy’.109 
It has been asserted by Bourne that manpower planning ‘was piecemeal and 
pragmatic.  It was extended step-by-step by the compelling force of circumstances’. 110  
Indeed, it was in this way that the imposition of a form of national service on all adult 
males to ensure national control over the economy was instigated.  From March 1917, 
this took the form of a Ministry of National Service, with Neville Chamberlain as its 
Director-General.111  Accompanied by much publicity, at its launch the scheme called 
for 500,000 volunteers by the end of March 1917.  On 27 March, the Express and Star 
described a meeting at Wednesbury Town Hall during which Wirral MP, Gershom 
Stuart emphasized the importance of industrial organization.112  A similar report 
appeared in the Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald, accompanied by a letter 
from Chamberlain that was addressed to every patriotic citizen, and which outlined the 
features of the scheme.113  The number of volunteers fell far short of expectations and it 
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had only reached 163,000 by mid April.  Trade union opposition to this national service 
was encountered owing to the suspicion that military discipline would be introduced 
into the civilian workplace.  Following Chamberlain’s departure, the Ministry was 
reorganized and a replacement Director-General, Sir Auckland Geddes, appointed.114 
Manpower continued to be a logistical problem and a further Military Service 
Act was introduced in January 1918, raising the age of conscription to cover men aged 
between 41 and 50 years.  In March of that year, Germany launched its last major 
offensive on the Western Front, which posed a grave threat to the Allies.  It coincided 
with the decision to provide the Army with only 100,000 Category ‘A’ men.  This was 
based on the belief that the enemy lacked the resources to attempt such an assault.  
Additionally, Lloyd George feared that the campaigns planned for that year would be 
repetitions of the Somme and Third Ypres, expending men on a colossal scale without 
achieving decisive results.115  In July 1918, Winston Churchill, as Minister of Munitions, 
authored a report on munitions and the limits of recruiting.  In this, he stated that the 
continued drafting of skilled men was having a detrimental effect on steel production, 
‘for the sake of getting comparatively small numbers of men of inferior physique who 
will not be of much use’.  He warned that ‘we run the risk of endangering production of 
munitions on which not only our armies, but the rapid importation of American troops, 
depend’.116  His comments regarding the standard of fitness and general health were long 
known to have been pertinent to the working class.  During the Boer War, the dire 
physical state of many of Britain’s poorest men was revealed for the first time, hence 
accounting for the rejection on medical grounds of many between 1914 and 1916.117 
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3.4 Civilians in uniform – Wednesbury’s servicemen 
 
The strong tradition of military service across the Black Country and in Staffordshire 
has been commented upon by a number of historians with Bourne affirming that the 
County ‘was one of the most fruitful recruiting grounds for the pre-war regular 
army’.118  Whereas many cities, towns and other localities responded to Lord 
Kitchener’s call to arms by raising service battalions for the New Armies (the so-called 
‘Pals’ battalions) these formations did not have such prominence in the Black Country.  
Instead, men tended to enlist with those units of the Territorial Force that had a strong 
local connection and long-standing support, since many Black Country towns had their 
own unit.  Wednesbury was no exception, with a Company of the South Staffordshire 
Regiment’s Volunteer Battalion having served during the Boer War.  Eventually, this 
became H Company of the Fifth (Territorial Force) Battalion of the South Staffordshire 
Regiment.119  Owing to the recruitment of the majority of its soldiers from amongst the 
town’s working-class community, especial attention will now be given to this unit. 
Andrew Thornton has pointed out that an important factor in the success of the 
TF in Staffordshire ‘was the support elicited by the County’s Territorial Association 
from local employers’.120  The TF was not without its critics, however, the foremost of 
which during the pre-war years was the National Service League, and this had become 
openly hostile to the TF by 1913.121  By this time, TF recruitment had begun to decline 
nationally, with Beckett arguing that it was also weakened by political expediency that 
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undermined ‘its status as a means of expanding the army’.122  A lack of regard from 
regular soldiers, bordering on contempt, in relation to matters of discipline and 
confidence had led to the TF being nicknamed the ‘Saturday Night Soldiers’ due to the 
perceived emphasis placed on social activities rather than military efficiency.123 
In contrast to this were the companies of the South Staffordshire’s Territorials, 
which, through the endeavours of the County Association, were well recruited from the 
localities and occupations that gave them a sense of shared identity that aided cohesion 
and combat effectiveness.124  This was confirmed by Nelson, whose research reveals that 
of the eight per cent of British males who had received military training, 70 per cent 
were of working-class origin.125  In assessing why the TF attracted working-class 
support given that its officers were unlikely to share the same sympathies as most 
working people, it was the customs, identity and values of the respectable working class 
that were paramount and supported the instinct to defend community and town.  
McCartney reiterated that the TF’s ‘traditions were derived from the social structures 
and values of its members and the locality from which it was recruited’. 126  Accordingly, 
when war did come, the Territorials of Staffordshire were mobilized without difficulty. 
One of the most controversial aspects of Lord Kitchener’s tenure as the 
Secretary of State for War was his flagrant disregard for the Territorials and their 
County Associations; instead, he preferred to raise his New Armies of service battalions 
from scratch and to do this directly through the War Office.  As Beckett related, ‘on the 
morning that he took over the War Office, Kitchener remarked that he could take no 
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account of anything but regular soldiers’.127  This was compounded by the TF soldiers 
only being able to serve abroad following the making by them of the Imperial Service 
Obligation.  Additionally, as Mansfield observed, Kitchener ‘was distrustful of the 
political influence of civilians through the County Territorial Associations, referring to 
the Territorials disparagingly as a Town Clerk’s Army’.128  Nevertheless, Adams and 
Poirier point out that an opportunity for the orderly expansion of the Army was missed 
because of Kitchener’s ‘total divergence’ from ‘established military structures’.129 
In August and September 1914, this led to competing recruitment campaigns 
between the New Armies and the TF, with each pressing their case and the advantages 
to serving with them.  The New Army recruits would be treated as regular soldiers, 
receiving higher rates of pay, and would serve abroad; the TF would accept younger 
recruits (17 year olds) and men who did not meet, for example, the height stipulations.  
Even though enlistment with the TF was curtailed until the first 100,000 men came 
forward for the New Armies, during the early months of the war 235,195 men joined TF 
units, with an additional 129,224 doing so by 3 February 1915.130  Direct recruiting to 
the TF, apart from to a few specialist units, ceased after 11 December 1915; and 
thereafter, all recruits were for general service and allocated to units as required. 
That there was essentially nothing original in the ‘Pals’ concept that emerged in 
the autumn of 1914 has been commented on by Simkins, who has emphasized that the 
numerous Territorial (and before them, Volunteer) battalions ‘contained whole 
companies of men drawn from the same community or workplace’.131  The TF units had 
always offered friends, siblings or work colleagues the opportunity to serve together in 
the same local unit.  Eager to dispel the impression that joining the TF was a soft option, 
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there was an overwhelming response by the TF men to signing the Imperial Service 
Obligation in order to be allowed to serve overseas.  On 5 September 1914, the 
Staffordshire Advertiser reported that this commitment had already been made by over 
75 per cent of Wednesbury’s H Company, and that this was higher than the typical 
national response rate, which was around 70 per cent.132  The minority of men who 
elected not to sign the Obligation were generally married men with wives and children 
to support, and ‘upon whom could devolve a great deal of hardship were their men to be 
taken for overseas service’.  This factor was distinguished during the war years, being 
pointed out by Edgar Wallace in Kitchener’s Army, a publication from the time.133 
In August 1914, it was the King’s Proclamation that signalled the necessity for 
the South Staffordshire’s TF battalions to mobilize, as envisaged since their formation, 
for home defence duties.  This would then permit the regular troops of the BEF to 
depart for the continent where they could be readied for immediate front line service.  
Having been at their annual camp at St. Asaph, North Wales, since 1 August, at 7.00 pm 
on 4 August the Territorials received the telegram authorizing their mobilization and 
requiring their immediate return to the Midlands.  This order was executed successfully 
by 8 August.  In the weeks that followed, the commanding officer of H Company, 
Captain John Lees spoke at numerous public meetings locally.  On 12 September, he 
called for fifty men to join the reserve battalion then in the process of being instituted.134  
On 3 October 1914, the Wednesbury Herald published the following notice. 
The Mayor of Wednesbury makes an urgent appeal to the young men of 
the town to join immediately the Reserve Territorial Battalion.  It is of 
the utmost importance that there should be no delay.  Lord Kitchener 
asks for this to be done at once as the War Office will not despatch the 
first line Territorial Battalion until all vacancies in the Reserve 
Battalion have been completed.135 
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In the autumn of 1914, preparations were being made to prepare the Fifth 
Battalion for departure to the front line.136  Captain Lees featured in the Wednesbury 
Herald of 24 October 1914, stating that ‘we regard it as an honour to have our place in a 
Battalion in the first Territorial Division to proceed to active service’.137 The 
Wednesbury Herald continued to provide reports from The Wednesbury Lads informing 
readers that they were in training in East Anglia, then proceeding to be conveyed to 
Rouen via Le Havre.  They reached the front line trenches on 10 April 1915, with the 
first fatality being Private William Dudley, a 19 year-old resident of Dudley Street, 
Wednesbury, killed in action at Wulverghem on 21 April.  Private Wilfred Tromans and 
Sergeant Jack Hayward were both wounded on 24 April.  A description of life in the 
trenches referred to working for up to 20 hours per day, with sleep rare and snatched at 
intervals.  In spite of this, it concluded that ‘the spirit of the men is indomitable’.138 
South Staffordshire’s 1/5th Battalion was initially posted to Armentières, and 
then to Ypres for acclimatization.139  Its first major engagement took place on the 
afternoon of 13 October 1915, during the Battle of Loos.140  With the other battalions of 
137
th
 Brigade, the 1/5
th
 was ordered to attack a German strongpoint and observation 
post that the British had named the Hohenzollern Redoubt, which was linked to a 
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coalmine with a high slagheap known as the Dump.  Martin Middlebrook stated this 
was to be attempted ‘without having had an opportunity for reconnaissance or 
preparation and with no support from any other units/brigades’.141  The attack would 
occur along the eastern end of the so-called Big Willie trench and it was intended to 
advance towards the objective, which was a position known as Fosse 8.142  The British 
artillery bombardment commenced at midday, having a negligible effect on the enemy, 
so that when the 1/5
th
 and other South Staffordshire Battalions left their trenches at 2.00 
pm, ‘they came under a deadly crossfire from three sides’ making them ‘perfect targets 
for the efficient and deadly machine guns’ of the German 6th Army.143  Progress was 
impossible, with the attack along Big Willie only being able to be carried out by small 
parties of men with bombs and grenades.  This continued into the night and until the 
South Staffordshire’s men were relieved next morning by the 2nd Guards Brigade. 
Correspondence from Private B. Walford to the Reverend G. Percival Jones of 
St. John’s Church, Wednesbury, was published in the Midland Advertiser on 30 October 
1915.  This described the scenes of the battlefield saying, ‘it was like Hell with the lid 
off’.144  The attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt, as argued by Bourne, ‘was almost 
certainly pointless.  It never stood any realistic chance of success and failed totally with 
tragic results’.145  The losses of 137th Brigade were 32 officers and 533 other ranks killed 
or wounded, and a further 157 other ranks missing presumed killed in action.  For the 
1/5
th
 Battalion, there were 13 officers and 306 men killed on 13 October 1915.  
Although reported in the press, with the Wednesbury Herald of 30 October confirming 
the deaths of Captain William Millner, Company Sergeant Major Jack Hayward, Lance 
                                               
141
  M. Middlebrook, Your Country Needs You: Expansion of the British Infantry Divisions, 1914-1918 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword Paperbacks, 1999), pp. 106-107. 
142
  The Fosses were pitheads that had been constructed around Loos during development of the area’s mining 
industry.  The Hohenzollern Redoubt was 300 yards long, with extensions to two trenches, Big Willie to the 
south and Little Willie to the North.  Both were well fortified and equipped with machine gun positions. 
143
  J.P. Jones, p. 415; W.L. Vale, History of the South Staffordshire Regiment (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 
1969), p. 310.  Chlorine gas was also released so that the infantry were required to wear the primitive 
hooded gas masks known as Hypo helmets.  This action warned the Germans of an imminent attack. 
144
  Midland Advertiser, 30 October 1915. 
145
  J.M. Bourne, ‘Burslem and its Role of Honour, 1914-1918’, p. 212. 
102 
 
Corporal John Williams, and Privates Simeon Hall and Archie Taylor, the coverage did 
not make the extent of the carnage obvious.  Presumably, this was to avoid creating the 
tremendous blow to civilian morale to be expected from such news.146  However, by 
actively recruiting to the Territorials men who lived and worked together in the same 
community, this localized and intensified the scale of the loss.  Therefore, the sense of 
devastation felt in July 1916 by the many other communities that had raised the Pals 
battalions, in the days following the first day of the Battle of the Somme, had already 
been experienced by Wednesbury and other Black Country towns in October 1915.147 
On 1 July 1916, 1/5
th
 Battalion participated in the Battle of the Somme when 
46
th
 Division and 56
th
 (London) Division were involved in a diversionary action at 
Gommecourt, eleven miles north of the main attack.  The losses for the Staffordshire 
Brigade that day were 68 officers and 1,478 men, with most of the casualties occurring 
in the first minutes of the initial attack at 7.30 am.  A further assault at 3.30 pm also 
failed.  The intention had been to take Gommecourt Road and village, approximately 
four miles north of Beaumont Hamel.  Although this tied up men and guns that the 
Germans could have used further south, the four-wave assault by 137
th
 Brigade failed to 
achieve its objectives.148  As a consequence of this, and especially the view that there 
had been a lack of offensive spirit, the General Officer Commanding 46
th
 Division, 
Major-General the Hon. E.J. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, was dismissed, ‘and the Division 
seems to have been given the reputation as only being suitable as a line holder’.149 
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Although it had been engaged in operations along the River Ancre, participating 
in an attack on Liévin in July 1917 and the action at Hill 70 in August 1918, general 
opinion on 46
th
 Division did not change until 29 September 1918.  This was the day 
when the Division executed a successful attack on the strongly held Hindenburg Line 
defences at Bellenglise by crossing the St. Quentin canal.  J.P. Jones provided a succinct 
account of this feat of arms, describing Bellenglise as ‘the key to the German position’ 
and that ‘once the canal was forced the defences on either side would be turned’. 150  
Commencing at 5.30 am with a heavy artillery and machine gun barrage, the advance of 
the battalions - 1/5
th
 South Staffordshire in the centre, with the 1/6
th
 North Staffordshire 
to the left, and 1/6
th
 South Staffordshire to the right – was aided by a dense fog.  This 
allowed the Territorials to approach the German trenches before their defenders could 
repel them.151  Some parts of the canal were impassable, being 50-60 feet wide and up to 
10 feet in depth but the men used those footbridges that had survived undamaged, or 
they made their way across in inflatable rafts.  Some men even swam across, using 
lifebelts that had been taken from cross-Channel ferries.  Advancing on the German 
positions the Staffordshire men captured over 4,200 prisoners and 70 artillery pieces.152 
The President of Staffordshire County Territorial Association, Lord Dartmouth, 
was in prompt communication with the commanding officers of 137
th
 Brigade, 
Brigadier General J.V. Campbell VC, and 46
th
 Division, Major General G.F. Boyd.  The 
latter had declared to the Lord Lieutenant, ‘how can we fail to win through with men 
like mine to command’.153  In a similar spirit was Lord Dartmouth’s further response. 
How fully my confidence has been justified and has been shown over 
and over again, and I should be glad if you would tell our Staffordshire 
lads that we are thinking of them today in the Old Country and in the 
Old County.154 
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The 2/5
th
 Battalion of the South Staffordshire Regiment was formed as a second 
line or reserve battalion in September 1914 in accordance with successive Army Orders 
of 21 and 31 August and 21 September.155  Intended to take over home defence duties 
from the first line and to provide drafts of reinforcements when required, the unit was 
receiving training at St. Albans when called upon to help suppress the Easter Rising that 
had broken out in Dublin on 23 April 1916.  Rather than troops from Irish formations, 
English units had been specifically requested to crush this armed insurrection by Irish 
republicans and there was severe fighting, with heavy casualties being taken by the 
South Staffordshire’s 2/5th and 2/6th Battalions as key buildings were cleared of 
snipers.156  Subsequently, 59
th
 Division completed its training in Ireland, at the Curragh, 
before returning to England and being sent to France in February 1917.  It participated 
in pressing the German retreat of 1917, and at third Ypres and Cambrai.  For their 
gallantry at the Marne in January 1918, the men of 2/5
th
 Battalion received a DSO, three 
MCs, one DCM and three MMs, although this did not prevent the unit being disbanded 
later that month.  This was due to a Cabinet Committee decision to reduce the number 
of battalions per division from twelve to nine, and the 2/5
th
 Battalion men were sent to 
other South Staffordshire units.  As McCartney noted of the units disbanded, they were 
‘often privately raised units such as Pals battalions or second line Territorial units’. 157 
On the home front, the Volunteer Training Corp (VTC) was established as a 
defence force of volunteers who either were above military age or engaged on war 
work.158  The creation of Wednesbury’s VTC unit was prompted by a call from John 
Norton Griffiths MP for ‘the formation of a Home Defence Corps of those not enrolled 
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in the regular forces or the reserve’.159  This became a unit of the Staffordshire Volunteer 
Regiment in 1915, led by A.J. Glover, and T.R. Knowles as platoon commander.160  
Although Charles Messenger made a comparison, viewing the VTC as ‘the equivalent 
of the Home Guard of the Second World War’, Osborne added that there was a mistrust 
of the VTCs and the ‘feeling in high places...that they were playing at soldiers’. 161  
VTCs typically concentrated on supporting recruitment activities or providing 
rudimentary military training, yet as the value of such spontaneous outbursts of 
patriotism had been overtaken by the Military Service Act and conscription, this made 
the VTCs appear somewhat irrelevant, and they were finally disbanded in 1916.162 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In view of the level of industrial unrest in Britain prior to the outbreak of war, it might 
have been expected that Britain’s working class would be reluctant to come to the aid of 
the nation at this time.  Furthermore, the working class had a long-standing antipathy 
towards the military, borne principally from the low status to which a career in the army 
was viewed by society as a whole.  Yet, when the call to arms came, men of all political 
persuasions and from all social classes volunteered their services, not least being the 
working class, which was and remains patriotic in outlook.163  Research by Gregory and 
Pennell has underlined the importance of the events in August and September 1914, 
especially in the aftermath of the Battle of Mons, signifying that the rush to the colours 
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was a more complex phenomenon than previously supposed.  As Silbey suggested, ‘the 
singular event which shocked the British public out of complacency was the retreat of 
the BEF in late August 1914 and the consequent realization that the war was unlikely to 
be over before Christmas’.164  Therefore, the men who volunteered between August 
1914 and December 1915 did so not because they wished particularly to become 
soldiers but because it had become evident that the nation was in danger.  Pennell 
asserted that ‘a variety of complex and nuanced social, political and economic factors 
encouraged men to enlist’.165  As much as any ideological, moral, nationalistic or 
patriotic feelings, or the sense of adventure and pressure from employers, friends and 
family, or women brandishing white feathers, it was the pragmatic belief that 
community, family and home were worth fighting for that drove men to enlist. 
Between August 1914 and November 1918, 4,970,902 men enlisted, with almost 
half of them (2,466,719) doing so of their own free will.166  This unselfish response 
produced the largest volunteer army in British history.  However, in a total war in which 
effective use was required of all resources, the efficient co-ordination of manpower 
proved elusive.  Lord Derby’s Scheme having failed to convince men of the case for 
attestation to produce the numbers of recruits required for the front line, conscription 
was introduced in 1916.  This was followed by a scheme of National Service for 
industrial workers, although working-class reaction to this was unenthusiastic.  The 
expectation that a vast pool of shirkers evading the call to duty would be revealed also 
proved misplaced.  Many of the men that it was expected would be drawn into the 
armed forces by these measures were already engaged on essential war work and, until 
they could be replaced by other (female or unskilled) labour, they could not be spared 
by industry.  Britain was unique in making some allowance for conscientious objection 
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by introducing tribunals to consider the cases of men who felt unable or unwilling to 
undertake combatant service, although evidence of tribunals being held in Wednesbury 
has verified only one occurrence.  There were also the men who had tried to enlist but 
who had been rejected because of their inability to satisfy the medical requirements for 
service due to the dire effects of poverty and industrial labour.  As the months passed, 
these standards were reduced and more men found their way into the armed forces. 
A substantial contribution to the war effort was made by the Territorial Force, 
which prior to the ending of voluntary enlistment in December 1915, raised 318 
battalions compared to the 404 service battalions formed for Kitchener’s New Army. 167  
The total number of men enlisting in the TF was 725,842, some 577,016 of whom 
became war casualties.  The notion of men serving in the same unit as their friends, 
family members of work colleagues that was typically used as an inducement for 
recruitment into the so-called ‘Pals’ battalions had long been established in TF 
companies.  These were rooted in their local communities, with service being seen as an 
extension of civic responsibility and a commitment to maintain the defence of the area, 
as was the case with Wednesbury’s H Company (subsequently renamed D Company 
upon reorganization in 1915) of the Fifth Battalion of the South Staffordshire Regiment. 
Although this enhanced the identity and esprit de corps of individual units, there 
were other implications that arose from this localism, however.  The well-documented 
experiences of those communities that responded to Lord Kitchener’s call by raising the 
Pals battalions, and which were devastated by the tremendous losses of men incurred on 
the first day of the Battle of the Somme, were experienced months earlier across the 
towns of the Black Country and in Staffordshire in the aftermath of the Battle of Loos.  
The greatest number of fatalities and casualties occurred on 13 October 1915 when the 
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Territorials of the North and South Staffordshire Regiments attempted what was to be a 
forlorn assault on the defences of the Hohenzollern Redoubt.  Almost three years later, 
it was a Territorial formation, namely, the 46
th
 (North Midland) Division, and which 
included men from these same Staffordshire Regiments that carried out one of the war’s 
most decisive and successful actions.  On 29 September 1918, with audacity, courage 
and skill, these men crossed the St. Quentin Canal and broke through the fortified 
positions of the Hindenburg Line.  This added to the conviction of Germany’s military 
leaders that victory was unachievable and hastened progress towards the armistice.168 
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CHAPTER 4:  THE MOBILIZATION OF THE ECONOMY –  
INDUSTRY AND MUNITIONS PRODUCTION 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As Claire Culleton has observed, there has been a tendency for historians of the First 
World War to differentiate between those who fought and those who waited; a more 
appropriate division perhaps being between ‘those who fought and those who worked’.1  
This Chapter will examine this latter group’s experience in relation to the mobilization 
of the economy and munitions production, which was defined in the Munitions Acts of 
1915, 1916 and 1918 by reference to the manufacture and repair of arms, ammunition, 
ships, vessels, vehicles and aircraft intended for the successful prosecution of the war.  
Furthermore, there was the construction of essential buildings and docks, the supply of 
heat, light, water and power, together with the provision of transport facilit ies.2 
Marwick conveniently segregated the domestic history of the war into three 
parts.3  Firstly, there was the initial period in which notions of business as usual were 
dominant, and the first section of this Chapter will consider the requirements for waging 
the war, including the transition and move towards total war, and its translation at local 
level.  Marwick’s second period, from 1915 to 1916, was one in which there is the 
beginning of state intervention, the status of the labour movement improved and new 
freedoms for women emerged for the first time, and the second section will assess the 
manner in which these developments influenced industrial output for the war effort.  
The third period, representing the years 1917 and 1918, was denoted by even greater 
regulation at a time of shortages and industrial disharmony.  These factors will be 
considered, therefore, in terms of their impact on industry in Wednesbury, the support 
that the war effort received on the home front and the significance for social change. 
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4.2 Meeting the requirements for waging the war 
As Gerard de Groot has related, ‘In total war, strategy is affected by home front 
capabilities.  The size of a country’s military force is strictly limited: too many soldiers 
means not enough workers to equip them’.4  Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the British 
Government rejected the notion of despatching a large contingent to the continent; 
instead, reliance would be placed on the Regular Army (augmented by reservists and 
Territorials), the imposition of a Royal Navy blockade on Germany (albeit without 
inconveniencing any neutral countries), and the supply of money and munitions to 
Britain’s allies.5  At this time, and with the exception of the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich 
and the small number of other armaments manufacturing establishments on the War 
Office and Admiralty lists, there were few factories dedicated to munitions production.  
This would have important implications as attempts were made to meet the increasingly 
imperative demands to furnish the military with the requisite supplies, whilst also 
preserving civilian goods and services, and combating domestic inflationary pressures.6 
On 4 August 1914, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, 
expounded the Liberal Government’s conviction that laissez faire economic principles 
would continue to enable the traders of this country to carry on with business as usual.  
This standpoint drew on pre-war assumptions regarding the international financial 
connections between the industrialized societies, which have been described by Patrick 
O’Brien as leading to the conclusion that ‘from the vantage point of 1900-14 there 
seemed to be no need to be anything but optimistic’.7  This attitude made it difficult for 
the policy-makers to comprehend and visualize the extent of the mobilization of 
resources and application of industrial techniques that would be required, and which 
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would prolong the conflict for four years.  The consumption of men, munitions and 
other scarce resources was to be so vast that market enterprise and voluntarism could 
not possibly satisfy demand without ultimately jeopardizing military strategy.8 
One of the Liberal Government’s first wartime actions occurred on 8 August 
1914 with the passing of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA).  This extremely brief 
legislation ‘to ensure the public safety and defence of the realm’ furnished the state with 
unprecedented powers, including those to requisition buildings and land, deport 
problematic individuals from key areas, and to try civilians accused of sedition or 
treason before courts martial.  This was swiftly followed by the DORA (No. 2) Act, 
which came into effect on 28 August 1914, empowering the movement of private firms 
(or any part thereof) to munitions production, with this work being given priority.  
Interestingly, no reference was made to the regulation of profit making, however.9 
The official History of the Ministry of Munitions records that from the close of 
1914, there were increasing demands from the army for ‘a more liberal supply of 
ammunition’ and by March 1915, it was evident that ‘so far as the immediate future was 
concerned, an adequate supply of ammunition could not be assumed’.10  Early 
expectations were of a war of movement, requiring mobile artillery and smaller calibre 
ordnance but, as the belligerents adapted to trench warfare, as Hew Strachan remarked, 
‘in the winter of 1914-15 this seemed to be a matter of guns and high-explosive shell’.11  
The existing stockpiles of high calibre high explosive shell were quickly expended, with 
replenishment dependent on the few dedicated manufacturers struggling to increase 
supply given their insufficient capacity, production bottlenecks and labour shortages. 
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The British system was ostensibly geared towards waging small colonial wars and this 
was causing men to die at the front.12  Despite this, the Ministry reported the difficulty 
of expanding production elsewhere because the ‘ordinary engineering firms could not 
take up such work at a moments’ notice when there was little or no organization or 
headquarters for instructing or supervising them’.13  Sir George Askwith’s memoirs 
recall the other dimension of manpower limitations, in that ‘neither contactors nor 
subcontractors could fulfil contracts or subcontracts without more skilled labour.14 
By 1915, the economic climate was such that rising commodity prices and 
shortages were being experienced on the home front for the first time.  There had been 
warnings of this possibility during the earliest days of the war.  For instance, the 
Wednesbury Herald had highlighted the damage to trade leading to rising prices that 
would follow from a continental war.15  Combined with evidence that successive 
military setbacks were attributable to deficiencies in the supply of the appropriate 
ordnance, this made the case for the reorganization of the munitions industries 
increasingly compelling.16  The military situation came to a head on 14 May 1915, when 
The Times published an article by its military correspondent, Charles a’Court 
Repington, quoting Sir John French’s comments that at the Battle of Festubert, ‘the 
need for an unlimited supply of high explosive was a fatal bar to our success’.17  This 
prompted the House of Commons debate on 21 May 1915 when concerns were aired 
about both the shortage and the poor quality of munitions that helped to further 
undermine Asquith’s Liberal administration, leading to ‘the formation of a Coalition 
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Government committed to a more efficient and purposeful prosecution of the war’.18  As 
David French has identified, ‘the real significance of the Shells Scandal was that it gave 
Lloyd George the opportunity to implement his vision of a total war economy’.19  The 
local perspective was given by the Wednesbury Herald, via a letter from Mr J. Foster of 
Wednesbury, whose son was on active service, which concluded with the observation 
that in ‘curtailing the supply of munitions of war they are keeping indefinitely 
thousands of men out who are anxious to get back to their homes and families’.20 
This was the background for the establishment on 9 June 1915 of the Ministry of 
Munitions, with its unprecedented powers to institute the changes to employment 
relations and industrial practices.  Not only could skilled labour be compulsorily 
transferred to armaments production by the Ministry, private manufacturers were to be 
compelled to undertake work for the war effort.  By continuing to appropriate 
responsibility for such essential areas of the economy, this new branch of the state 
became an important employer in its own right.  By the conclusion of the war, this 
included a staff of 65,000 working in over 250 factories and it had spent in excess of 
£2,000m.  It also supervised 20,000 controlled establishments.21  As Waites has pointed 
out, with the Ministry’s encouragement, ‘many firms used the opportunity afforded by 
wartime profits to develop their works’.22  One consequence of this was the introduction 
of new machinery and techniques thereby facilitating the replacement of craft 
production with standardization.  Such was the rate of increase that, for example, annual 
machine gun production rose from a meagre 274 in 1914, to 120,864 by 1918.23 
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Under Lloyd George’s direction as Secretary of State, and drawing on the fund 
of goodwill that he had amassed with business interests before 1914, many prominent 
industrialists agreed to assume senior positions within the administration and in the 
relevant Ministries or Departments.  As related by Davenport-Hines, it was following 
the 1915 munitions crisis that ‘hundreds if not thousands of business men were 
seconded to government departments in the belief that the traditional officials, though 
honourable, laborious and loyal, lacked initiative or wide outlook’.24  The best example 
is provided by Eric Geddes, the Deputy General Manager of the North Eastern Railway 
Company, described by Grieves as ‘the embodiment of the men of push-and-go’ so 
valuable in such roles.  Appointed as the Deputy Director of Munitions Supply in 1915, 
Geddes made rapid progression to become ‘the pre-eminent trouble-shooter of the 
British war effort’.25  It was men with these qualities, and who were able to thrive in 
emergency conditions that acquired control of the management of the ten munitions 
districts for England to be created by the Ministry between June and August 1915. 
The Midlands District was comprised of the ten counties of Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Rutland, 
South Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Worcestershire.  It was described in The Official 
History of the Ministry of Munitions as ‘was one of the first engineering centres to be 
organized by the Government for the spread of munitions work, for although important 
armament works had very large interests...there was ample engineering capacity which 
these works did not touch’.26  Co-ordination was conducted through the Midlands 
District Office, which was located centrally within the City of Birmingham and where it 
was controlled by the local financier and industrialist, Frank Dudley Docker.27 
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4.3 Industrial output for the war effort 
The concentration of metal-based manufacturing in Wednesbury and elsewhere in the 
Black Country ensured that when the War Office and Admiralty did begin to place 
orders with new suppliers, those local firms that had sufficient productive capacity, or 
were able to expand their operations, could fulfil much of the work.  Industrial 
association records and trade directories for the years 1914 and 1916 detail the 
extensive network of enterprises in Wednesbury alone that would make their 
contribution to supplying munitions to the armed forces.  The town possessed at least 
ten manufacturers of steel and brass tube, four iron and brass founders, five producers of 
nuts and bolts, and two axle makers and carriage wrights.28  At the end of the war, 
Wednesbury Borough Council produced a guide listing local firms holding military 
contracts and elaborating on the particular types of production undertaken.29 
Wednesbury’s largest manufacturer, the Metropolitan Railway Carriage, Wagon 
& Finance Company already performed an extensive array of manufacturing activity at 
its three works.  The expertise gained in providing items of rolling stock for the railway 
industry domestically and internationally meant that the firm was ideally placed to 
supply the army with suitable vehicles onto which large calibre naval guns could be 
mounted in order to act as mobile siege artillery.30  Arising from the confirmation of 
government control in August 1915, the Company’s Monway works began delivering 
the various forgings that were then shipped to other establishments across the country 
where they were transformed into finished artillery shells ready for the front line. 31  One 
of the most significant manufacturing contributions to be made from 1916 onwards, 
however, remains the assembly of the first tanks at the Company’s Old Park works. 
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By 1915, the combination of proficient rapid-firing artillery, barbed wire and the 
machine gun, giving a distinct advantage to the defenders of entrenched positions, had 
resulted in the deadlock on the Western Front.  The most viable solution to this problem 
was produced by the British, and Major W.G. Wilson is attributed with conceiving the 
idea for the tank, derived from his work on designs for a trench-crossing machine.32  
Between September 1915 and January 1916, the early prototypes were designed and 
assembled at the Lincoln works of William Foster & Co. Ltd.  They were the outcome 
of collaboration between Wilson and William Tritton, a Director of Fosters.33 
At trials held on 29 January 1916, a practical demonstration was given and the 
military observers were so impressed by the machine’s capacity for dealing with the 
obstacles placed before it that ten days later the Army Council made a recommendation 
to the War Office that one hundred of these tanks (as they were to become known) 
should be ordered.  As The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions stated, the 
contract for the manufacture of these vehicles was to be awarded to two firms.  Twenty-
five machines were to be built by William Foster & Co. Ltd. and, owing to the greater 
capacity of its organization, seventy-five would be constructed by the Metropolitan 
Railway Carriage, Wagon & Finance Company, at its Old Park works in Wednesbury.34  
An additional order to the Metropolitan for a further fifty tanks was authorized by the 
War Office in April 1916, with all of these 150 vehicles being allocated to the six new 
tank companies then being raised as a component of the Heavy Section of the Machine 
Gun Corps and to be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel E.D. Swinton.35 
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Assembly of the Mark I tanks, as these vehicles were subsequently classified 
once improved models had been developed, required the provision of materials from 
across the country.  The armoured plate was made in Sheffield, the caterpillar track 
links, locally, at Wednesbury’s F.H. Lloyd & Co. Ltd., and the engine and other 
mechanical components in Coventry.  The armoured plates were bolted or riveted to a 
cast iron superstructure and the 105 hp Daimler engine and other internal fittings then 
lowered in from above and secured.  The two tracks ran along the sides of the machine’s 
rhomboid frame, operating on sets of rollers and toothed idler wheels.  There were two 
variants of the tank, each to fulfil a particular battlefield role; the Male being armed 
with four machine guns and two Hotchkiss six pounder (57mm) artillery guns, and the 
Female carrying five machine guns.  In order to minimize the height profile, these 
armaments were housed in sponsons mounted on either side of the tank’s central hull.36 
Combining firepower and movement, these new weapons went into action for 
the first time on 15 September 1916, during the battle of Flers-Courcelette. Accidents 
and mechanical problems before they reached the front line meant that of the forty-nine 
machines available, only thirty-six actually participated.37  A lack of reliability and poor 
performance, with a top speed of no more than four miles per hour, prompted eventual 
refinements, with replacement models such as the more successful Mark IV and Mark V 
machines (having a new engine, brakes and gears, giving an improved top speed of 4.6 
mph) coming into service in 1917 and 1918 respectively.  Further orders were placed, 
with 1,000 Mk IV tanks being constructed in 1917 at a cost of £3,800 each (equating to 
£235,460 in 2015), so that a total number of 2,297 tanks had been manufactured by the 
end of 1918, many of them originating from Wednesbury’s Old Park works.38 
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On the home front, what was heralded in the press as a war-winning weapon 
gave a tremendous boost to civilian morale; its propaganda value being arguably equally 
as important as its intrinsic military value, especially in the light of the initial success 
achieved by tanks at the Battle of Cambrai in 1917.39  Naturally, this bolstered the 
Metropolitan’s finances, although production was dependent upon the cooperation and 
good will of the workforce in meeting the output targets.  On 22 December 1917, the 
Midland Advertiser reported that the Wednesbury workers and their colleagues at the 
company’s other works in Oldbury and Saltley, had demonstrated ‘their very practical 
patriotism’ by raising £5,000 for the production of a tank that was to be named The 
Metropolitan.  The presentation of this vehicle was made in a formal ceremony that was 
attended by the commander of the Tank Corps, Major General Sir Hugh Elles.40 
At least as diverse was the output of another leading Black Country firm, namely 
that of F.H. Lloyd & Co. Ltd., with its James Bridge plant situated on the border 
between Wednesbury and Darlaston.  This company had been responsible for the 
fulfilment of a number of pre-war armaments contracts.  Notably, this included 
producing castings that were then used in the construction of the Royal Navy’s 
Dreadnought class of battleships.41  As with many local organizations, a considerable 
portion of its manufacturing effort was subsequently turned over to the production of 
artillery shells and other forms of ordnance.  Correspondence with the Ministry of 
Munitions and the Admiralty from 1917 revealed that F.H. Lloyd created castings that 
were then sent on to A.B.C. Coupler Ltd. of Wolverhampton.  The next part of the 
process having been executed, the consignments of shells would be despatched to one of 
                                               
39
   The First World War (Wark Clements/Hamilton Film Partnership and Channel 4, 2003).  At Cambrai, some 
400 tanks were deployed on a six-mile front.  An initial advance of five miles and the taking of 4,000 
German prisoners was celebrated by the ringing of church bells in Britain for the first time during the war. 
40
  Midland Advertiser, 22 December 1917; Who’s Who and Who Was Who, 2012.  Sir Hugh Jamieson Elles 
(1880-1945) was a veteran of the Boer War and he had served with the 4
th
 Division at Le Cateau in 1914.  
In January 1916, he attended the trials of the prototype vehicle, ‘Mother’.  Appointed to lead the Heavy 
Branch of the Machine Gun Corps in September 1916, he personally led the tanks into action at the Battle 
of Cambrai on 20 November 1917.  He commanded the Tank Corps for the remainder of the war. 
41
  SCHAS BS-FHL/9/7/1: F.H. Lloyd & Co. Ltd. – Booklet issued to commemorate the First World War. 
119 
 
the National Shell Factories, where they were filled with explosive and finished as 
either Common Pointed Shell or Semi-Armour Piercing Shell.42  In a booklet published 
in 1919, the management of F.H. Lloyd chronicled the company’s other wartime 
endeavours, including creating the castings used for the construction of submarines and 
torpedo boats, and the development of transporter gear that enabled the Royal Navy’s 
ships to be re-coaled while at sea.43  The production of the links for the caterpillar tracks 
of the new tanks having been referred to above, it is notable that the firm were 
providing the Patent Shaft’s Old Park works with 40 tons of links per week, at a cost of 
£80 per link.  Correspondence with the Ministry of Munitions from May 1918 
confirmed that an extension of the James Bridge plant was sanctioned because the 
tonnage output of the firm had risen by 400 per cent during the four years of the war.44 
The files of the Ministry of Munitions document some of the other contracts 
undertaken by Wednesbury firms.  This included the manufacture of three-inch Stokes’ 
mortar bombs, and the supply of 45,000 cartridge containers, as performed in June 1916 
by the Steel Nut & Joseph Hampton Ltd.45  The Chief Industrial Commissioner’s 
Department of the Board of Trade provided arbitration for the settlement of a number of 
disputes, thereby revealing the commodities manufactured by the firms concerned.  For 
example, on 24 November 1915, a hearing considered the conditions of labourers who 
were manufacturing hand grenades at Messrs Edward Pugh & Co. of Wednesbury.46  
Further examples are that John Spencer’s Globe works were also providing castings for 
artillery shells and manufacturing the automatic water sprinklers for use in the 
explosives factories, Edwin Richards & Sons were manufacturing axles for a variety of 
military vehicles, including gun carriages, and Samuel Platt Ltd. were concentrating on 
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machine tools.47  Elsewhere in the Black Country, the Birmingham Metals and 
Munitions Company factory in Rowley Regis produced 12,000,000 rounds of .303 mark 
VII ammunition per week; the National Projectile Factory in Dudley and the Walsall 
Munitions Company made 4.5 and 6 inch calibre artillery shells; and Albright & 
Wilson’s Oldbury chemical works supplied phosphorous and Tri-nitro-toluene (TNT).48 
 
4.4 The impact of the war on industry in Wednesbury 
Notwithstanding the extensive changes to the organization of the region’s engineering 
and metal manufacturing enterprises during the previous decades, as have been 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the impact of the war on local industry and on 
conditions in its labour market was initially one of some dislocation.  This was 
attributable to economic uncertainty created by the outbreak of hostilities, and the loss 
of valuable overseas customers and markets, together with the consequences of a 
sizeable portion of the nation’s workforce volunteering for military service in 1914-
1915.  In the earliest days of the war, on 15 August 1914, the Wednesbury Herald 
explained that a public meeting taken place two days earlier, during which steps were 
advocated to minimize potential suffering in the town by maintaining levels of trade and 
work.  It was reported that the Mayor of Wednesbury, Councillor Nat Bishop, attended 
this gathering and he had urged the owners of local companies to assist the families of 
those men who had volunteered or been called back to the colours as reservists.49 
The records of F.H. Lloyd & Co. Ltd. show that at the commencement of the 
war every worker of this firm agreed to make a financial contribution to assist the 
families who would be deprived of their breadwinner.  Consequently, a system of 
subscriptions was established that was to yield a total sum of £1,920 1s. 6d., and from 
which allocations were made both to the families of those employees on active service 
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and to other war funds.  Significantly, these records state that the workers, managers 
and directors of the company also combined to pay the rents of the families of the 
married men who were performing military service from the time of their joining up.  
Furthermore, each year the firm’s directors would organize a party for these families, 
usually at Christmas, at which the children were presented with gifts of new boots.50 
At the beginning of the war, the problem had been insufficient work and 
employment, ‘but by the early part of 1915 the situation had so far improved that the 
question of unemployment generally amongst the industrious classes had almost 
disappeared’.51  By March 1915, the Wednesbury Herald was stressing the need for 
unity.  It argued that ‘Employers and employed must address themselves resolutely to 
the great task of providing the Navy and the Army and our allies with the materials of 
war’.52  This served to highlight that pre-war underemployment had been more 
widespread than realized, as ‘the additional employees had been drawn from many 
sources, the most important being the continuous employment of persons who were 
hitherto casuals’.53  Consequently, there was the employment of older workers who had 
come out of retirement and men who had had been discharged from military service 
owing to wounds they had received during service.  In the engineering industries, 
shortages of skilled workers continued to be problematic though, as Waites suggested, 
the movement from craft-based to mass production meant that ‘by 1917 the demand for 
the skills of craftsmen had been overtaken by the general demand for labour’.54 
Many Black Country firms had been small, family-owned enterprises supplying 
specialist products via limited production runs.  In 1914, they did not possess the plant 
capable of supplying an army of the size to which the British Expeditionary Force was 
                                               
50
  SCHAS BS-FHL/9/7/1: F.H. Lloyd & Co. Ltd. – Booklet issued to commemorate the First World War. 
51
  Cd. 8195 Special War Work. Local Government Board Report, Command Papers (London: HMSO, 1916), 
p. 45. 
52
  Wednesbury Herald, 6 March 1915. 
53
  A. Gregory, The Last Great War, p. 194; Cd. 7850 Report of the Board of Trade on the State of 
Employment in the United Kingdom in February 1915, Parliamentary Papers (1914-1916), vol. xxi, p. 5. 
54
  P.E. Dewey, War and Progress: Britain, 1914-1945, p. 23; B.A Waites, ‘The Effect of the First World War 
on Class and Status in England, 1910-1920’, p. 36. 
122 
 
to grow by end of the war.  It took time for existing productive capacity to be 
transferred away from domestic production and across to munitions work, for new 
factories to be erected and supplies of raw materials to be acquired, and for energy and 
transportation to be co-ordinated.55  Such expansion was transformative of industry and 
the labour market, particularly where there was a migration of employees.  However, 
this could often be at the expense of other, competing industries that then contracted.  
Mineral excavation had been one of the principal industries in Wednesbury and across 
the Black Country, albeit one that was already in decline by 1914, and Dewey related 
how ‘coal mining was hit early on by the reduction in exports and heavy recruiting’.56  
In 1915, the coal mining industry received official protection from military recruitment 
but its labour force was to continue to remain below pre-war levels throughout. 
Another dimension was the unprecedented level of control exercised by the 
government through the granting of financial and technical assistance and support for 
training.  Kozak observed that ‘as a result of the new Government-inspired armaments 
requirements, substantial changes occurred in local industries’.57  The reorganization 
instituted by the Ministry of Munitions was responsible for the creation of the 200 new 
National Factories, for example, which were an exemplar for the efficient use of 
manufacturing methods and the deployment of labour.  Facilities hitherto unheard of in 
the workplace, such as canteens, were now being provided for this first time.  Also 
designated as controlled establishments were all of the important armaments 
manufacturers in the area, such as the three plants of the Patent Shaft and of F.H. Lloyd.  
Within these organizations, and in accordance with the Munitions Acts and DORA, 
priority was given to war work and there was a limitation on the profits to be made. 
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It has been suggested by Waites that, ‘up to the First World War, wage rates 
were strongly influenced by the customary comparisons which the skilled and unskilled 
in one trade made with each other, and with men of similar levels of skills in other 
trades in the district’.58  Indeed, such practises had been the cause of the 1913 Black 
Country Strike and while innovations such as industry-wide bargaining and wider union 
recognition did emerge, the rapid expansion of munitions production carried with it 
obstacles to the progress of the labour movement.  Hence, the war was the ideal 
opportunity for employers to attempt to weaken controls over the labour market, 
including ‘the elaborate structure of trade union rules and restrictions built up over the 
years of struggle with the employing classes’.59  The 1915 Munitions of War Act 
introduced restrictions on labour mobility, control of wages, and attempted to eliminate 
industrial indiscipline.  For instance, Schedule 4(3) of the Act stipulated that: 
Any such practice or custom not having the force of law which tends to 
restrict production or employment shall be suspended in the 
establishment, and if any person induces or attempts to induce any other 
person (whether any particular person or generally) to comply, or 
continue to comply, with such a rule, practice or custom, that person 
shall be guilty of an offence under the Act.60 
 
With over a million men having enlisted voluntarily by December 1914, the loss 
to the labour force of such an immense number of valuable workers had grave 
implications for the war economy.  It has been noted by A.J.P. Taylor that the army ‘had 
more men than they could equip’ and Stevenson asserted that a balance was required for 
the ‘seemingly insatiable appetite of the military chiefs for fresh divisions with the 
requirements of securing the basic needs of the home population’.61  Official reluctance 
on the part of the Liberal Government to introduce conscription led to the compromise 
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of the Derby Scheme.62  The results of this endeavour enabled two conclusions to be 
reached.  Firstly, given disappointment at the number of men who had attested, it was 
unavoidable that conscription would be introduced.  Secondly, that there was a surplus 
of skilled workers readily transferrable to munitions production, so that alternatives 
could be utilized more effectively, namely women workers and unskilled labour. 
The labour movement had a long-standing opposition to military conscription, 
viewing it as comparable to the “Prussianism” against which the war was being fought, 
and Alan Clinton attributed this to the not unrealistic ‘fear of the power it would place 
in the hands of the employers, since it might lead to industrial conscription’.63  
Nevertheless, by late 1915, this concern was overcome without great difficulty and, 
whilst Lloyd George and others made occasional reference to the need to extend such 
compulsion to the civilian population, this was never attempted due to the possibility of 
a collision with both employers and unions; governmental powers being extended 
incrementally, instead.  The military’s continual calls for more men to fill the ranks, and 
the affect this had on the structure of the labour force, created a scarcity of even 
unskilled workers in some areas and industries; a problem that was ‘most pressing in the 
blast furnaces, in steel works and rolling mills, in tube works and in foundries’.64  The 
consequences of taking skilled men into the army remained contentious and, even as 
late in the war as July 1918, the Minister of Munitions, Winston Churchill, expressed 
his grave concerns about the impact this would have on the production of tanks: 
To take hundreds of men from the manufacture of tanks, thus 
dislocating the whole of the Metropolitan works, with the result that for 
the sake of getting enough men to make a couple of companies of 
infantry, the equipment of perhaps four or five battalions of tanks will 
be lost.  Considering that one tank is worth hundreds of men, and, 
properly used, may conceivably be worth a whole battalion, I must 
avow myself unable to comprehend the processes of thought which are 
at work.65 
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The depletion of labour had far-reaching consequences, with employers paying 
higher wages to retain existing skilled workers and to entice those of other firms to join 
them.66  Government sought to curtail this by introducing the Leaving Certificate 
scheme.  Under the 1915 Munitions of War Act, employers were forbidden from hiring 
any munitions workers not possessing such a certificate from their most recent place of 
work unless six weeks had elapsed since they had left their last job.67  Rubin highlighted 
that no provision ‘generated more hostility among munitions workers’ who saw it as 
‘the embodiment of slavery, it bound reluctant workers to their employer’.68  This 
legislation also introduced Munitions Tribunals for the purposes of ruling on any 
transgressions, including withholding of Certificates and compelling labour to work for 
lower pay.  The Midland Counties Express of 1 January 1916 reported that a 
Wednesbury man, Jeremiah Bray of Meeting Street, won his claim that the Certificate 
was being unreasonably withheld, thereby preventing him from taking up a promotion 
of a skilled job as an engineer.69  The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions 
stated, however, that these bodies usually found in favour of the employers and, ‘the 
total effect was to arm employers, managers and foremen with arbitrary powers that 
were certain to be abused’.70  Despite the Leaving Certificate scheme’s amendment in 
1916, continued severe criticism led to its eventual abolition in October 1917. 
The Express and Star envisaged that with this development, there would be a 
considerable movement of labour; the expectation being that workers residing in 
lodgings near to their place of employment would seek work nearer to home.  This 
article described the steps taken by the Ministry of Munitions and the Trade Union 
Advisory Committee to avert such a dislocation by encouraging workers not to change 
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their employer unless for substantial reasons.  Inducements included the payment of 
subsistence allowances and the granting of railway passes allowing workers to make 
regular visits home whilst staying in their current job, thereby minimizing the impact 
over as long a period as possible.71  The October 1917 Ministry of Labour Situation 
Report remarked upon the abolition of the Leaving Certificate that ‘it seems clear that 
the commonly expected anticipation of disastrous results was groundless and the 
stolidity of labour will be little affected’.  The reasons for this were a disinclination to 
sacrifice good wages, the anticipation of conscription should unemployment arise and 
the actions of the employers themselves.  It was observed that some employers were 
attempting to introduce a Character Note to protect themselves from the employment of 
potential agitators but this was immediately viewed as merely an unofficial Leaving 
Certificate ‘and, if it is really persisted in by the employers, trouble will result’.72 
The continual pressure on firms to increase munitions production was 
inextricably linked to the size of their workforce and its skill level, which were to result 
in both dilution and substitution.  A definition provided by Deborah Thom was that, 
‘dilution meant the replacement of skilled men by semi-skilled or unskilled workers; 
substitution meant the replacement of one semi-skilled or unskilled worker by another, 
usually in both cases thereby increasing the number of women in the workplace’.73  This 
was assisted by the stipulation for standardized products, and made possible by new 
engineering techniques, semi-automated machinery and mass production processes.  
Furthermore, it facilitated the progression of unskilled (often-female) workers to semi-
skilled status, thereby narrowing the economic and social demarcation between workers, 
and raising the wages of the formerly unskilled.  Initially, the intention was for a more 
flexible deployment of existing skilled labour, ‘not to reduce the skills of existing male 
                                               
71
  Express and Star, 1 October 1917. 
72
  TNA CAB 24/29: The Labour Situation: Report from the Ministry of Labour, October 1917, pp. 1-2. 
73
  D. Thom, Nice Girls and Rude Girls: Women Workers in World War I (London: IB Tauris, 2000), p. 31. 
127 
 
workers but rather to release them to jobs where their skills could be used more 
effectively’.74  However, it was not popular with the employers that were losing their 
skilled workers and, as Marwick pointed out, it became ‘overshadowed by the decision 
to release as many fit men as possible for service’.75  Such comb-outs of those men 
eligible for military service exacerbated the tensions between the skilled and unskilled 
and their respective unions, with the craft unions viewing the dilutees – and especially 
male dilutees - ‘as a permanent threat to craft status (which women were not)’.76 
Kozak has asserted that the reorganization of munitions production and the 
introduction of dilution, ‘paved the way for the large scale mobilization of women into 
all government work and even more significantly into metals and engineering which 
prior to the war were almost exclusively the preserves of men’.77  Adrian Gregson’s 
research into community and identity during the First World War has examined the 
experience of a Territorial Battalion of the King’s Liverpool Regiment and its home 
towns of Bootle and Southport in Lancashire.  He made the case that the ‘single most 
identifiable group of non-combatants in the war were women and it is perhaps their 
level of commitment which most clearly demonstrates the extent of community identity 
shared with the troops abroad’.  Gregson further described the role of these women in 
terms of the material, financial and emotional support that they provided for the 
services; being the dependents of the men who marched away; and their nascent 
employment in traditional and non-traditional areas, as a direct result of the war.78  It has 
been argued by Braybon that to assess women’s work during the war, ‘it is essential for 
one to have some understanding of the kind of approach adopted by government, 
employers, press and middle-class public towards working-class women before the 
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war’.79  In July 1914, women comprised 29 per cent of the total workforce.  Employed 
not only in domestic service; they also worked in manufacturing, with 36 per cent 
belonging to the industrial workforce.80  Throughout the Black Country, substantial 
numbers of women possessed experience from employment in mechanized industries - 
albeit for lower wages than paid to men, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.81 
When labour shortages became obvious in early 1915, the employers turned 
firstly to the unemployed and the reserves of casual labour, the retired, boys about to 
leave school and the men who were working in the non-essential industries.  The first 
indications of an increase in employment opportunities for women became noticeable in 
the latter months of 1914, as clerical and shop work became more widely available.  
The first systematic attempts to utilize female labour for munitions work arose from the 
creation of a special war register by the Board of Trade in March 1915.82  With the 
introduction of conscription in January 1916, the replacement on the factory floor of the 
men now in uniform assumed the highest priority and it seemed to accelerate the entry 
into industry of large numbers of women.  After a faltering start, the number of women 
workers in key industries rose from a national total of 212,000 in 1914 to 819,000 by 
1917, with overall female employment increasing from 5,966,000 in 1914 to 7,311,000 
in 1918.83  In 1916, Ryder’s Annual stated that for Wednesbury, ‘the insistent demand 
for munitions of war, and especially of shells, also led to the employment of large 
numbers of women and girls in the various factories engaged on war contracts’.84 
Some firms had already assumed responsibility for training their own female 
workers, whereas others benefited from the courses offered at technical colleges and 
other training facilities.  On 28 October 1916, the Midland Advertiser featured an article 
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‘Women Munitions Workers – Wednesbury Education Committee seeking students’ 
describing the County Metallurgical and Engineering Institute’s scheme to train women 
aged between 18-45 years to become munitions workers.  Lasting six weeks, the 
scheme’s suitability for soldiers’ wives was stressed and reference made to how the 
wider community could assist with supporting these women’s childcare arrangements. 
The Midland Counties Express of 11 November 1916 reported in an item, ‘Women 
Workers – Patriotic Services as Munitions Workers – How they are trained in Walsall 
and Wednesbury’ on a visit to such training facilities by the Government’s Special 
Commissioner.  It was stated that the absence of pay was an obstacle in the case of some 
of these women because they had to face the cost of living during the period of 
instruction.  It further noted that the women would receive between 30 and 35s. per 
week as soon as they were able to gain employment.  Drawing attention to the numerous 
applications for admission to the scheme that had been made, it added that ‘In all cases 
the training is given free but the student undertakes to enter a munitions factory at the 
end of the course’.85  It is important to note that in most parts of the country, there had 
been no agreement negotiated on the wage rates to be payable to women workers.  The 
major exception, however, as has been pointed out by Hugh Clegg, was in the Black 
Country and this was entirely due to ‘the settlement between the Midland Employers’ 
Federation and the Workers’ Union following the 1913 Black Country strike’.86 
The day-to-day requirements of war work ensured that it was not a safe option; it 
was often extremely arduous and dangerous labour, with the performance of shifts in 
excess of twelve hours being commonplace.  In the most part, rather than being dilutees, 
the women workers were substitutes carrying out simple, repetitive work.  Of course, 
this could also be highly physical, strenuous and exhausting.  Employment conditions 
varying between trades and workplaces, adequate amenities such canteens and separate 
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toilet facilities often had to be introduced by the companies to accommodate the needs 
of their new and growing workforces.  As Braybon noted, some employers ‘often took 
advantage of women’s patriotism to make them work harder and longer than they would 
have done in peacetime’.87  There was also the high risk of industrial accidents and 
fatalities due to the nature of the work, the machinery operated or the substances 
handled, with chemicals such as TNT dyeing the skin and hair of those working with it.  
In 1916 alone, 52 deaths occurred due to chemical poisoning but censorship under the 
DORA legislation ensured that this went unreported in the press for fear of damaging 
civilian morale.88  Woollacott acknowledged that, ‘Although the deaths were only a 
fraction of those of the armed forces, a significant number of men and women 
munitions workers laid down their lives for their country as surely as did the troops’.89 
What Braybon has described as the ‘romantic idea, commonly held, that the 
classes came together through munitions work’ was in general terms a far from accurate 
depiction, being the home front equivalent of ‘the myth of class harmony in the 
trenches’.90  Kozak has stressed that despite the official publicity, ‘the well-worn image 
of the Florence Nightingale-type of woman taking up patriotic munitions work had little 
basis in fact’.91  The majority of the women munitions workers were from a working-
class background, working out of economic necessity rather than choice; frequently, 
they were either already employed and had transferred occupation, or they had returned 
to the workplace they had left following marriage and motherhood.  Many of the latter 
were wives and mothers working to supplement the meagre Separation Allowances 
received when husbands and/or other male family members were on active service.92  
Where women from the other social classes performed work in the war industries, and 
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there were middle-class women who did so, it was generally in supervisory or welfare 
capacities that this employment was carried out since it was believed that these women 
possessed the authority needed to maintain acceptable standards of behaviour.  The 
benefits that the working-class women attained during the war were the increased 
employment opportunities, better health due to higher wage levels and a greater degree 
of confidence and independence, financially and socially, than hitherto possible.  In 
remarking that ‘factory work supplied the women with a sense of achievement and 
agency outside the confines of the house’, Culleton endorsed this interpretation.93 
The war has been credited with the attainment of many changes that were 
already underway.  It can be argued that it created a new and modern image for women 
workers, especially for those in the munitions industries, who were given the popular 
nicknames of munitionettes or Tommy’s Sister.  Contemporary propaganda tended to 
emphasize the higher motivation of patriotism.  As Susan Pyecroft noted, ‘the glowing 
press reports did not always reflect conditions on the shop floor’ or comment on the 
stoicism of those contending daily with dangerous and sweated working conditions.94  
Hopkins rightly maintained that these women deserved ‘recognition for their war 
service just as much as the men in the trenches’.95  However, working-class women also 
had to tolerate regulation by curfew and prohibition under the DORA legislation, and 
press and public criticism owing to perceptions of their behaviour outside of work and 
for the supposedly extravagant manner in which they spent their wages.  It was 
emphasized by Woollacott that they were considered threatening ‘when they sought by 
their own agency to control and shape that experience to their own ends’ and the classic 
view ‘that women were recruited eagerly by employers, and that they left willingly, of 
their own accord, when they were no longer needed’ does not stand up to scrutiny.96 
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The implications for the nation’s workforce of the eventual return to peace were 
discussed as early as October 1916, with the publication of the first (interim) report of 
the sub-committee on the demobilization of the army.  This document recognized that 
assistance would have to be provided to those servicemen unable to secure immediate 
employment upon their return to civilian life.  To prevent the labour market being 
flooded by these men, the sub-committee made recommendations for the payment of 
unemployment insurance and for Labour Exchanges to take an active role in assisting 
the men to find suitable work.97  This was not forgetting the undertaking made by many 
employers at the outbreak of the war that for those men who went away, their jobs (or 
other employment) would be available upon their return.98  So that by 1918, the 
implications for the current workforce of the eventual return to peace were beginning to 
be contemplated.  An example may be elicited from the minutes of the 2 February 1918 
meeting of the Wednesbury branch of the ASE.  Within this document, there was 
reference to the impact of the Government’s manpower proposals and, in order to 
discuss this, nominations for delegates to attend a national conference were invited.99 
On 26 October 1918, the Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald 
questioned what would happen to the women munitions workers with the approach of 
peace and a realignment of industry away from war work that was expected to follow 
soon thereafter.  This newspaper anticipated that there could be a widespread 
dislocation in employment, women having to give way to men who had completed their 
military service.100  There was the recollection in many minds of the wartime 
recruitment campaigns that had urged the employers to keep their men’s jobs open for 
their eventual return from the war.  For instance, David Englander cited William 
Beveridge’s comment from October 1916 ‘that unemployment experienced at the end of 
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the war will be predominantly that of workpeople substituted during the war for men 
joining the forces, or drawn from the munitions trades rather than that of the soldiers 
themselves’.101  This would have a major social as well as economic impact locally, 
therefore.  It is important to record the ambivalence of all parties to the plight of these 
women at this time, who despite their invaluable contribution to the winning of the war, 
were still seen as a temporary and inferior alternative to male labour, and as such, 
superfluous to the plans for post war reconstruction.  In the majority of cases, women 
workers were expected to return to the roles that they had previously held in British 
society.  Malcolm Brown pointed out that whilst the transformation had been temporary, 
the ‘movement of women from the private to the public world and the 
acknowledgement of a new relationship with the state would become permanent’.102 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The BBC television series The Great War noted the means by which industry had been 
transformed so that ‘Britain was now the war factory of the Allies’.103  As this was from 
the outset a conflict between populous and powerful industrialized nations, it followed 
that their economies would be capable of using the latest technologies to supply their 
armies with weaponry of a quality and quantity that would have been unimaginable a 
generation before.  The aim of this Chapter, therefore, was to examine Wednesbury’s 
munitions production and to carry out an in depth exploration of the experience of those 
who were involved in that work in order to gain some appreciation of and insight into 
the industrial changes that were necessitated by the war emergency.  In addition, this 
would allow for an assessment of the impact that these developments had on the 
employment experience of the men and women of the town’s working-class community. 
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In spite of the continual advancement of engineering and metal-based 
manufacturing in the latter years of the nineteenth-century and during the first decade of 
the twentieth century, the outbreak of the First World War had found many sectors of 
the British economy very much ill prepared for and unable to face the immediate and 
rapidly accelerating requirements for military hardware.  Adherence to an approach of 
business as usual had been manifestly unsuccessful so that ‘the wartime experience 
offered a fundamental challenge to the doctrines of economic industrialization and 
laissez-faire which had dominated the nineteenth century’.104  Accordingly, and within 
the relatively short period of four years, the introduction of processes that were more 
efficient and effective, improved technologies and innovative approaches to the 
mobilization of the workforce (and particularly the employment of women).  This 
enabled local enterprises to be able to deliver the immense quantities of equipment and 
ordnance that were required to wage the war successfully.  Such remodelling of British 
industry was of revolutionary proportions, albeit of a temporary nature, with the 
exceptional involvement of the British state.  The intervention included extensive 
participation in the recruitment, deployment and organization of the workforce and, for 
the first time, widespread consideration of the welfare needs of the nation’s employees. 
The working-class people of Wednesbury played a crucial role in supplying an 
extensive range of war munitions to all of the armed forces including, notably, the first 
tanks to be deployed by British forces on the Western Front during 1916.  The 
patriotism of this community was well established before the war, and it persevered to 
endure the day-to-day experiences and hardships in a protracted war of national 
survival.  Consideration of the complex interactions and the strategies required to deal 
with problems of local industrial relations, and the level of equality of sacrifice required 
to achieve victory, are themes that will be explored in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5:  INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DURING THE WAR 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The burden of producing the armaments while shouldering most of the privations of war 
fell principally on the country’s labour force.  Pre-war industrial conflict and social 
division had created reservations at the highest levels of government about the 
reliability of a working class that was, as Bourne noted, ‘the least militarized in Europe.  
Its attitude to the army was almost wholly negative even when not openly hostile’.1 
This Chapter examines the munitions industries during the war, giving an 
overview of the national picture in conjunction with a discussion of local developments 
in Wednesbury regarding industrial relations and productivity.  Consideration is given 
to attitudes within the trade union movement and the manner in which, following the 
dilemma of whether to adhere to pacifist inclinations, a patriotic stance largely was 
adopted, leading to the Treasury Agreement of March 1915.  The consequences of the 
growth of the labour movement, the emergence of new and powerful representation at 
shop floor level and the tensions between craft unions acting on behalf of the skilled 
workers and the general unions that campaigned for their semi-skilled and unskilled 
colleagues, will be assessed.  Further consideration of the essential issues of dilution 
and substitution, as highlighted in the previous Chapter, together with the impact of 
women workers are therefore integral to this.  A section will recount the strike that 
occurred at the Crown tube works of James Russell & Sons in Wednesbury during the 
summer of 1917.  As with the 1913 Black Country strike, this dispute carried great 
significance and its implications for the war effort were so serious that the matter was 
drawn to the attention of the War Cabinet.  Accordingly, there will be an account of the 
causes that motivated the strike, the actions taken by the protagonists, and its outcome 
and legacy for the men and women of Wednesbury and the wider Black Country. 
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5.2 The labour movement in wartime 
During July and early August 1914, many trade unionists had participated in the anti-
war demonstrations that were being held across the country at that time.  Yet, following 
Britain’s declaration of war on 4 August, and with the exception of some members of 
the Independent Labour Party (ILP) including such prominent individuals as James 
Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden, the labour movement was to drop its 
opposition to the war.2  As G.D.H. Cole related during 1915, this development was to be 
‘the signal for an industrial truce.  The important strikes which were in progress when 
war broke out were quickly settled, generally without consultation of the rank-and-file’.3 
In its simplest terms, the choice that was confronting the labour movement could 
be articulated in terms of patriotism or pacifism, with the non-partisan views of the 
Union of Democratic Control (UDC), created to call for a public examination by 
Parliament of war aims and foreign policy, also being influential.  A wartime report 
produced by Assistant Commissioner Basil Thomson of the Metropolitan Police’s 
Criminal Investigation Department is enlightening in the insights that it provides.  For 
instance, Thomson cited the ILP and UDC as non-revolutionary organizations, which 
had taken the line that the continental nations should be left to settle their own quarrels 
on their own ground, and recorded that the pacifist views tended to hold more appeal 
with the intellectual members of the working class rather than the rank-and-file.4 
On 29 July 1914, the Labour-supporting Daily Herald newspaper alluded to the 
grave responsibility that was falling on the trade unions: ‘At any moment the working 
classes of Europe may be called upon to defend interests in which they are not 
concerned, for a cause that tends in no way to uplift them’.5  The decision of the 
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leadership of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), and supported by the majority of the 
Labour Party, was for a total commitment to sustaining the war effort, stemming from 
its democratic traditions and an abhorrence of “Prussianism”.  Avner Offer’s 
explanation is suggestive that the labour movement, having arrived at the conclusion 
that the struggle for peace was now lost, had changed its position and ‘largely adopted 
an attitude of sane patriotism’, with many of its leaders proceeding to become involved 
in the ‘relief activities of the War Emergency Workers National Committee’.6 
However, working-class compliance was generally not so passive and 
identification of the war with the protection of British society and its institutions against 
external threat was, as Horne suggested, the means of combining nation and labour and 
nation and the working class, ‘perceived in the light of the international crisis to be 
intimately connected’.7  Nicholas Mansfield has observed that many local trade 
unionists were actively involved in persuading their members to join the forces, so that 
‘by early December 1914, the Daily Citizen reported that 250,000 trade unionists had 
enlisted’.8  In explaining this apparent new consensus, Waites has borrowed the concept 
of the moral economy that had been used by Edward Thompson to explore the 
legitimizing notions behind the eighteenth century food riots and the popular consensus 
regarding the rights of the people.  Building upon this idea, Waites proposed that the 
‘common mentalities of a distinct subculture’ within working-class communities ‘co-
existed with people’s patriotism and a nationalist “mass culture” to legitimise the war’.9 
While recognising that the labour movement’s support for the war effort 
appeared at times both laudable and understandable, Corfield and others have offered 
some rather more pragmatic explanations, however.  Namely, that it would have been 
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extremely difficult to avoid without incurring serious repercussions in the eyes of an 
overwhelmingly patriotic working-class community.  There was also the very real 
possibility of vilification by the other classes of British society, which were concerned 
‘about the malleability and irrationalism of the masses’.10  In spite of the strikes of 1911-
1914, the labour movement was essentially pragmatic and reformist in outlook; 
characteristics underlining a readiness to cooperate that went beyond simple patriotism.  
In concurring with Patrick Joyce’s analysis, Geoffrey Field attributed this to ‘the power 
of other sources of social identity and social imagery than class and to the continuing 
strength within the labour movement of nineteenth century radical liberalism’.11 
A prophetic warning was made by the Daily Herald in the war’s earliest days:  
‘It is the duty of all now to insist that the poor shall be protected against the 
machinations of plunderers, who, taking advantage of the necessities of the people, will 
force up food prices’.12  For the next two years, industrial relations in the manufacturing 
industries enjoyed an unparalleled absence of strife until such factors as wages being 
unable to keep pace with rising prices and the first public revelations of the making of 
extraordinary profits provided a potent symbol for workplace disharmony.  However, 
this does contrast with the experience in the rural areas of the Midlands, where the 
patriotism generated by the war was used to blur class divisions and reinforce 
conservative attitudes.  This is highlighted by Mansfield’s research into the experience 
of Shropshire’s agricultural workers, showing that from 1917 the growing power of the 
farm workers’ trade unions and attempts to redress rural poverty were diffused by the 
renewal of a sense of loyalty to country and the nation, fostered by the rural elites.13 
                                               
10
  T. Corfield, p. 21; J. Horne, Labour at War: France and Britain, 1914-1918, p. 49; A.J. Adams, ‘Working 
Class Organisation, Industrial Relations and Labour Unrest, 1914-1921’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Leicester, 1988), p. 1. 
11
  G. Field, ‘Social Patriotism and the British Working Class: Appearance and Disappearance of a Tradition’, 
International Labor and Working Class History, 42 (1992), p. 24. 
12
  Daily Herald, 5 August 1914.  This article is reproduced in C. Hampton, ed., A Radical Reader: The 
Struggle for Change in England, 1381-1914, p. 601. 
13
  N. Mansfield, pp. 123-128. 
139 
 
Locally, on 30 October 1915, the Midland Advertiser reported on a meeting held 
in Wednesbury at which the Wolverhampton MP, Alfred Bird, had addressed the 
employees of Messrs Edwin Richards & Sons and of Messrs C. Walsh Graham.  In this 
speech, he declared that ‘we now have two kinds of soldiers: there were the soldiers in 
the trenches and the workers at their benches, and they were absolutely indispensable to 
each other’.  There was also the warning that Germany had prepared for this war by 
assembling a system of espionage, which could only be thwarted by the workers and 
soldiers blending their efforts in effective combination.  Mr Bird received great 
applause from this largely working-class audience when he stated that the ‘consistency, 
regularity, worth and ability of British workers had no equal in the world’.14 
The tendency for levels of trade to fluctuate even on a localized basis had 
resulted in the implementation of the district bargaining arrangements that had operated 
before the war.  The consequence of this, as demonstrated in disputes such as the 1913 
Black Country strike, was that even for workers undertaking similar employment, the 
wages and differentials could differ between near localities.  As Waites observed, rates 
of pay were ‘strongly influenced by customary comparison which the skilled and 
unskilled in one trade made with each other, and with other men of similar levels of 
skill in other trades in the district’.15  Richard Price described this labour process as, 
‘above all else a social process in which the technical characteristics of a particular 
work environment shape and condition the forms of struggle for authority and control’.16 
The necessity of finding alternative mechanisms and structures to settle 
industrial disputes during the war and without recourse to strike action became 
increasingly urgent.  Three-way collaboration between the state, employers and 
organized labour began to evolve.  However, it proved to be an unequal relationship 
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with the trade unions having to rely on consultation, delegations, lobbying and moral 
persuasion when making the case on behalf of their memberships.  Real wages fell by 
thirty per cent during the first two years of the war and, for the Black Country’s iron 
founders, who had been earning from 30 to 33s. per week in 1914, the purchasing power 
of this income declined to a level below that which had been the cause of the 1913 
strike.17  In January 1916, the Midland Advertiser reported that Wednesbury workers 
had rejected the proposed wage settlement that was being offered by the Midland 
Employers’ Federation.  A combined meeting of several trade unions had concluded 
that the increase of 2s. per week for day workers and 1s. 6d. for men aged 18 – 21 years 
and 1s. for youths, was unsatisfactory although strike action was not instigated.18 
National wage negotiations eventually allowed the engineering workers to 
recover some of the ground that had been lost as prices had continued to rise, and those 
working to piece rates rather than flat rates derived greater benefit from this, although 
the importance of maintaining earnings led to the greater involvement of the state in the 
resolution of trade disputes.  The records of the Chief Industrial Commissioner’s 
Department at the Board of Trade illustrate the attempts to reach conciliatory 
agreements by arbitration.  Three cases involving Wednesbury firms during the early 
years of the war are extant and provide good examples of this process.  In November 
1915, in the case of Messrs Edwin Pugh & Co. and the Amalgamated Society of Gas, 
Municipal and General Workers, regarding the piece rates paid to youths employed in 
making hand grenades, when the Commissioner found in favour of the employer. 19  In 
August 1916, the case between Messrs James Russell & Sons and the Workers’ Union, 
concerning adjustments in the agreement between the Midland Employers’ Federation 
and the Midland Counties Tube Trade Federation, with the Commissioner determining 
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in favour of the union.20  In December 1916, between Messrs Isaiah Oldbury and the 
National Union of General Workers, for the payment of piece rates to various categories 
of workers, with the Commissioner again supporting the workers’ grievance.21 
The British Steel Smelters’ Mill, Iron, Tinplate and Kindred Trades 
Association’s records demonstrate the nature of the negotiations conducted by 
Wednesbury’s largest employer, the Patent Shaft & Axletree Co. Ltd.  On 24 May 1916, 
correspondence between the local branch of the Association and the organization’s 
General Secretary, John Hodge (who became the first Minister of Labour in Lloyd 
George’s Coalition administration in December 1916) indicated that for employees 
producing the steel to be cast for shell cases, the pay rates and war bonuses were 
incorrect.22  Reports of alterations to both wages and conditions between 30 June 1916 
and 4 February 1917 respectively confirmed that the firm’s crane drivers were to 
receive increased pay and bonuses due to the scale of work that was being carried out.23 
 
5.3 Industrial relations in wartime 
Important steps towards increasing industrial output occurred on 4 March 1915, when 
the Engineering Employers’ Federation, engineering trade unions and the government 
concluded the Shells and Fuses Agreement.  In return for the acceptance of greater 
flexibility by the unions, employers agreed to refrain from any erosion of pre-war 
conditions.24  This attitude was vociferously supported by the Wednesbury Herald in an 
article entitled, ‘Everybody’s Duty’.  This stated that, ‘we rely on the patriotic good 
sense of employers and employed to ensure that the reasonable requirements formulated 
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by the Government in the vital interests of the nation shall be cheerfully and completely 
fulfilled’.25  At the Midland Iron and Steel Wages Board meeting on 9 March 1915, a 
tribute was paid to the patriotism of the workers by the Chairman of that body, George 
Macpherson.  He observed that they had sent recruits to the armed forces, supported 
benevolent causes and adjusted their working conditions.  Negotiations on wages had 
been accepted by the unions because ‘it would be against the national interest to strike 
at the present juncture’.  Furthermore, ‘the men had pledged themselves to use the 
information they had among the workmen to the end that there should be no commotion 
of work, especially where contracts for the army and the allies are concerned’.26 
Successive national negotiations were held between 17-19 March 1915 at a 
Treasury Conference that was attended by Arthur Henderson and other leading trade 
unionists; the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George; and the President of 
the Board of Trade, Walter Runciman.  The outcome was that the unions relinquished 
the right to strike in favour of binding arbitration and relaxed restrictive practices.  In 
return, it was agreed that skilled wage rates would be upheld, that the measures were for 
the duration of the war, and the excessive profits derived from war work would be 
subject to taxation.27  In a speech on 10 May 1915, Lloyd George reiterated the need for 
employers to produce munitions, stating that ‘we propose to take steps under the 
Defence of the Realm Act to compel these gentlemen to use the whole of their resources 
for the purpose of increasing the supply of shell’.  Reference was then made to gaining 
co-operation when it was necessary, ‘to eke out, as it were, the skilled workman with 
either unskilled or female labour’, adding that they were already doing this in France.28 
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The Treasury Agreement was concluded by the nation’s leading trade unionists 
but, as argued by Henry Phelps Brown, it ‘could not and did not forthwith commit their 
members up and down the country’ attached to hard-won principles of free collective 
bargaining.  To ensure conformity at all levels of industry, the government ‘judged it 
advisable to give the necessary statutory backing to a Munitions of War Act which 
made it an offence to take part in a stoppage in any of the industries scheduled in the 
Act’.29  Introduced on 3 July 1915, this legislation sought to control the labour market 
and prevent interruptions to production.  Reid maintained that, ‘although there were 
clauses in the Act which could be used by hard-line employers as the nearest 
approximation to industrial compulsion’, government’s response recognized the 
importance of and was favourable to the unions from the outset.30  The National 
Advisory Committee’s memorandum on the organization of labour stressed that 
‘organized labour can and must take an essential and indispensible part, for with 
enthusiasm and unselfishness it can render invaluable service in a great national crisis’.31 
By willingly surrendering the right to strike without gaining any important 
concessions in return, the trade unions had relinquished what was arguably their most 
effective and potent weapon for dealing with partisan or uncompromising employers.  
This had been a decision of the union leadership, not the rank-and-file locally, and it 
had been made on the assumption that when peace returned the nation as a whole would 
be grateful to the workers for their sacrifice.32  It was also consistent with the generally 
held opinion that the war would be a brief one although as the months passed, the 
number of workplace grievances requiring settlement began to increase again.  This 
accentuated the importance of having more formalized bargaining procedures for, as 
                                               
29
  H. Phelps-Brown, The Origins of Trade Union Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 93. 
30
  A.J. Reid, ‘Dilution, Trade Unionism and the State in Britain During the First World War’ in Shop Floor 
Bargaining and the State: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. by S. Tolliday and  J. Zeitlin,       
p. 65; A. Clinton, p. 202. 
31
  TNA CAB 37/129/33: Acceleration of the Supply of Munitions: Memorandum of the National Advisory 
Committee, 1915. 
32
  G.J. De Groot, pp. 110-111. 
144 
 
Hyman argued, ‘the concept of an unofficial dispute became for the first time a clear 
one; and the union leaders were determined to prevent such outbreaks occurring’.33 
The developments of 1915 constituted the beginning of a major transition in the 
relationship between the state and its main interest groups, the employers and trade 
unions.  Waites suggested that notable differences remained, however, ‘in the ways in 
which government intruded into production and consumption, and into the everyday life 
of producers and consumers.34  Although state regulation and the need for cooperation 
between capital and labour undermined further business as usual, as Rodney Lowe 
noted, ‘many employers were still reluctant to recognize trade unions and consequently 
the unions were suspicious of the permanent use to which wartime concessions might be 
put’.35  Within the labour force itself, even though a prominence unobtainable before the 
war had been achieved, the friction between the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
categories of workers remained, however.36  Consultation, as Rubin indicated, prompted 
the ‘abandonment of the voluntarist, non-statist and non-legally hidebound system of 
pre-war industrial relations’ to clear the way for ‘a new political and economic strategy 
for industrial relations, which we describe as corporatism’.37  Reid has succinctly 
portrayed this as the ‘new kind of bargaining in which British Government offered large 
measures of social reform in order to win the co-operation of the working people’.38 
One of the consequences of the increasing effectiveness of trade unions and their 
enhanced bargaining power during the war was the putting aside of employer resistance 
to workplace organization, at least temporarily for the duration.  Membership in the 
                                               
33
  R. Hyman, p. 114. 
34
  G.R Rubin, War, Law and Labour: The Munitions Acts, State Regulation and the Unions, 1915-1921, p.13; 
B.A. Waites, ‘The Government of the Home Front and the “Moral Economy” of the Working Class’ in 
Home Fires and Foreign Fields: British Social and Military Experience in the First World War, ed. by  
P.H. Liddle, p. 175. 
35
  R. Lowe, ‘The Ministry of Labour, 1916-1919: A Still, Small Voice’ in War and the State: The 
Transformation of British Government, 1914-1919 ed. by K. Burk (London: Allan & Unwin, 1982), p. 115. 
36
  N. Whiteside, ‘Welfare Legislation and the Unions during the First World War’, The Historical Journal,  
23 (4) (1980), p. 858. 
37
  G.R Rubin, War, Law and Labour: The Munitions Acts, State Regulation and the Unions, 1915-1921, p.7. 
38
  A.J. Reid, ‘World War I and the Working Class in Britain’ in Total War and Social Change, ed. by             
A. Marwick (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 23. 
145 
 
general unions of the semi- and unskilled workers rose dramatically and, for example, 
the Workers’ Union gained over 250,000 new members by 1918.39  This added to the 
responsibilities undertaken by local officials and, as Waites has suggested, was to lead 
to ‘a toughening of labour organization and a transfer to them of power and prestige’.40  
In Wednesbury, this union increased its branches from four to six, and there was a 
consistent year-on-year increase in membership, even allowing for the surge that 
occurred during and in the months that followed the Black Country strike of 1913.41  In 
an article entitled, ‘The Patriotism of the Nation’s Workers’, the Express and Star 
reported on the 30
th
 annual conference of the Midland Counties Trades Federation in 
July 1916.  Parallels were drawn between the plight of small nations in need of 
protection from aggressors and the principles of trade unionism to ‘stand by every man 
until he had a living wage’.  The MCTF pledged itself to ‘give every assistance to the 
government to carry on the war until it has defeated the common enemy of mankind’. 42 
The continuation of industrialized trench warfare on the scale of the First World 
War required much more from the nation’s labour force than could ever have been 
imagined by those entering into the industrial truce of 1914.  The unprecedented 
requirement for munitions led to attempts to conserve skilled workers via the granting 
of exemptions to those working in the ‘starred’ occupations in engineering (August 
1915), and by the issuing of badges (February 1916), trade cards (November 1916) and 
the Schedule of Protected Occupations (April 1917).43  The engineering and metal 
manufacturing industries enjoyed a long tradition whereby there had been domination 
by craft unions that refused admission to women and to newcomers who had not served 
the long apprenticeship deemed necessary for membership.  The general unions such as 
the Workers’ Union had been the beneficiaries during a recent rapid expansion and, 
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with the coming of the war, their members were now taking on some of the roles in the 
workplace formerly performed by skilled workers, yet the skilled workers alone enjoyed 
the immunity from conscription.  This represented the latest stage in a strained 
workplace relationship, the antagonism within the working class arising from the 
divisions between the various strata of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers.44 
The craft unions were in a far stronger position to exert pressure on employers 
and the government than the other agencies of the labour movement.  In May 1915, the 
ASE, having secured an agreement with engineering employers to exempt their 
members from military service, at the same time rejected overtures from the Workers’ 
Union for closer links and, as Tanner noted, this action by the ASE incurred criticism 
for being party to ‘secret diplomacy on the manpower question’.45  Nevertheless, despite 
the steps taken to preserve skilled men and their jobs, there was an influx of unqualified 
and untrained diluted labour at the lower levels of the industrial hierarchy.  Eventually, 
even the jealously guarded privileges of the craft unions were to be overtaken by the 
countervailing pressure of inducing into the army as many men as possible.46 
The war confronted the leaders and members of trade unions with difficult 
industrial and political problems, typically on dilution, wage rates and the combing-out 
and conscription of workers.  Yet in discussing their industrial and political attitudes, 
Waites refers to the workers facing ‘acute contradictions between the conflict 
consciousness that arose at the workplace and their support for the war’.47  As Laybourn 
related, however, ‘most of the British workers were patriotic, accepted the industrial 
demands of the wartime government’ and ‘there was relatively little dissent against the 
war effort and revolutionary intent was minimal within the trade union movement’.48  
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This is evidenced by the report in the Express and Star on 28 May 1917, which stated 
with some satisfaction that the MCTF had provided no strike pay during the whole of 
the year, and this was due to ‘the conduct of officials and the rank-and-file’.49  Upon 
closer examination, however, war-weariness was becoming discernible before this date.  
Rising front line casualties, increasing food prices and rents, and shortages on the home 
front, gave the clear impression that Britain’s working class was bearing a sacrifice that 
was disproportionate to that elsewhere in society.  Thus far, patriotic sentiment had 
restrained excesses in bargaining and largely averted the necessity for strike action.  It 
had its limits, however, and the growing evidence of profiteering increased the working 
people’s scepticism.  This belief was eloquently stated in Askwith’s memoirs: 
While they were being called upon to be patriotic and refrain from 
using the strong economic position they occupied, employers, 
merchants and traders were being allowed perfect freedom to exploit to 
the fullest the nation’s needs.50 
 
On 20 July 1917, the Express and Star captured the public mood with its 
assertion that ‘the feeling amongst the people is strong that they are being unfairly 
treated, nay misled, and much evidence exists in support of this statement’.51  This 
affront to the working class community arguably did more to encourage the growth of 
class-consciousness than any specific dispute, with Waites asserting that it constituted a 
fundamental shift ‘in the value cluster of the working-class moral economy’.52 
Across the nation, the engineering industries were troubled by periods of unrest 
during the years 1917 and 1918, with a number of strikes being a reaction to 
profiteering or the product of pacifist agitation.53  This coincided with the negative view 
within the local trade union branches of the passivity of the labour movement’s national 
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leadership.  Increasingly perceived as an abdication of responsibility, a vacuum was 
created and filled by the emergence of a radical shop stewards’ movement.  Henry 
Pelling acknowledged that shop stewards had existed before the war to carry out union-
related administrative tasks in the workplace but now ‘they made their appearance with 
impunity and often exercised an important role, especially in the large factories of the 
engineering industries’.54  By providing some validation and moral justification for this 
response to working-class economic grievances, and being easily accessible to union 
members, these representatives (many of whom still subscribed to the syndicalist 
notions of worker control) began to exert some influence, albeit for a brief duration 
since the bulk of trade unionists and the wider working class remained unpoliticized. 
The Government’s response to the engineering disputes across the country in the 
spring of 1917 came on 13 June 1917 was the establishment of Commissions of Enquiry 
into Industrial Unrest for eight munitions districts, including the West Midlands.55  The 
Commission’s report acknowledged that the area had been generally free of strikes, 
which was due to ‘the wise and patriotic action taken by the employers’ federation and 
by the trade union leaders, and by the people generally’.  The report stressed the ‘bitter 
resentment amongst workers at the thought that someone is making excess profits out of 
them’.56  The main areas of discontent have been extracted from the evidence by George 
Barnsby: the trade card system’s protection of skilled workers from conscription, loss of 
hard-won union liberties, dilution, leaving certificates, the differentials between skilled 
and unskilled labour, and rising food prices.  Barnsby’s assessment was that all the 
official report achieved was to make ‘a series of the most anodyne proposals for most of 
these ills’.57  Subsequent Ministry of Labour Situation reports provide evidence that 
numerous small-scale disputes in local firms continued into 1918 and through to the end 
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of the war.  At this point, these were mainly concerned with the calling up of skilled 
men for military service when dilutees were available and had not been conscripted.58 
Hence, women war workers were often caught up in continuing conflicts 
between employers and trade unions.  There had been reluctance on the part of some 
employers to take on female labour at all because they did not wish to encourage the 
principle of equal pay for equal work.  Many firms were concerned at the costs of 
introducing new machinery and techniques, together with the additional supervision and 
training needed, and the employment of women in roles formerly occupied by men 
created speculation about their capability and potential.  As early as 1916, reservations 
about the efficiency of women workers were being articulated in the columns of the 
Express and Star, with one correspondent’s view being that only a fraction of the work 
was actually performed and that ‘they should be called munitions shirkers!’ was greeted 
with a barrage of criticism from other readers.59  As Kozak asserted, ‘by and large the 
Government extolled the virtues of the women workers, employers found dilution in 
munitions profitable, whilst trade unions were careful not to appear too blatantly 
discriminatory.60  The fragmented attitude towards dilution and substitution resulted in 
hostility to women working in the formerly male-dominated occupations, where it was 
believed that as well as giving up the right to strike, they had opened the way for anyone 
to do their jobs.  There was the widespread expectation that unscrupulous employers 
would exploit an inexperienced female labour force, reducing wages and eroding 
conditions.  The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions commented as follows: 
Women were badly organized, prone to manipulation by employers, 
ignorant of workshop practices, in particular defensive practices; and 
content to work in lowly positions for low pay.  Women did not enjoy 
the protection of custom, they were not organized in strong trade unions 
nor could such organizations be built up in an emergency.61 
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This was compounded because some unions had not accepted female members 
before the war, or women had been effectively prohibited from joining as their part-time 
hours and low pay prevented them from paying the subscription fees.  In time, with 
growing expectations and the greater sense of collective entitlement and other benefits 
of union membership becoming more apparent, female participation in the trade unions 
rose dramatically, so that total female membership increased from 357,000 in 1914 to 
1,086,000 by 1918.  The Workers’ Union annual reports reveal that its female 
membership improved from less than 5,000 to over 80,000 during the same period, and 
that from having just one female official (namely Julia Varley) covering the whole 
country, by the end of the war there twenty female organizers employed by the union. 62 
The increase in union membership among female munitions workers noticeably 
affected the balance of negotiating power, since not only were the general unions 
strengthened in numerical terms, wage levels in the diluted occupations had held up 
well during the war to the benefit of both the men and women employed in those roles.  
Consequently, the general unions were to emerge from the war as amongst the most 
successful of organizations due to their ability to mobilize the large numbers of semi-
skilled and unskilled munitions workers.  Seeing the war as a means for making 
progress in the attainment of equal rights, Julia Varley supported mixed union branches, 
stating that ‘Both sexes should pay in the same book and meet in the same room’.63 
Nationally, the views of the popular press with respect to the trade unions and 
strikes tended to be highly critical, and especially so during wartime.  The economic and 
military impact was such that as indicated by Sven Müller, ‘contemporaries regarded 
strikes or the absence of strikes as an essential indicator of the powers of endurance of 
both one’s country and the country of one’s enemies’.64  Examples are encapsulated in a 
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series of cartoons that appeared in Punch and which were syndicated to other local 
publications, in this case the Midland Counties Express.  It is notable how they become 
increasingly accusatory in tone as the years pass, beginning in March 1915 with appeals 
to refrain from industrial action, followed by the questioning of workers’ patriotism, and 
culminating in October 1918 with the depiction of the stereotypical trade unionist as a 
traitor, willing to stab his working-class brother, the front-line Tommy, in the back.65  
These contrast strikingly with a local press nearer to its working-class readership rather 
than a middle-class audience with, for example, an article in the Midland Advertiser and 
Wednesbury Herald on 2 June 1917 concerning Teddy Williams, a Wednesbury trade 
unionist who had voluntarily enlisted in the South Staffordshire Regiment.  Believed 
killed in action on 17 February 1917, official notification had been received that he was 
now a prisoner of war in Germany.  This newspaper was moved to comment: 
That in the days after the war, industrial strife will, if it exists at all, be 
experienced in an atmosphere of conciliation where there will be 
opportunity for that peculiar brand of sweet reasonableness which under 
a rough exterior of blunt manner and sometimes crude utterance 
manifested itself in the gallant Tommy who is now captive in the 
enemy’s country.66 
 
In contrast to the demonizing of wartime trade unionism, further evidence of the 
extent of working-class support for the wider war effort is discernible in some of the 
surviving local trade union records, such as those of the Wednesbury branch of the 
ASE.  Included in these documents are the frequent financial contributions from the 
members to the various funds for the welfare of sailors and soldiers and their families.  
Also of importance is the continued payment of subscriptions to their union made by 
those men who were now in uniform and who wished to retain their branch membership 
in expectation of resuming employment in their particular trade in peacetime.67 
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5.4 The 1917 Crown tube works strike 
Tony Adams has emphasised ‘the ability of trade unions to construct an identification 
between their own fortunes and those of others within the local community’.68  An 
incident occurred in Wednesbury during the summer of 1917 to illustrate such a 
connection, with the workers and their trade unions appearing in a very different light to 
that generally portrayed in the press.  Given its implications, it was of such importance 
that the highest levels of government were made aware of it, with the War Cabinet 
memoranda of 1 August 1917 concluding: ‘The incident is not without significance’.69 
Specifically, this concerned a strike that had broken out at the Crown tube works 
of James Russell & Sons, one of the largest factories in the town.70  The dispute’s 
origins can be traced back to the morning of 26 July 1917, when a former employee of 
the company, Frank Bowen Smith, arrived at the Crown works site with the intention of 
regaining his old job.  This man had volunteered for the army at the outbreak of the war, 
served with distinction on the Western Front (including being mentioned in despatches), 
and had been honourably discharged following wounds received that resulted in the loss 
of his leg.  Notably, the press reports pointed out that Smith wore the Silver War 
Badge.71  In returning to his former employer, he said that he was ‘depending upon a 
promise given in the early stages of the war that every man who offered himself for the 
fighting forces would be given his job again if he returned’ and that ‘if wounded or 
invalided he should be found employment suitable to his physical condition’.72  Upon 
his discharge, Smith would have forsaken his army pay and any separation allowance 
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that had been payable to his family by the state.  The imbursement of the disability 
pensions being notoriously slow, this may have necessitated his search for work.73 
Having reported to the firm’s main office, where he had been told to wait and a 
job would be found for him, the reward for the former soldier’s valour was to endure an 
abrupt interrogation by the works superintendent, Alexander Marshall, who had not 
recognized Smith and demanded to know why he was there.  Despite the explanation 
given, Marshall ordered Smith out of the office, stating that it was not the place for him, 
before physically manhandling him and telling him to go and wait outside, at the factory 
gate.  This incident was witnessed by several other workers, who felt a great sense of 
outrage at the deplorable treatment meted out to the wounded ex-serviceman by this 
manager, and they swiftly communicated this to other employees.  When news of what 
had happened became known more widely, over 1,800 of the firm’s employees ceased 
work immediately, proceeding to walk out of the factory to commence a strike.74 
Meetings of the Crown’s workforce were held in Wednesbury during that day 
and the next, and their demands were made known to the firm.  These were that Frank 
Smith should be reinstated without any delay, and that for his behaviour Alexander 
Marshall should be dismissed.  The Company’s senior management were keen to make 
amends for the offence caused and offered reassurances that the promise to returning 
soldiers would be honoured in full.  They attempted to gloss over Marshall’s treatment 
of Smith, however, by suggesting that ‘the men were under a misapprehension in regard 
to the official concerned’.75  This was not well received by the firm’s workforce and it 
was apparent that Marshall ceased to hold the confidence of the Crown work’s 
employees, who passed a resolution that the Ministry of Munitions should be requested 
to hold a full inquiry into the matter.  The branch secretary of the Workers’ Union, Fred 
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Thorpe ‘expressed himself pleased that the men of the Crown tube works had stood by 
one of the men who they believed had been treated in a very shabby fashion’.76 
Although a return to work had occurred on 30 July 1917, when it became 
evident that no action was going to be taken against Marshall by the company, the strike 
action was resumed, beginning with the night shift.  The Workers’ Union Birmingham 
Organizer, John Beard (well known locally, and especially for the role he had played in 
the 1913 Black Country strike) informed the Express and Star that Marshall ‘could see 
the silver badge…and even he might have been civil to a silver badged man’.77  Support 
for the Crown work’s strikers was offered by the trade unionists from the Patent Shaft & 
Axletree Co. Ltd., and from several other firms in Wednesbury, together with those in 
the nearby localities of Darlaston and Tipton.  Fred Thorpe had referred to ‘the 
seriousness of the position in regard to output’ and he added that ‘the men had the 
support of workers in other districts in the attitude they had taken up’.78  The Express 
and Star was certain that what could be detected was the same strength of feeling and 
spirit in the people in Wednesbury and its neighbouring towns that had endured to win 
an earlier dispute.  The viewpoint of this newspaper was that many ‘were prepared to 
cease work in support of the action of the men at the Crown works, similar to 1913’.79 
Negotiations now involved the principal trade unions providing representation to 
the majority of the Crown works’ employees.  Accordingly, John Beard of the Workers’ 
Union and the other representatives (from the Engineers and Firemen’s Union and the 
Tube maker’s Society) held several meetings during the following days with the 
company’s management, which included the chairman (Councillor Stanley Mills Slater) 
and the managing director (Frederick Guy).  This represented an attempt to reach a 
conciliatory understanding that would minimize the impact of the dispute on the firm’s 
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production for the war effort.80  In a meeting at Wednesbury Town Hall on 9 August 
1917 that was chaired by Fred Thorpe, it was made clear that the measures proposed by 
the firm were deemed most unsatisfactory.  Mr J. Wright of the Engineers and 
Firemen’s Union told this gathering that ‘in future it would be the duty of every worker 
to see that when their brothers came back from the war, they shall have justice done’.81  
In a secret ballot subsequently held in Wednesbury on 10 August 1917, over 95 per cent 
of the workers who voted indicated their intention to remain out and on strike until their 
demands for Marshall’s dismissal and an inquiry were satisfied, thereby necessitating 
arbitration.82  Even such an anti-trade union newspaper as the Midland Advertiser and 
Wednesbury Herald was of the plain opinion that ‘the Wednesbury men in the trenches 
knew the exact position, and were with them as far as sympathy was concerned’.83 
From the point of view of the workers, the situation had become greatly 
inflamed because no public apology to Frank Smith had been offered by Marshall, 
although a letter giving his version of the events of 26 July was published in the Express 
and Star on 9 August 1917.  In this correspondence, he stated that he wished ‘to make it 
clear that I did not know that the stranger with whom I had been speaking was a 
returned soldier’.84  This account being refuted by the evidence that Smith was clearly 
wearing the Silver War Badge, it did little to endear Marshall to the Crown’s workforce.  
As reported in the Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald on 11 August, it was 
apparent that Marshall already had a poor reputation for his high-handed attitude, which 
had built up considerable resentment amongst the firm’s employees.  The workers’ 
representatives were of the conviction that had this been an isolated incident they would 
have been more willing to come to an accommodation with the firm but this injustice 
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was the latest in a long series of objectionable dealings and Marshall’s behaviour 
towards an ex-serviceman and loyal worker such as Frank Smith was the final straw.85 
 A meeting of the local trade unionists was convened on 15 August 1917 in 
Wednesbury, and was again chaired by Fred Thorpe, at which there were 
representatives from the tube workers and other associated trades.  Those present 
confirmed that ‘they had notified their employers that they were willing to support the 
men at the Crown tube works to any extent’.86  Assurances of sympathy, together with 
the prospect of supportive industrial action, if necessary, were also received from the 
trade unions representing these other engineering occupations and trades.  The 
difficulties of resolving the dispute having been communicated directly to the Ministry 
of Munitions, the representatives of both sides were informed that they were required to 
attend a summit to take place at the Ministry’s London offices on 16 August 1917.87 
The dispute finally came to its conclusion when an emergency conference of the 
National Employers’ Federation was convened in Birmingham on 24 August 1917.  
Testimony was taken from the relevant parties, including Messrs Smith and Marshall, 
and corroboration supplied by other witnesses to the event.  The finding of this body 
was that although it was an extremely unfortunate situation, it was felt that the demand 
for the dismissal of Marshall could not be supported.  Nevertheless, in the aftermath of 
these proceedings, Marshall resigned of his own accord and this decision was accepted 
by the Company.  On the following day, the unions met and a resolution to return to 
work was unanimously supported.88  The Ministry of Labour’s situation report for the 
week commencing 7 November 1917 indicated that the prospect of a further dispute at 
this works had been averted due to the success of the negotiations between the parties.89 
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It is notable that this strike occurred during a year in which immense pressure 
was being experienced by the allied cause.  In February 1917, Germany had resumed its 
policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in an attempt to disrupt the supplies of food 
and other necessities to Britain and its allies; and, in March, Russia had experienced the 
first of the year’s revolutions, upsetting the prospects for concerted action against the 
central powers on all fronts during 1917.  There was already considerable discontent 
amongst the munitions workers across the country, and especially those in the 
engineering trades, with disputes arising over pay and conditions, dilution and the 
combing-out of workers channelled to fill the ranks on the stalemated Western Front. 
The dispute in Wednesbury was of a completely different nature, however, and 
this is evidenced by the positive reporting of the local press.  The Midland Counties 
Express of 28 July 1917 highlighted the workers’ motivation, as they saw themselves 
‘acting in the interests of their comrades who were still fighting their battle in the 
trenches’, to which John Beard added in the Express and Star that ‘no one could charge 
the employees of the Crown tube works with a lack of patriotism’.90  On 11 August 
1917, Beard also informed the readers of the Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury 
Herald that ‘Nobody could accuse Wednesbury men of doing anything against the 
success of the war.’  Added to this, he stressed that the promise made to the workers by 
their employers ‘was based on the fundamental principles of liberty, and would have to 
be redeemed’.91  This sentiment was therefore entirely consistent with the motivation 
that had underpinned the earlier Black Country strike of 1913, with both of these 
disputes drawing support from across the community in Wednesbury and its 
neighbouring towns.  The Ministry of Labour’s report to the War Cabinet for the week 
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ending 8 August echoed this point of view by noting that ‘the incident suggests that the 
workers have a very high regard to the rights and interests of the discharged soldiers’.92 
Six months’ after the commencement of the Crown tube works dispute, in an 
article headed ‘Tribute to Labour – Extracts from Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches’, the 
Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald reproduced elements of his 25 December 
1917 despatch.  This had originally been published in the issue of the London Gazette 
dated 8 January 1918, with the relevant extracts supplied by the War Office.  Reference 
was made in the article to ‘the invaluable help and zeal manifested by the workers in the 
district in enabling the Commander-in-Chief to carry out so successfully his operations 
on the Western Front’.  Furthermore, it emphasized that in such times of anxiety and 
industrial unrest, the importance of the patriotic purpose of ‘stimulating more than ever 
the work people in the district, and the country generally, to bring about by their united 
efforts a speedy termination of the world-wide struggle’.  Within the article, there was 
featured a letter from Colonel S.L. Cozaster, Chief Mechanical Engineer, addressed to 
Messrs James Russell & Sons, Crown tube works, Wednesbury.  Writing on behalf of 
Major General Sir G. Scott Moncrieff, Colonel Cozaster highlighted the relevant 
sections of Field Marshal Haig’s despatch to openly acknowledge the efforts that were 
being undertaken at home to assist in winning the war.  Furthermore, the request was 
made to the firm that the appreciation and thanks of both the Field Marshal and Major 
General Moncrieff be communicated to ‘your staff, foremen and workmen, who have 
contributed to the successful supply of engineer stores to our armies in the field’.93  
The wider events of 1917 and their impact and consequences stimulated 
discussion within the local labour movement on the issue of the right to strike, with the 
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Wednesbury Trades and Labour Council’s proceedings being published in the local 
press in early September 1917.  Concerns were expressed by this forum’s executive 
committee with regard to the power accumulated by employers and the prospect of the 
permanent removal of the hard-won rights that the trade unions had surrendered for the 
duration of the hostilities.  The Express and Star reported that this Council was mindful 
of the prospect of there being a high demand for labour in the manufacturing industries 
after the war, due to the anticipated need for reconstruction.94  Hence, it was imperative 
that living standards should not be allowed to suffer.  The conclusion arrived at by the 
Council was that ‘the employers, politically and economically, were never more 
powerful than today’ and the workers ‘should not be deprived of their “most priceless 
treasure,” the power to strike and withhold their labour for the adjustment of wrongs’. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Expanding on the previous Chapter’s discussion of wartime munitions production in 
Wednesbury, the intention of this Chapter has been to give an account of industrial 
relations and productivity, exploring the way in which this affected both local industry 
and wider society.  Consideration has been given to the further development of the 
labour movement and the manner in which local trade unionists committed themselves 
to the aims of winning the war, especially in the light of negotiations such as the 1915 
Treasury Agreement.  The establishment and maintenance of local power bases by the 
new generation of general unions fostered an environment whereby wartime demands 
on issues such as equal pay and the widening of the scope of jobs previously restricted 
to skilled labour alone could be used to greater advantage.  Perhaps one of the ironies of 
this total war was that many people actually now enjoyed better living and working 
conditions than had been the case in peacetime, due to a combination of government 
intervention and trade union activism.  Of particular importance locally was the 
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Workers’ Union, which from 1913 onwards was to become increasingly dominant 
because its membership was open to the semi-skilled and unskilled workers, including 
the large influx of women munitions workers entering employment with local firms.  
Under the conditions of war, the wages of many workers rose to a level inconceivable 
before the war, providing a taste of ‘what life might be like with regular earnings and a 
higher standard of living’.95  The size and influence of the labour movement continued 
to grow and their efforts in achieving this enhanced not only the position of trade unions 
within their industries; it also added to their prestige in the community generally. 
That the 1913 Black Country strike had revealed a real spirit of community and 
worker solidarity was exhibited in Chapter 2, and this Chapter has provided evidence 
that the essential spirit of this was continued even during wartime.  The 1917 dispute at 
James Russell & Sons Crown tube works was a clear demonstration of the people’s 
reaction to the unjust treatment of a returned and wounded veteran, Frank Smith.  Such 
community patriotism was indicative of the wider concern for the welfare of the town’s 
men and the treatment they could expect when they returned home from the trenches.  
Because the existence of this type of ‘sectional patriotism of the workers was not 
antagonistic to a larger patriotism’, this meant that the working class emerged from the 
war as a more cohesive and powerful entity than it had entered it.96  These events 
highlighted in very practical terms the power that the local labour movement had now 
acquired for itself, both in the workplace and beyond.  The logical extension was 
therefore for organized labour to mobilize and seek political power at local and national 
levels, and this will be one of the themes to be discussed in Chapter 8.  Before 
proceeding to that, there will be an examination of another aspect of the home front; 
namely the air raid that was carried out by the Imperial German Navy’s Zeppelin 
airships on 31 January 1916, during which several Black Country towns were bombed. 
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CHAPTER 6:  ZEPPELINS OVER THE BLACK COUNTRY - 
THE MIDLANDS’ FIRST BLITZ 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The following extract is taken from a letter sent to his mother by Fregattenkapitän Peter 
Strasser, the commander of the Imperial German Navy’s Airship Division: 
We who strike the enemy where his heart beats have been slandered as 
baby killers and murderers of women.  What we do is repugnant to us 
too, but necessary, very necessary.  A soldier cannot function without 
the factory worker, the farmer and all the other providers behind them.  
Nowadays there is no such animal as a non-combatant.  Modern warfare 
is total warfare.1 
 
This statement articulates the rapidly changing nature of war in a conflict that 
harnessed industry and technology on an unprecedented scale, providing exceptional 
innovation in the development of armaments.  The majority of these were deployed at 
the front line but one weapon that had a profound impact on the British home front was 
the German airship.  This targeted cities and towns, industries and essential services, the 
workforce and ordinary civilians.  Whilst the damage and disruption were relatively 
limited, especially when compared with that taking place in later conflicts, fear and 
panic were widespread during what might be viewed as the first Battle of Britain. 
This Chapter is principally concerned with the German air raid that commenced 
on 31 January 1916; an incursion into the West Midlands by hostile aircraft during part 
of what was the first sustained strategic bombing campaign in military aviation history.2  
Commencing with an examination of the revolutionary development of the airship as an 
offensive weapon, thereby altering forever the relationship between the front line and 
the home front, the changing nature of warfare will be considered.  As a driving force in 
this process, the creation and aspects of the war service of the Germany Navy’s Airship 
Division, the Marine-Luftschiff-Abteilung, will be charted.  The focus will then shift to 
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the detail of the events of 31 January to 2 February 1916, when an audacious mission 
intended to make a clear statement about Germany’s ability to strike anywhere on the 
British mainland took place.  Following a discussion of the background to this 
operation, there will be an extensive examination of the participation of the Zeppelins 
L19 and L21, which were responsible for the bombing of Bradley, Tipton, Walsall and 
Wednesbury.  Coverage will be given to these towns and some of the individuals so 
tragically affected, of whom the Midland Advertiser commented on 5 February 1916: 
The people of Staffordshire have had an experience this week which 
they will never forget for the rest of their lives.  For the first time in 
eighteen months of warfare, the horrors of war were brought to their 
very doors.3 
 
There will be a discussion of the political, public and press reaction, the human 
and other costs, and the longer-term consequences for Britain and Germany.  A 
previously neglected area concerns the early history of Britain’s air defences and the 
growth in prominence and sophistication of this will be evaluated in terms of the 
changes arising from the events of January-February 1916.  The Chapter will also make 
a firm contribution to the debate regarding the intended target of this raid, and whether 
this was in fact, the port of Liverpool.  Finally, there will be reference to the 
memorialization that the respective towns carried out at the time and subsequently, to 
honour the civilian victims, supporting the argument that not only was this was a tragic 
event and one that generates emotion amongst local people, even to the present day.4 
 
6.2 The war reaches the home front 
 
The First World War was to be the conflict in which a threat to the security of the nation 
state came, for the first time, from the air.  Through the deployment of aircraft capable 
of performing long-range strategic bombing missions that caused devastation, outrage 
and panic, a new and terrifying dimension to warfare was heralded.  This was because 
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until the twentieth-century, wars were generally fought by professional armies (notably 
in the nineteenth century’s colonial campaigns) and situated far from the battlefield the 
civilian population performed the roles of spectator and supporter.  The defence of the 
British Isles had been the traditional preserve of the Royal Navy, with its Grand Fleet 
constructed at vast expense to control the sea-lanes and deter any possible threat of 
aggression.  However, within the span of a decade, aircraft progressed from travelling 
but a few yards to being capable of comfortably crossing the English Channel, so that 
the possibility of aerial combat was contemplated by amongst others, the author       
H.G. Wells.5  Yet complacency in government and military circles was prevalent, the 
view being that this was science fiction, and as John Morris has recounted, few believed 
‘air attacks upon citizens would soon become an integral part of modern warfare.6 
At the outbreak of the war, the air forces of the combatant nations were so small 
that they were utilized principally for reconnaissance duties; however, on 8 October and 
21 November 1914, the Royal Naval Air Service had bombed the airship storage sheds 
at Düsseldorf and Friedrichshafen respectively.  German forays were undertaken by 
seaplanes on 21, 24 and 25 December 1914, the first two being flights to Dover (a bomb 
landing near to the Castle on the second visit) and the third to the London Docks.7  No 
fatalities or casualties occurred in any of these German raids.  The implication was 
clear; it was only a matter of time before the execution of rather more ambitious 
missions.  This was to occur at the beginning of 1915, spearheaded by airships the 
German propagandists would portray as wonder weapons capable of rendering Britain’s 
defences redundant and raising the cost of resistance to a level too high to bear. 
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Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin’s pioneering LZ1 rigid airship flew for the first 
time at Friedrichshafen, on the German side of Lake Constance, on 2 July 1900.  
Christopher Chant pointed out that from this modest beginning, the features of 
subsequent Zeppelin models could be discerned.8  These were the streamlined 
cylindrical shape, structured by a framework of duralumin rings and girders, enclosed in 
a fabric envelope.  This contained separated hydrogen gasbags providing the airship’s 
lift, and stability during flight was via the operation of horizontal and vertical control 
surfaces.  The use of duralumin, an aluminium alloy, gave lightness and a high strength 
to weight ratio that was essential to the Zeppelin’s performance on long endurance 
flights.  Hydrogen gas being prone to escape through most materials, to counter this, the 
gas bags were fabricated from a material known as Goldbeater’s skin, which was 
derived from the chemically-treated intestines of cattle.9  Propulsion was supplied by 
petrol engines, each of which had an independent fuel supply, and control was located 
in gondolas suspended beneath the airship’s hull to afford the best forward and 
downward fields of vision.  Standard features on later Zeppelins included electric 
lighting (powered by engine-driven generators), radio and flight equipment.  To assist 
with navigation, and where fitted, a Goerz sub-cloud car could be suspended by a cable 
extending up to 1,000 metres below the airship.  Hence, by using a telephone linked to 
the airship’s commander, a member of the crew located in the cloud car could assist 
with locating the target while allowing the airship to remain hidden in cloud cover.10 
By the end of the decade, the airship had established itself as a proven means of 
transporting civilian passengers.  Widely associated in Germany with national pride and 
seen to be indicative of technological achievement, improvements made to the design 
brought such lighter-than-air ships to the attention of German authorities keen to exploit 
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the potential of such inventions.  Fundamental logistical and technical problems had to 
be resolved before the application to military use, including the provision of a support 
infrastructure comprised of hangers, maintenance shops, the facilities for producing the 
immense quantities of Hydrogen gas required, and a network of wireless stations. 
In the way that the brand name of Hoover is virtually synonymous with the 
vacuum cleaner, that of Zeppelin has become almost a generic name for a German 
airship.  There were other manufacturers, however, including Parseval and the firm of 
Luftschiffbau Schütte-Lanz.  The latter company’s airships were constructed using a 
framework of three-ply wood and although offering the advantage of lightness, they 
were prone to inferior performance, especially during inclement weather when the wood 
absorbed moisture, causing splits in the frame and hull.11  Hence, by the outbreak of 
hostilities, Luftschiffbau Zeppelin had established itself as the dominant contractor 
supplying airships to Germany’s Army and to its Navy.  The production of this 
company expanded to such an extent that by 1918 a workforce numbering in excess of 
12,000 was employed, of whom there were some 1,600 scientific and technical staff. 
The German Army’s Airship Division, the Heers Luftschiffe, had been created 
in 1909 following the acquisition of Zeppelin Z1.  By 1914, it had twelve airships, 
several of them being civilian vessels impressed for military use at the outbreak of the 
war, and which were used for training purposes.  Consequently, four airships were 
allocated for service on the Western Front, and three to the Eastern Front.12  The 
Marine-Luftschiff-Abteilung was the airship division of the Imperial German Navy, the 
Kaiserliche Marine.  Founded in 1912, Griehl and Dressel relate that its first airship the 
Zeppelin L1 had crashed in the North Sea on 9 September 1913 when participating in a 
naval exercise.13  Its sister ship, the Zeppelin L2, had exploded during a flight in the 
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same month; there being no survivors from either of the airships.  The first commander 
of the Marine-Luftschiff-Abteilung had been Korvettenkapitän Friedrich Metzing, who 
had perished together with all of the crew of the L1.  His successor to the post of Führer 
der Luftschiffe (Leader of Airships), and reporting directly to the commander-in-chief 
of the German High Seas Fleet, was the recently promoted Korvettenkapitän Peter 
Strasser, who was to become one of the outstanding pioneers of military aviation.14 
As Wilbour Cross confirmed, when war broke out the sole airship at the German 
Navy’s disposal was the Zeppelin L3, which was considered suitable for reconnaissance 
missions only.  Nevertheless, Strasser’s energetic determination and his vision resulted, 
within a matter of months, in the establishment of large-scale installations on 
Germany’s North Sea and Baltic coasts.  These grew to accommodate an airship service 
that expanded from an initial 120 to 7,000 officers and men, and which completed over 
1,000 reconnaissance and 300 bombing missions by the end of the war.15  Commenting 
on this force, Thomas Fegan related that they ‘were among the most highly motivated 
personnel to be found in the German services.  They were all volunteers and the dangers 
that were faced instilled in them an abiding sense of comradeship between the officers, 
the NCOs and the men that was not found elsewhere’.16  The transcripts of the 
interrogations of prisoners from surviving airship crews note the dominance of the 
German Navy in this field of operations.  This was attributed to Germany’s Army 
officers being rather ‘less competent as navigators than the commanders in the Navy’.17 
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Airships, by virtue of their range and payload, offered major advantages when 
compared with the conventional fixed-wing aeroplanes available during the period.18  
Nevertheless, in the first year of the war, they tended to be employed predominantly on 
long-range scouting operations, in the case of the German Army over the front lines and 
for the Imperial German Navy over the Baltic and the North Sea.19  As Charles 
Stephenson has noted, tactical attacks are made with the intention of defeating military 
forces; strategic attacks aim to defeat an enemy state without fighting its military forces.  
As such, this was a tactical role being performed to the detriment of the potential 
strategic importance of this weapon.20  Their size created visibility problems, 
particularly when flying during daylight and at low altitude, with three Army airships 
downed during the war’s opening weeks.  Hence the German General Staff’s stipulation 
that offensive operations were to be carried out only under the cover of dark moonless 
nights, effectively making Germany’s airships the world’s first stealth bombers. 
The value of such a weapon came to be appreciated more fully with the arrival 
of trench warfare and the imposition of the British naval blockade, together with the 
realization that the output of the war industries and morale of the civilian workers 
would be imperative to the war effort.  Fegan pointed out that German public opinion 
had been enraged by fatalities incurred during a French air raid on Freiburg.  This had 
prompted Admiral Hugo von Pohl’s proposal that airships should be employed on 
bombing missions.  However, before this recommendation could be implemented, the 
Imperial assent was required but ‘the Kaiser prevaricated, worried about the effect this 
unprecedented form of warfare might have on the opinion of neutral countries, such as 
the United States’.21  This hesitation was understandable given the prevailing codes of 
military honour, which held that non-combatants should be shielded from the dangers of 
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war.  Furthermore, there were the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 to be 
considered.22  Of course, the consequences for civilian populations of blockades and 
sieges, as strategies that had been used by armies and navies for centuries, meant that 
such assurances were far from being guaranteed.  When implemented, the reaction, 
succinctly articulated by Morris, was that this extension of warfare to the home front 
‘was enough to create widespread indignation and anger amongst the British public’.23 
On 10 January 1915, the Kaiser gave his qualified support, although he forbade 
damage to royal palaces and historic buildings; only targets such as coastal defences, 
docks and military installations were to be attacked.24  Many of these being located near 
to densely populated areas, the rudimentary aiming techniques rendered it virtually 
impossible to bomb with precision.  The initial raid by airships occurred on the          
19-20 January 1915 when German Naval Zeppelins L3 and L4 attacked Great 
Yarmouth, King’s Lynn and Sheringham; the first victim of these airships was a 
civilian, Samuel Smith, a resident of Great Yarmouth.  On 21 January 1915, when 
reporting on this event, a German publication, the Kolnische Zeitung, exclaimed: 
The first Zeppelin has appeared in England and has extended its fiery 
greetings to our enemy.  It has come to pass, that which the English 
have long feared and repeatedly have contemplated with terror.  The 
most modern war weapon, a triumph of German inventiveness and the 
sole possession of the German military, has shown itself capable of 
crossing the sea and carrying the war right to the sod of old England.25 
 
The first air raid on London was carried out on 31 May 1915 by German Army 
Zeppelin LZ38, commanded by Hauptmann Eric Linnerz.  The first bombs falling on 
Stoke Newington, thirty-five high explosive and ninety incendiary bombs were 
released, killing seven people (including four children) and injuring a further thirty-five. 
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6.3 The Zeppelin raid of 31 January – 1 February 1916 
 
Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer’s appointment as the commander-in-chief of the High 
Seas Fleet on 18 January 1916 was a catalyst for the implementation of a more 
aggressive naval strategy.  Maximizing the role of the Marine-Luftschiff-Abteilung was 
central to this thinking.  The last air raid over the British mainland having taken place 
on 13 October 1915, that scheduled for 31 January 1916 was planned to be the most 
ambitious yet attempted, involving the largest number of airships, to demonstrate 
Germany’s military prowess.26  As Tom Morgan stated, this time airships would ‘fly 
across the entire breadth of England en masse and bomb Liverpool which, until then, 
had been considered well beyond the range of the raiders’.27  Not only would industrial 
and military targets be assaulted, it was believed that the sheer scale of the attack would 
shatter British morale and resolve.  There were reservations on the German side, 
however.  Although airships of the latest class of Zeppelins would be employed, Cross 
recorded that Strasser was concerned for the welfare of his crews because in carrying 
out this mission they would have to make round trips of several hundred miles.28 
Unfortunately, no single document survives to confirm that the target of the raid 
was Liverpool, and there has been inevitable speculation on whether the Zeppelins that 
reached the Midlands did so intentionally seeking munitions factories.  The evidence 
presented supports the case that this large port, receiving shipments of munitions and 
supplies from the British Empire and neutral countries, was a logical choice for the 
German Navy.  Firstly, on 4 February 1916, The Times reproduced the text of two 
telegrams that had been intercepted by the Wireless Press.  These had been transmitted 
by the German Admiralty and claimed that the action of its airships had been a success. 
The telegrams were set out in an article headed ‘German Reasons for the Raids’. 
                                               
26
  Five airships (the L11, L13, L14, L15 and L16) had bombed South London and some parts of the Home 
Counties on 13 October 1915.  This was an air raid that resulted in 71 fatalities and 128 casualties. 
27
  T. Morgan, ‘The Great Zeppelin Raid Night of Jan 31st – Feb 1st 1916’ <http://www.hellfire-
corner.demon.co.uk/zeppelin.htm> [Accessed 1 September 2009]. 
28
  W. Cross, p. 52. 
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To the German Embassy, Washington:- 
The newspapers point out that Birkenhead, which is the chief place for 
the construction of warships, is the principal entrance to the harbour of 
Liverpool, and is a depot for American ammunition at the mouth of the 
Mersey. 
 
To the United Press, New York:- 
 
Judging from the Zeppelin observations, it is believed that the attack on 
Liverpool accomplished its objective, which was to destroy the grain 
elevators.  It is officially stated that England receives most of her grain 
from foreign countries through Liverpool, and that there are also great 
mills there, so that practically all English grain supplies must go 
through Liverpool.29 
 
Secondly, the report of the Intelligence Section, GHQ Home Forces, in 
considering whether the airships had originally intended to go to the Black Country, 
concluded that they did not.  It pointed out that their courses, ‘if persisted in, and 
opening out fanwise from the coast, would have brought the airships over the Liverpool-
Manchester-Sheffield district’.  Although none reached there, it noted that ‘the fact that 
the German Admiralty officially reported the airships had visited the Liverpool-
Manchester district tends to show that this was the intended objective’.  This was 
reinforced by the report’s statement that ‘the airship crews themselves believe, or affect 
to believe that they had reached this district’.30  Thirdly, this argument was further 
strengthened by the transcript of the interrogations of the surviving crew of Zeppelin 
L15 that crashed during a later raid, and which are available in the National Archives.  
Despite their only reaching Caythorpe in Lincolnshire, the transcripts record: 
The crew are apparently fairly convinced that they reached Liverpool 
on 31st January.  It is quite possible that the extinction of lights in 
certain towns upset the calculations of the commanding officers and led 
to their believing this error.31 
 
At 11.00 am GMT on Monday, 31 January 1916, a force of nine airships – 
Zeppelins L11, L13, L14, L15, L16, L17, L19, L20 and L21 – set out from their bases 
                                               
29
  The Times, 4 February 1916. 
30
  TNA AIR 1/2123/207/73/5: Air raids on Britain, 1 January 1916 – 28 February 1916, p. 3. 
31
  TNA AIR 1/1269/204/9/86: Precautions against Zeppelin raids.  This represents the first time that this piece 
of evidence has been presented, and it considerably strengthens the argument for Liverpool being the target. 
171 
 
on the northern coast of Germany.  They made a rendezvous at Borkum Island and in 
successive groups, crossed the North Sea.  As the GHQ Intelligence report confirmed, 
‘the entire available squadron of the new standardized naval airships was employed’.32 
The operations that they had carried out during the previous year had provided 
the crews with valuable experience enabling them to hone their tactics.  Cooksley stated 
that essentially this involved ‘climbing as soon as possible to an altitude where the 
prevailing easterly winds were beneficial in good weather or nights when there was 
little moon’.33  Approaching the British coastline during the final moments of daylight, 
altitude would then be reduced briefly so that the airship commanders could identify 
their location and plot their course.  The intention was that their arrival over the target 
area would be when visibility from below was minimal, giving them the opportunity to 
drop their bombs and safely return to base before dawn.  During these early raids, 
navigation was aided and abetted by the airships being able to follow the lights along 
roads, so that they could better identify the cities and towns that they encountered.  An 
anti-cyclimatic system having extended over Western Europe for some days previously, 
on the evening of 31 January weather conditions over the North Sea were quiet, 
although there were large patches of mist and fog on the eastern coast of Britain.  Whilst 
crossing the North Sea with relative ease, the difficulties of identifying their place of 
landfall and in making the necessary course calculations was compounded by rain and 
snow, taking all of the insurgents away from their intended direction inland.34 
A member of the Q class of twelve airships, Zeppelin L21 (LZ 61) was virtually 
brand new, having been delivered from the company’s Löwenthal works on 10 January 
1916.35  It was a huge machine, 585 feet in length and 61 feet in diameter, with four 
Maybach HSLu engines of 240 horsepower giving it a maximum speed of 59.72 mph, 
                                               
32
  TNA AIR 1/2123/207/73/5, p. 3. 
33
  P.G. Cooksley, p. 43. 
34
  TNA AIR 1/2123/207/73/5, p. 3. 
35
  C. Chant, p. 110; <http://www.zeppelin-museum.dk> [Accessed 01/11/2010].  L21 was the navy’s tactical 
number, whereas LZ61 (standing for Luftschiff Zeppelin) was the company’s production number. 
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an operational range of 2,672 miles and a maximum altitude of 9,185 feet.  The crew of 
up to eighteen men were located in two gondolas suspended below the hull, and the L21 
could deliver a payload of 3,880 lb (usually a mixture of high explosive and incendiary 
bombs).  Based at Nordholz, near Cuxhaven, the L21’s commander was Kapitänleutnant 
Max Dietrich, with Leutnant der Reserve von Nathusius as the executive officer.36 
The following particulars of the flight of the L21 were taken from the GHQ 
Intelligence report.  The L21 entered the British mainland north of Mundesley and 
passed over Hanworth shortly after 4.50 pm.  It was accompanied by the L13, which 
was commanded by Kapitänleutnant Heinrich Mathy, already a legendary figure being 
the veteran of several air raids on London.  The L21 reached Narborough at 5.20 pm, 
proceeding towards King’s Lynn, then south of Grantham at 6.30 pm, travelling in a 
direction that took it north of Derby but south of Nottingham.  From this point, the L21 
veered north-west towards Stafford, where it was observed at 7.25 pm.  By this time, 
after nearly nine hours spent airborne, the L21 was completely lost.  Approaching 
Wolverhampton at 7.45 pm, by 7.55 pm its engines were heard in the neighbourhood of 
Netherton for several minutes, after which it headed northwards towards Dudley and 
then onwards to Tipton, arriving over this Black Country town at 8.00 pm.37 
The L21 began its offensive manoeuvres by dropping three high explosive 
bombs that landed in Tipton’s Union Street and Waterloo Street.  In Union Street, two 
houses were demolished and others were destroyed, as was the gas main; in Waterloo 
Street, some outbuildings to the rear of houses were destroyed and damage caused to the 
nearby canal bank.38  Three incendiary bombs fell into gardens and yards in Bloomfield 
                                               
36
  <http://www.zeppelin-museum.dk> [Accessed 01/11/2010].  Max Dietrich, who was the uncle of the 
actress and singer, Marlene Dietrich, had been a merchant seaman before the war.  He would fly 41 
missions and prior to commanding the L21 had served on the L7 and the L18 airships.  During July 1916, 
he was given the command of the L34 but was killed when this airship was shot down near to Lowestoft by 
Flight Lieutenant Egbert Cadbury on 28 November 1916.  By coincidence, this was the same day that the 
L21 (with Oberleutnant zur See Kurt Frankenberg in command) was also shot down over the sea near to 
Hartlepool by Sub-Lieutenant Edward Pelling of the RNAS.  See Appendix 6, Photograph 62, p. 312. 
37
  TNA AIR 1/2123/207/73/5, p. 5. 
38
  Ibid. 
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Road and Barnfield Road, where they failed to ignite.  In total, fourteen people were 
killed (five men, five women and four children) and a further ten were injured.  In an 
article published in December 1918, the Manchester Guardian supplied a detailed 
account of several air raids, including this one.  It offered the explanation that ‘these 
reports were all compiled at the time by our own reporting staff or by our 
correspondents in the towns concerned but were held up by the censor’.  It recorded that 
with respect to Tipton, five of the people that were killed in one house (now known to 
be 8 Union Street) were a husband and wife (64 year-old William Greensill and 67 year-
old Mary Greensill), their daughter (44 year-old Sarah-Jane Morris) and her two 
children (eight year-old Millie Morris and eleven year-old Martin Morris).39 
Proceeding to the district of Lower Bradley, situated close to the town of 
Bilston, the L21 dropped five high explosive bombs that landed near to the towpath of 
the Wolverhampton Union Canal, damaging the canal bank and the wall of the drainage 
pumping station at the Pothouse Bridge Basin.  This action caused the deaths of a young 
courting couple, 23 year-old Frederick Fellows of Coseley and 24 year-old Maud 
Fellows of Bradley who, although sharing the same surname, were not in fact married or 
related to each other in any way.  Frederick died instantly as a direct consequence of the 
bomb blast and Maud was critically injured and, having been brought to 
Wolverhampton General Hospital, died there on 12 February 1916 from septicaemia.40 
The L21’s flight then took it in the direction of Wednesbury.  At 8.15 pm, 
twelve high explosive and eight incendiary bombs were unleashed, many landing in 
King Street, close to the Crown tube works of James Russell & Sons.41  Three houses 
were demolished and, as the Manchester Guardian later reported, after the first 
explosion a number of people were killed as they rushed from their houses when further 
                                               
39
  Manchester Guardian, 19 December 1918. 
40
  TNA AIR 1/2123/207/73/5, p. 5.  A memorial plaque situated at the Pothouse Basin to the memory of 
Frederick Fellows and Maud Fellows was unveiled by the Bradley-born MP, Dennis Turner, in 1994. 
41
  See Appendix 6, Photograph 63, p. 313.  These show the nature of the bomb damage, as caused to buildings 
in the King Street area of Wednesbury, which was inflicted during the air raid on 31 January 1916. 
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bombs landed in the street.42  The fatalities included 37 year-old Joseph Horton Smith, 
his thirteen-year-old daughter, Nellie, his eleven-year-old son, Thomas, and his seven-
year-old daughter, Ina, all resident at 14 King Street.  Yet more distressing was that the 
blast of the explosion was so great that Ina’s body was not found until the next morning, 
when it was discovered on the roof of the Crown tube works by Police Sergeant Frank 
Robinson.  This factory also received a direct hit, killing one person, wrecking the roof 
and shattering the windows.  The Crown and Cushion Inn, the stable and outbuildings at 
Hickman and Pullen’s Brewery, the railway goods yard in the Mesty Croft area, and the 
Old Park colliery, were also damaged during the raid.43  Having added thirteen 
Wednesbury people to its growing list of victims, the L21 proceeded towards Walsall.44 
There being no expectation that any enemy aircraft would be able to reach the 
Black Country, as with Tipton, Bradley and Wednesbury, Walsall was fully illuminated 
when the L21 arrived there at 8.25 pm.  Dropping seven high explosive and four 
incendiary bombs, the first building to be hit was the Wednesbury Road Congregational 
Church, the roof and interior being smashed.  A group of local primary school children, 
working in the church’s parlour were miraculously unharmed and their teacher, 
Winifred Clark, gave a powerful description, stating that ‘she saw a small piece of 
ceiling fall from the roof and then a blinding blue flash more vivid and fearsome than 
any lightning she had ever seen’.45  Walsall’s first fatality was 28 year-old Thomas 
Merryless, who was taking an evening walk and died instantly from a head wound 
caused by a bomb fragment.  Situated on the outskirts of the town, Walsall’s General 
Hospital had an incendiary bomb fall into its grounds.  This was swiftly extinguished by 
Police Constable Joseph Burrell, who also helped to calm the hospital’s patients by 
                                               
42
  Manchester Guardian, 19 December 1918.  Due to the lifting of the wartime censorship, more information 
on the various German air raids became available, as published in this post-war edition of the newspaper. 
43
  TNA AIR 1/2123/207/73/5, p. 5. 
44
  T. Morgan, ‘The Great Zeppelin Raid Night of Jan 31st – Feb 1st 1916’ <http://www.hellfire-
corner.demon.co.uk/zeppelin.htm> [Accessed 1 September 2009].  The names of the thirteen Wednesbury 
civilians are shown on Wednesbury’s main war memorial in Walsall Street and on the memorial erected in 
the town’s main cemetery by an anonymous benefactor in 2012.  See Appendix 6, Photograph 65, p. 314. 
45
  Walsall Chronicle No. 8 - Walsall at War (Walsall: Walsall Local History Centre, 1998), p. 23. 
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telling them the noise produced by the airship’s engines had been the sound of a new 
engine at the town’s gas works.46  A bomb also fell in Mountrath Street having no effect, 
whilst another blew a hole in the wall of the saddle works of Elijah Jeffries. 
The impact of the high explosive bomb that landed in this town’s centre, at 
Bradford place, and near to the Walsall Institute of Science and Arts, remains visible in 
one of the walls of a nearby building.47  Injury was caused to several people.  This 
included the passengers of the number 16 tramcar, one of whom was Walsall’s 
Mayoress, 55 year-old Mrs Mary Julia Slater.48   Sustaining severe wounds to her chest 
and abdomen, and although she was able to alight from the tramcar, Mrs Slater was 
immediately taken to the nearby hospital, where she remained for several days.  She 
died from septicaemia and shock on 20 February 1916, which by tragic coincidence was 
the date of her birthday.49  This family’s heartbreak was compounded because, as 
reported in the Walsall Pioneer and District News on 26 February 1916, their eldest son 
was Lieutenant Percival Slater, then serving as a subaltern with the 1/6
th
 Battalion of the 
South Staffordshire Regiment.  Lieutenant Slater was himself recovering from wounds 
received during the assault on the Hohenzollern Redoubt on 13 October 1915, in the 
final stages of the Battle of Loos.50  Mrs Slater’s funeral on 24 February 1916 was 
presided over by the Bishop of Lichfield, Dr John Kempthorne.  As the procession made 
its journey to St Matthew’s, the parish church of Walsall, local people and soldiers of 
the South Staffordshire Regiment lined the streets to demonstrate their respect.51 
                                               
46
  Express and Star, 25 August and 1 September 2011 and 29 March 2012.  These issues of this local 
newspaper have featured a number of articles that have been written by Professor Carl Chinn. 
47
  At the time of the raid, this building housed the town’s Labour club.  It is now a nightclub and the marks 
where the bomb caused damage to the building remain visible.  A Blue plaque has been erected here. 
48
  Walsall Chronicle No. 8 - Walsall at War, p. 23. 
49
  Walsall Observer and South Staffordshire Chronicle, 26 February 1916.  Mrs Slater was a noted 
philanthropist and heavily involved with the work of the local Red Cross.  Her husband was the Liberal 
Mayor of Walsall, Councillor Stanley Mills Slater, who was also the Chairman of Wednesbury’s James 
Russell’s Crown tube works, which by coincidence had been bombed by the L21 earlier that evening. 
50
  I am indebted to Andrew Thornton for providing further information on Lieutenant P.J. Slater.  Percival 
James Slater saw war service with the 1/6th South Staffordshire Regiment, in the Royal Flying Corps and 
the Royal Air Force.  He attained the rank of Brigadier in the Second World War, served as a Deputy 
Lieutenant of the County of Staffordshire, and marched in the Queen’s Coronation procession in 1953. 
51
  Walsall Pioneer and District News, 26 February 1916. 
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The other victims that evening were Walsall’s William Haycock, a 50 year-old 
bed-ridden former Police Constable, who had been particularly agitated by the 
explosions caused by the L21’s bombs; his death was attributed to shock when the 
L19’s bombs were subsequently dropped.  A patient at Walsall’s workhouse infirmary, 
59 year-old John Thomas Powell, also expired from shock.  Two Wednesbury residents, 
34 year-old Charles Cope and 36 year-old Thomas Linney, were also among those 
killed in Walsall by the L21.52  Returning to its base via Sutton Coldfield, Nuneaton, 
Market Harborough, Kettering, Ely and Thetford, it dropped the remainder of its bombs 
at Thrapston in Northamptonshire although no harm was done by this.  When crossing 
the coastline near to Lowestoft at 11.35 pm, the L21’s return journey across the North 
Sea coincided with its sister ship, the L19, commencing its offensive actions.53 
Constructed at Friedrichshafen, the L19 (LZ 54) airship was a member of the 
twenty-two P class of Zeppelins, making its maiden flight on 19 November 1915 and by 
January 1916, it had completed fourteen missions.  Its specification was similar to that 
of the L21, in that it was 536 feet long, with a diameter of 61 feet, could achieve a 
maximum speed of 59.72 mph, operate over a range of 2,672 miles and reach a height 
of 9,185 feet.  It was originally fitted with four Maybach CX 210 horsepower engines, 
which were replaced by the more powerful HSLu 240 horsepower engines also used by 
the L21.  Based at Tondern in Schleswig-Holstein (later ceded to Denmark by the 
Versailles Treaty), its crew of up to eighteen men were commanded by Kapitänleutnant 
Odo Loewe, with Oberleutnant zur See Erwin Braunhof as the executive officer.54  As 
with its sister ships, the L19 carried a mixture of high explosive and incendiary bombs.55 
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  Walsall Chronicle No. 8 - Walsall at War, p. 23. 
53
  TNA AIR 1/2123/207/73/5, p. 5. 
54
  C. Chant, p. 109; <http://www.zeppelin-museum.dk> [Accessed 01/11/2010].  See Appendix 6,  
Photograph 61, p. 311 of Zeppelin L19 and its commander, Kapitänleutnant Odo Loewe. 
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  Attack of the Zeppelins (Windfall Films for Channel 4, 2013).  See Appendix 6, Photograph 64, p. 314 for 
examples of both the high explosive and incendiary devices that were dropped during this air raid.  
Containing the highly inflammable chemicals Benzine and Thermite, the incendiary devices had also been 
wrapped in tar-coated rope.  This meant that once they had been ignited, they became extremely 
combustible and able to burn at very high temperatures, causing considerable damage to property. 
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The GHQ Intelligence report confirmed that the L19 had reached the British 
coast near to Sheringham at approximately 6.30 pm.  From there, the airship followed 
an erratic path, so that it was seen at Swaffham at 7.05 pm, at Stamford at 8.10 pm, and 
at Loughborough at 9.20 pm, heading in the direction of Burton-on-Trent, where it was 
the third airship to drop its bombs that evening.  Turning south to skirt Birmingham, 
which was blacked-out, it passed near to Bewdley, Kidderminster and Stourbridge, and 
then from 11.30 pm, Loewe began to follow a similar route to that taken by the L21.  
The L19 arrived at Wednesbury at midnight, releasing a single bomb that caused some 
minor damage to the Monway Works of the Patent Shaft & Axletree Co. Ltd.56 
Travelling towards Dudley, five high explosive and seventeen incendiary bombs 
were dropped.  Some windows were broken by the blast, with no injury or devastation 
caused.  Indeed, most of the bombs landed harmlessly in fields, some even in the 
grounds of Dudley Castle.  Tipton was another town to receive a second visitation 
when, at approximately 12.20 am, eleven high explosive bombs fell demolishing 
dwellings and wrecking the Bush Inn public house on Park Lane West but with no loss 
of life.57  At 12.25 am, L19 came to Walsall, dropped three high explosive bombs killing 
three pigs and a horse in the Pleck area, and causing damage to St Andrew’s church and 
vicarage in the Birchills district.  The Walsall Pioneer and District News commented, 
‘with a fellow feeling for their own kind, the Germans no doubt would have spared the 
pigs had they known’.58  A slow, haphazard journey ensued as the L19 struggled to 
return to its base.  Passing over Sutton Coldfield at 12.30 am and Coventry at 12.50 pm, 
L19 did not reach the coast until 5.25 am.  Several signals requesting a position fix by 
radio triangulation were sent; the last relayed from the airship at 4.00 am on 1 February 
when 22 miles from the Dutch island of Ameland, reported the failure of three engines.59 
                                               
56
  TNA AIR 1/2123/207/73/5, p. 7. 
57
  Ibid., p. 8. 
58
  Walsall Pioneer and District News, 5 February 1916; Walsall Chronicle No. 8 - Walsall at War, p. 23. 
59
  Despite being more powerful than those they replaced, the Zeppelin’s new engines were far less reliable. 
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It is reported from Ameland this afternoon that a Zeppelin, which 
probably owing to fog had lost its way, was seen about 100 yards from 
the coast flying very low.  A coastguard station bombarded the airship.60 
 
Drifting at very low altitude, on 2 February 1916 the L19 had crossed the 
Friesian islands.  At 7.30 am that morning, the distress signals of the by now crashed 
and waterlogged airship, 95 miles east-by-north of Spurn, were seen by a British 
trawler, the King Stephen, which duly investigated.  Upon reaching the L19, the 
trawler’s captain, William Martin, refused to give assistance to the stranded airship’s 
crew, despite being offered money and the assurances of Kapitänleutnant Loewe, upon 
his word of honour.  Martin’s justification for this was that his own nine-man crew were 
outnumbered by the Germans, who were most likely armed, and that it was be an easy 
matter for them to gain control of his ship and take him and his crew back to Germany 
and an uncertain fate.  This was corroborated by First Mate George Denny in the 
Wednesbury Herald on 12 February 1916.61  With a calm sea and no indication that it 
would sink, Martin’s intention was to find a Royal Navy vessel and alert them to the 
airship’s position.  Failing to locate one, he only reported the matter to the authorities 
upon the return of the King Stephen to Grimsby.62  The weather worsened and all of the 
L19’s crew were lost.  They placed farewell messages into bottles, some of which 
eventually reached Gothenburg, Sweden.  The text of Loewe’s message read as follows: 
With fifteen men on the top platform and backbone girder of the L19, 
floating without gondolas in approximately 3 degrees East longitude, I 
am attempting to send a last report.  Engine trouble 3 times repeated, a 
high headwind on the return journey delayed our return and, in the fog 
carried us over Holland where I was received with heavy rifle fire; the 
ship became heavy and simultaneously the engines broke down. 
[2 February 1916, towards One o’clock, our last hour is approaching.]63 
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  Express and Star, 2 February 1916.  This was also reported by the Manchester Guardian on 7 February, 
which added ‘with their usual contempt for neutrality, the airship had passed over Dutch territory’. 
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  TNA AIR 1/2123/207/73/5, p. 8; Wednesbury Herald, 12 February 1916. 
62
  The King Stephen was later converted to military use as a Q-ship (with concealed weaponry), commanded 
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  T. Morgan, ‘The Great Zeppelin Raid Night of Jan 31st – Feb 1st 1916’ <http://www.hellfire-
corner.demon.co.uk/zeppelin.htm> [Accessed 1 September 2009]; <http://www.zeppelin-museum.dk> 
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The formal confirmation of the fate of the L19 was made by the Press Bureau on 
5 February 1916, stating that the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that ‘a fishing 
trawler has reported today to the naval authorities that she had seen a German Zeppelin 
in the North Sea in a sinking condition’.64  In conveying this message, the Midland 
Advertiser newspaper also urged its readers to remember that German airships had 
bombed and sunk a merchant vessel, the Franz Fischer, with the loss of most of her 
crew in the North Sea.  Nevertheless, this was a controversial action.  An official French 
communiqué was cited by the Wednesbury Herald that ‘on the destruction of the 
Zeppelin L19 by Dutch guns, we may say there is justice somewhere, after all’.  The 
same issue also carried the conflicting views of the French and German press: 
The Journal des Débats says:- The wretched murderers aboard the L19 
succumbed probably after terrible agony, not by virtue of the harsh law 
of retribution, but as the consequence of a measure of precaution, which 
nobody can blame the British sailors for having taken.  Everybody else 
would have done the same in similar circumstances.  The Germans can 
no longer expect as of right the benefit of those usages which civilised 
nations have gradually adopted to soften the hardships of war. 
 
The Lokalanzeiger says:- This final infamous action provides still 
another of those disclosures which the present war has furnished us of 
the brutality of the British character. 
 
The Vossische Zeitung resonates:- Everyone who has still proffered an 
impartial judgement will agree that the King Stephen affair...is a blot on 
the character of Britannia. 
 
The Krenz Zeitung writes:- The attitude of the crew of the King Stephen 
was more cruel than that of the bombing crew...If the crew of the King 
Stephen feared an attack from the shipwrecked Germans they could 
have disarmed them, but who believes in such a fear, which would have 
been simply and solely proof of cowardice.65 
 
Praise for the actions of the Captain of the King Stephen came from the Bishop 
of London, Arthur Winnington-Ingram, who commended Captain Martin for placing the 
safety of his own crew first, which in turn provoked German anger, bitterness and 
vilification.  During a service to dedicate two ambulances that had been provided by 
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  Wednesbury Herald, 12 February 1916. 
180 
 
donations from the residents of Stoke Newington, the Bishop said, ‘any English sailor 
would have risked his own life to save another human life but the sad thing was that the 
chivalry of war had been killed by the Germans, and their word could not be trusted’.66  
In relation to the possibility that members of the L19’s crew might have been rescued 
by another vessel and incarcerated, an exchange of correspondence occurred between 
the Foreign Office and the United States Embassy; a neutral state in 1916, the United 
States had interceded at the request of the German Government.  On 3 March 1916, a 
letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the United States’ Ambassador 
that acknowledged that there were no known survivors nevertheless requested that the 
names of the airship’s crew be forwarded to facilitate further enquiries into the matter.67 
 
6.4 The implications and legacy of the raid 
 
Of the nine airships that set out on 31 January 1916, none succeeded in reaching their 
intended objective of Liverpool, nor did they inflict any damage of military 
significance.  Nevertheless, the actions of the L19 and the L21 were profoundly 
shocking to the people of the Midlands.  This was the view conveyed by the Midland 
Advertiser, which commented that ‘the raid was so tragically sudden and unexpected 
that the bulk of the population were staggered more by the novelty of the occurrence 
than by the danger to life and limb’.68  The Walsall Pioneer and District News suggested 
that ‘it seems difficult to believe that the war should have been brought to our own 
doors, even in such devilish fashion’.69  The GHQ Intelligence report argued that had the 
airships been able to navigate as accurately as the German authorities maintained, and 
had they wrought the level of destruction claimed, ‘there is little doubt that raiding 
expeditions of this nature would have continued on an extensive scale’.70  Dependent on 
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dead reckoning, observation of the landscape and the reception of radio signals, few 
airship commanders knew their position with any great certainty; all experienced 
navigational problems to some extent.  Furthermore, whilst equipped with Zeiss optical 
bombsights, aiming was also problematic for the crews, even though they no longer 
dropped the bombs by hand from the control gondola as done in the early missions.71 
Germany’s action of 31 January 1916 confirmed for many what Trevor Wilson 
described as ‘the popular image of the enemy as an unscrupulous murderer of citizens, 
to be resisted at all costs’.72  Nationally, in total there were 70 deaths (29 men,              
26 women and 15 children) and 113 injuries (44 men, 50 women and 19 children). 73  
Locally, there were 34 fatalities and 19 injuries.  In Bradley, the deaths of one man and 
one woman were directly due to the air raid.  Fourteen people died in Tipton (five men, 
five women and four children), and there were ten people in the town who sustained 
injuries (one man, five women and four children).  In Wednesbury, there were thirteen 
people killed (four men, four women and five children).  Five fatalities occurred in 
Walsall, both directly and indirectly due to the air raid (three men and two women) and 
there were nine people with injuries (seven men and two women).74  The Express and 
Star and the Midland Counties Express newspapers noted that ‘a great majority of the 
victims belonged to the poorer classes, and about half of the total number were women 
and children’.75  Regarding the damage to property, it was indicated that no buildings of 
military importance were hit and that many of the bombs that were dropped landed 
harmlessly.  A statement issued by the Press Bureau and reproduced in the Wednesbury 
Herald on 12 February 1916 alluded to severe damage to an unnamed tube factory.76 
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The Staffordshire Coroners’ Inquests provided an immediate outlet for the 
venting of feelings of public anger, with the proceedings being reported in the local and 
national press.  However, as noted by Mick Powis, owing to wartime censorship, the 
newspaper reports refer in general terms to the raids occurring in ‘areas of 
Staffordshire’.77  Consequently, there has been confusion because these articles did not 
differentiate between the northern and southern parts of that County, which were 
bombed by different airships.  Therefore, where place names are discernible because of 
the other details in the articles, they have been provided here in parenthesis.78 
At the first Inquest to be reported (Tipton), the Coroner notified the jury that 
‘their duty was to inquire into the cause of this unhappy and appalling occurrence’.  The 
evidence having been received, including that from a man whose two children, wife and 
her parents had all perished, the Coroner gave a direction to the jury.  He recommended 
that the verdict should be that ‘the victims met their deaths by the explosion of bombs 
discharged by an enemy airship’ and it was his hope that ‘we should not adopt the 
barbarous methods of our enemies’.  The Coroner recounted that several juries had 
returned a verdict of wilful murder against the German Emperor.  Whatever their 
feelings, he suggested that it was ‘quite useless to return such a verdict, because there 
was no one in this country who could be brought to answer such a charge’.79 
In responding, the foreman of the jury stated that such was their feeling that the 
jury could not accept this recommendation.  Accordingly, their opinion was that thirteen 
persons had been killed by explosive bombs dropped by an enemy aircraft and ‘that a 
verdict of wilful murder be returned against the Kaiser and the Crown Prince of 
Germany as being accessories before and after the fact’.80  Despite the Coroner’s 
attempts to persuade the jury to reconsider, which was met with the response that ‘he is 
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the controller of Germany, and as such orders these things’, the verdict was unchanged 
and accepted.  The foreman made a further point on behalf of the jury, namely that their 
concerns about the extent to which enemy aircraft could travel inland without any 
resistance and the authorities not being informed should be referred to the War Office.81 
The second Inquest (Walsall) considered the cases of four individuals and the 
Coroner advised this jury that they had to satisfy themselves that all the deaths were 
directly due to the air raid.  The first fatality, a 28 year-old man had died ‘with the back 
of his head blown off’ received the verdict that his death ‘was due to injuries caused by 
the explosion of a bomb dropped from an enemy aircraft’.  A similar verdict was 
achieved in the second case, a 36 year-old man whose severe leg injury had caused 
death due to loss of blood and shock.  The third and fourth cases were two men that 
were aged 50 and 59 years respectively, and both individuals were known to have had 
heart-related problems that were aggravated by feelings of agitation experienced during 
the air raid and the ensuing shock was confirmed as being the cause of their deaths.82 
The third Inquest (Wednesbury) was held into the deaths of twelve people, 
including a father and his three children.  In each case, the bodies were identified and 
the cause of death attributed by the witnesses called upon to give evidence.  The 
Midland Counties Express remarked that the body of one child was identified by the 
mother and that ‘during the giving of her evidence she was in a hysterical condition and 
left the court crying bitterly’.  A Police Sergeant described the discovery of several 
mutilated bodies, including one of a young child found hanging from a beam on the roof 
of the adjacent tube works.83  At the conclusion of the proceedings, the Coroner 
expressed his sympathy on his own behalf and that of the jury, describing the German 
air raid as a ‘dastardly and useless outrage perpetrated by an enemy aircraft’.84 
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The political cost of air raids was high, shaking the beliefs of those brought up in 
the relative calm of the Victorian and Edwardian years, and believing in the 
inviolateness of the home.  This was, as Cooksley has argued, ‘a massive moral shock 
as people saw that the dead were not just soldiers, fighting in a far-off land but civilians, 
including women and children, in their own homes’.85  Further to the claims of the 
aforementioned German Admiralty telegrams, a War Office response was published in 
The Times on 3 February 1916 repudiating what was described as the ‘utterly inaccurate 
report in the Berlin official telegram of 1 February’.86   Furthermore, there was the 
comment that ‘the raiders were quite unable to ascertain their position or shape their 
course with any degree of certainty’.  Nevertheless, the low-key tone of this despatch 
does suggest that there was some embarrassment in the War Office.  The feelings of 
people in the Midlands were of ‘displeasure with the Government that no official air  
raid warning had been received’.87  For instance, the comments in the Walsall Pioneer 
that ‘it is the greatest indignity that Great Britain has ever suffered during the lifetime of 
the present generation, against which we have today no redress whatsoever’.88 
The Manchester Guardian reported on 6 February 1916 that the Lord Mayor of 
Birmingham, Alderman Neville Chamberlain, had organized a conference that had 
taken place on 4 February, and which had been attended by local civic leaders and the 
respective chief police officers to discuss the preventative measures to be carried out in 
future.89  Chamberlain had made representation to the Home Secretary, Herbert Samuel, 
asking for the issuing of an order ensuring uniformity of lighting restrictions throughout 
the whole area and a system of early warning for the Midlands.  This conference was 
held in private session, although an official report was subsequently made available for 
publication in the press and the summary statement is reproduced as follows: 
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The Lord Mayor stated that the meeting, which was unique in character, 
was the natural outcome of the recent air raid.  The meeting had created 
widespread interest, and general satisfaction had been expressed that the 
conference of the Midland authorities was to take place.  He deprecated 
anything in the nature of recrimination, and whilst expressing in strong 
terms his opinion of the inadequacy of the arrangements made to warn 
local authorities of the approach of aircraft, he considered it would be 
better to discuss the means to prevent the recurrence of recent events 
rather than to apportion blame.90 
 
A resolution of the Conference was moved, seconded by the Lord Lieutenant of 
Staffordshire, Lord Dartmouth, and carried unanimously, which expressed the view: 
That this meeting, representing the local authorities of the Midlands, 
while welcoming the new order from the Home Office ensuring 
uniformity of lighting restrictions throughout the area, records its 
conviction that no arrangement for the defence of the area will be 
adequate which does not provide an organized system for giving early 
warning of the presence of hostile aircraft in the country, and 
information as to their subsequent movements in land.91 
 
The minutes of the quarterly meeting of Wednesbury Borough Council refer to 
this Conference, recording that a letter had been received from ‘the Corporation of 
Birmingham summoning delegates to a meeting of Midland local authorities to consider 
the best means of taking concerted action in the event of future air raids’.92  
Subsequently, local authorities received correspondence from the General Staff – Home 
Forces, informing them of the arrangements being made with the Post Office to notify 
police forces by telephone of the movements of hostile aircraft.  An example from 
Major P. Maud of the General Staff to the Mayor of Walsall was reproduced in the 
Walsall Observer and South Staffordshire Chronicle on 12 February 1916.93 
Local towns also held their own conferences, such as that occurring in 
Wednesbury on 11 February 1916, which was reported in the following day’s 
Wednesbury Herald.  Convened and chaired by the Mayor of Wednesbury,             
Councillor W. Warner, this forum considered the issue of uniformity of lighting 
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restrictions.  However, as related in a statement by Wednesbury’s Town Clerk, Thomas 
Jones, given the importance of maintaining munitions output, local manufacturers 
pointed to difficulties posed by the constant operation of blast furnaces and other works.  
The conference concluded that in order for the necessary precautions to be taken, 
sufficient warning of the approach of enemy aircraft was essential, with co-ordination 
between the War Office, Home Office and the Postmaster General being called for.94  
The GHQ Intelligence report indicates that on the night in question, one aeroplane 
piloted by Major A.B. Burdett was sent out from the Castle Bromwich aerodrome at 
8.30 pm, remaining airborne for an hour yet unable to locate the airships.95  In the towns 
that had been attacked by the airships, there was anger not only that they had been so 
affected but that there had been no official warning of the imminence of the air raid and 
that deterrence was so ineffective.  The Tipton Herald recorded the criticism levelled at 
the War Office by the Mayor of Dudley, Councillor S.C. Lloyd, which, he said, seemed 
‘unable to grapple with an emergency of any kind; such dilly-dallying is fatal to the 
public safety’.  Furthermore, he was especially unimpressed by official intransigence 
with regard to the arrest of aliens deemed to be a danger to the public peace.96 
Alfred Gollin asserted that ‘as early as the year 1908…H.H. Asquith’s Liberal 
Government found it necessary to take up the question of the air defence of Britain’.97  
Consequently, Lord Esher was charged by the Committee of Imperial Defence with the 
task of reviewing the dangers that might be posed by hostile aircraft.  Relatively little 
preparation was forthcoming.  Responsibility for the air defence of the British Isles was 
shared by the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS).98 
Rivalry between the War Office and the Admiralty impeded the creation of an efficient 
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national air defence system, and the government proved unable to make them cooperate 
to this end.  Gollin added that these ‘two departments of state followed policies and 
strategies that were entirely opposed to each other in this new sphere of national 
defence’.99  Indeed, the War Office had been sending all spare aircraft to France and in 
the early years there were only thirty-three anti-aircraft guns for available for home 
defence.  Most of these were situated in London and the Home Counties but proved 
incapable of hitting targets able to fly at the height attainable by the German airships. 
The bombing raids of 1915 and early 1916 forced the authorities to take action.  
Wilson identified this as the shifting of responsibility from the Royal Navy to the Army, 
introducing an early warning system, and diverting expertise and guns to the home 
front.  He noted that from February 1916 onwards, a number of RFC air bases were 
established for aircraft equipped for night fighting.100  Several important implications 
arose from these developments; especially the allocation of scarce resources, hardware 
and personnel otherwise destined for the front line.  By the end of 1916 there were 
17,000 officers and men serving the twelve RFC home defence squadrons and in anti-
aircraft and search light battalions.101  These efforts were assisted by new direction-
finding techniques, coastal listening stations and a code-breaking department.102 
The only truly effective counter to the German airships was interception by 
fighter aircraft.  The British machines of early 1916 were too slow and easily 
outmanoeuvred.  For instance, the most proficient model then in service was the Royal 
Aircraft Factory’s BE2c, which had a 90 horsepower engine that gave it a maximum 
speed of 72 mph and a ceiling of 10,000 feet.  However, even when an airship was 
located, the standard .303 ammunition did not have any great effect on the airships.  
One imaginative proposal was to use seaplanes that had been fitted with floats and 
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armed with a 2-pounder artillery gun.  However, because the seaplane would have had 
to track the airship before it reach the coast, land at sea and then fire upwards, this was 
deemed most impractical and not taken further.103  Hence, typically, the aircraft 
continued to be armed with a single Lewis machine gun and a complement of bombs.104 
A more practical and effective approach came with the introduction of 
incendiary bullets (filled with phosphorous) and explosive bullets (filled with nitro-
glycerine).  Both varieties of this Brock-Pomeroy-Buckingham ammunition were loaded 
into the Lewis Gun’s magazine, and when discharged it punctured the airship’s gas cells 
and ignited the escaping Hydrogen with the most devastating consequences.105  The 
vulnerability of Germany’s airships was immediately apparent and throughout 1916, the 
RFC achieved considerable success.  Despite the creation of a new generation of ‘Super 
Zeppelins’ that could climb to even higher altitudes, the pace of technological 
development for conventional aeroplanes prompted the emergence of long-range 
bombers; notably from 1917, such as Germany’s two-engined Gotha and the six-
engined Giant.  Airship losses resulted in many vessels being transferred to the Eastern 
Front, with the last raid of the Zeppelins on Britain occurring on 9 August 1918.106 
Prior to 1914, the impression of war on Britain’s civilian population had been 
slight, exacerbated by slow communications that often diminished the emotional effect 
of events happening weeks earlier.  The German air raids were immediate and, as Fegan 
asserted, ‘the most profound impact of the bombing was psychological, undermining 
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morale and the nation’s will to fight’.107  Compared with the Second World War, the 
damage done was of a lower magnitude, owing to fewer direct hits to munitions 
factories.  Yet account should be taken of the disruption caused by the raids, the delays 
to transport, accidents due to extinguished street lighting, and other infringements to 
everyday life.  Morris argued that ‘the shock of the air raids did begin to wear off, and 
that people began to adjust to this new type of war’.108  Ultimately, the air raids had the 
opposite effect to that anticipated by their perpetrators because the fighting spirit of the 
British people strengthened.  An example was the statement made by the Mayor of 
Walsall, and Chairman of Wednesbury’s Crown tube works, Stanley Mills Slater. 
If we in this district give way to panic or nervousness, if we allow our 
apprehension to interfere with the output of munitions, we are doing 
exactly what the Germans want, and exactly what will encourage them 
to persevere with these raids.109 
 
To provide financial relief to the victims and their families, some of whom were 
deprived of a breadwinner, and others of their home and belongings, recourse was made 
to the Prince of Wales’ Fund and to other local charities.  Postcards showing one of the 
incendiary bombs that landed and failed to ignite were sold to raise money.110  A benefit 
football match also took place at the ground of Wednesbury Old Athletic FC on             
4 March 1916.  The Midland Advertiser appealed to local manufacturers to support this 
by purchasing the 6d. tickets to distribute to their workers.  This would allow them to 
see an exceptional attraction with the teams ‘captained by Jesse Pennington, the West 
Bromwich Albion skipper, and Harry Hampton, the Aston Villa Centre Forward’.111 
Jay Winter and Antoine Prost provide the valuable insight that ‘from consolation 
and support it is a short step to commemoration’.112  Drawing together communities 
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related by blood or experience, terrible events such as those of 31 January 1916 required 
an outlet for the inevitable grief and, in turn, this became a part of the collective 
memory of the localities concerned.  Tom Morgan recorded that in Wednesbury, there 
was a ‘simple wooden memorial which used to be fixed to a wall in King Street bearing 
the names of those killed’ but that this disappeared many years ago.113  With the passage 
of time, more-enduring monuments have been erected.  Walsall’s war memorial stands 
in Bradford Place on the spot where the bomb fell that was to result in the death of the 
Mayoress, Mary Julia Slater.  A commemorative Blue Plaque was also situated on the 
wall of a building that still bears the scar of a bomb fragment.  A plaque to the memory 
of Maud and Frederick Fellows was placed in the Bradley canal basin yard in 1994.  
The most recent tribute to the victims is shrouded in mystery, being placed in 
Wednesbury’s cemetery by an anonymous benefactor in December 2012.114  What these 
monuments demonstrate with the utmost eloquence is that not only was this was a tragic 
event and that it continues to resonate with feeling for the people of the Black Country. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has examined the first attack by enemy aircraft to be experienced by the 
people of the Midlands.  As the conflict in which the strategic bombing from the air 
would be sustained for the duration, affecting the lives of so many civilians directly and 
indirectly, the First World War blurred forever the distinction between the front line and 
home front.  The wider significance of the air raid of 31 January 1916 is that, at the 
time, it was the largest incursion yet attempted in an organized campaign that shocked 
civilised men and women in all countries.  Although not the intended target, which the 
available evidence suggests was Liverpool, many towns, including those in the Black 
Country, fell victim to the German airships that penetrated so far in land unchallenged. 
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Even in the pre-war years, airships captured the imagination of the population at 
large.  They became the embodiment of industrialized conflict, acknowledged in the 
BBC Television Series, The Great War, which stated that ‘the scientist and the engineer 
had created a new dimension in warfare: the air’.115  These machines were sinister, vast 
and seemingly invulnerable, bringing death and destruction indiscriminately.  At its 
outset, this first aerial Battle of Britain was one-sided, there being no way to predict 
when and where the airships would arrive.  This experience was unparalleled, the aim of 
the protagonists to raise the price of resistance to a level too high to bear.  Indeed, the 
opinion of the Marine-Luftschiff-Abteilung itself, was that the raids were exerting a 
deep-seated effect on morale and that the consequences for industry and the military in 
Britain was much more serious than was being acknowledged in the press at the time. 116 
From this Chapter’s discussion of the political, public and press reaction, it is 
evident that after the initial disruption, and with the introduction of counter measures, 
the air raids began to have the opposite effect on British morale to that intended.  The 
first home defence measures, early warning systems and effective interceptor aircraft 
were put into place and grew in sophistication.  This laid the foundations for the air 
defence that would be so vital during the Second World War and the experience of the 
Black Country towns on 31 January 1916, and in the days that followed, played its part. 
An event that continues to have profound meaning for the people of Bradley, Tipton, 
Walsall and Wednesbury, it is contended that this is no mere historical footnote. 
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CHAPTER 7:  THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON                                                   
SOCIETY IN WEDNESBURY 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The First World War was much more than a conflict involving armed forces and their 
servicemen; it was a total war affecting all social levels within the participant nations.  
The citizens of these societies were crucial to sustaining the war effort and any collapse 
in morale on the home front carried potentially disastrous repercussions.  This was 
noted by Brock Millman when he stated that ‘the maintenance of a nation’s will to fight 
is as important as its physical ability to continue the struggle’.1  The intention of this 
Chapter is to describe and evaluate the impact of war on society in Wednesbury by 
reference to three elements relating to the town’s social life and structures. 
In order to understand the impact of the war on the part of the town’s working-
class community, the first of these elements will include an examination of health, 
housing and welfare in Wednesbury during these years.  Included within this discussion 
will be an assessment of the manner in which wartime hardships were endured, together 
with local and national responses to remedy this by alleviating poverty and raising 
living standards.  One of the paradoxical improvements found on the home front was to 
wellbeing and Marwick argued that ‘other, more complicated, and sometimes 
contradictory, influences must be examined if the deeper changes wrought in the pattern 
of British life and leisure during the period are to be understood’.2  Therefore, the class 
dimension will also feature, particularly in terms of local reactions to injustice and 
profiteering at a time when national calls for equality of sacrifice were being made. 
The second element will be a discussion of citizenship and wider support for the 
war effort in Wednesbury.  This was of great importance to the nation when millions of 
men were joining the armed forces, firstly as volunteers and later as conscripts; when 
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there were major reorganizations of industry, with consequences for conscription and 
employment, as well as production; and the state’s involvement through the regulation 
of everyday life reached levels hitherto unimaginable.  Success demanded cohesion and 
the upholding of public order and purpose.  The manner in which this was translated to 
the local level, the changing of any attitudes compared with those of the pre-war years 
will be undertaken by reference to the main aspects of working-class culture and life. 
The final element will be a review of press and propaganda.  This will include 
both the traditional newspaper and other media, such as the cinema, together with 
consideration of censorship via the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA).  The operation 
of the local press in Wednesbury and the wider Black Country will be integral to this 
discussion, focusing on the key issues covered in the period.  Examples will include 
fund-raising activity, aspects of military news and the events following the bombing of 
Wednesbury and other Black Country towns by Zeppelin airships in 1916.3 
In following this structure, the Chapter will investigate Wednesbury’s 
experience and the influence of war on civilian life.  Hence, it is motivated by 
Marwick’s view that to understand the British social experience during the war, it must 
‘lead to a detailed study of war and war’s impact on society’.4  This will be achieved by 
addressing several questions, including the following:  How did Wednesbury’s society 
change during the war?  Were some people expected to make a greater sacrifice than 
were others?  How did the community respond when it became apparent that the war 
would not be won quickly?  What were the consequences of greater state regulation?  In 
responding to these questions, the existing evidence has been reinterpreted and 
challenged, and attention given to those primary sources that have not been fully 
utilized until now, such the reports of Wednesbury’s Medical Officer of Health.5 
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7.2 Maintaining morale - health, housing and welfare 
 
Jay Winter and Blaine Baggett described morale as ‘the determination to go on’ and 
state that it ‘mattered in this war in a way that it never had before’.6  Incomparable to the 
demands made on those at the front line; nevertheless, the civilian population endured 
material hardships to finance and equip the armed forces so that they could continue the 
struggle for national survival.  Their morale, and especially that of the working class in 
towns such as Wednesbury, depended on community identity and sense of belonging, 
together with other factors that could fluctuate, making it difficult to quantify, so that it 
could not be taken for granted.7  The suggestion that all members of society participated 
equally and for the common good must necessarily be tempered, since the propensity 
for animosity and disapproval to materialize was ever-present, and it increased in the 
war’s latter years.  As Waites has argued, whilst class differences may have diminished, 
‘class conscientiousness in contrast became sharpened through the scandal of 
profiteering, and the vision of vultures feeding off the corpses of dead British soldiers’.8 
The outbreak of war was accompanied by a belief that hostilities would be brief 
and that Britain would emerge victorious.  Typical of the public pronouncements were 
remarks passed at a public meeting on 14 August 1914 by Wednesbury’s Mayor, 
Councillor Nat Bishop.  He stated that ‘the loyal spirit shown throughout the British 
Empire was an undoubted proof that all were prepared to make sacrifices and to suffer 
in a cause which they believed to be righteous’.9  Indeed, most of the nation, if not 
welcoming them, generally accepted the transformations occurring in the autumn of 
1914.  This was important, especially once it became evident that a successful outcome 
would not be achieved within a few months and, as Catriona Pennell noted, there were 
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‘too many socio-economic changes for anyone to carry on as if the war was not 
happening’.10  Moreover, for a town such as Wednesbury, the demographic and 
economic implications were crucial due to the competing military and industrial 
burdens that would in due course fall upon its people.  Added to this was the national 
population’s social composition because, as pointed out by Bourne, ‘the working class 
comprised 80 per cent of the population.  Their morale was the national morale’. 11 
In the first months, there had been the belief that economic hardship would be 
incurred.  However, as Marwick remarked, ‘it was one of the lesser ironies of the war 
that, after all the preparation for unemployment, it was in the end to furnish an 
unprecedented demand for labour’.12  Nevertheless, considerable energy and time on the 
part of individuals, charitable bodies, municipal authorities and central government was 
expended to alleviate distress.  The pre-war years being notable for the emergence of 
numerous voluntary organizations, including local branches of political parties, friendly 
societies and cooperatives, together with various religious denominations, there was 
crucial fund-raising activity within local communities.  This often dovetailed with the 
National Relief Fund established on 6 August 1914, with the Prince of Wales as 
President, to assist the dependants of those undertaking military service as well as other 
people affected by industrial disruption.13  On 15 August 1914, the Wednesbury Herald 
reported on local activity instigated at a town meeting by the Mayor, Councillor Nat 
Bishop.14  He stated that all current public works would continue and further schemes be 
initiated via grants from the Local Government Board under the Unemployed Workmen 
Act 1905.  Referring to a telegram issued on behalf of the Prince of Wales, he hoped 
that the National Relief Fund would be generously supported in the Borough. 
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The local press also outlined activities by local manufacturers to support the 
community, including regular charitable donations from their workforces.  For example, 
the Patent Shaft & Axletree Co. Ltd. provided for the families of those employees who 
had enlisted in the army.  A similar commitment to make weekly subscriptions to relief 
funding was given by the James Russell & Sons Crown tube works.  The workers of 
Edwin Smith’s Brunswick tube works had agreed to donate between 1d. and 4d. per 
week, and the Staffordshire Patent tube works would make a weekly contribution 
equivalent to 1½ per cent of the firm’s wage bill.15  Total subscriptions to the National 
Relief Fund were recorded on 29 August 1914 to be £1,196 15s. 11d.16  By November 
1914, this increased to £2,776 5s. 2d. and within a year would achieve £4,933 5s. 2d.  
From this sum, £400 18s. 2d. was allocated to the Mayor’s fund and £451 19s. 5d. to aid 
Belgian refugees; the remainder being made available to the Prince of Wales’ Fund. 17  
On 22 August 1914, the Wednesbury Herald reported that the town’s women had 
created a committee to provide clothing to servicemen.  The deeds of Florence 
Nightingale and Dorothy Pattison were cited and the Mayor stated that ‘it was time for 
women to emulate such noble examples of self-sacrifice and he had no doubt that the 
women of Wednesbury would give a good account of themselves’.18  Fund-raising 
continued throughout the war and the Midland Counties Express reported on 6 July 
1918 that £170 had been in collected in Wednesbury at a flag day for the Red Cross.19 
The payment of Separation Allowances to the families of servicemen was 
delegated to the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Families Association. 20  Founded in 1885 with 
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royal patronage, the SSFA was a philanthropic body.  In Wednesbury, it was established 
that the SSFA funds were £138, which the Association’s Treasurer (Mr Joynston) and 
the President (Wednesbury’s Mayor) would allocate upon receipt of deserving 
applications.  The aforementioned local expressions of generosity from the townspeople 
and local firms elicited a response from the SSFA, with Mr Joynston being ‘delighted to 
find that the working men of Wednesbury were showing themselves alive to the 
necessities of the case now as in the Boer War’.21  Although experienced in managing 
such payments, most recently during the Boer War, as Susan Pederson noted, its ‘class 
composition and explicit moral agenda’ did not engender it favourably to recipients.22 
A factor crucial in Britain’s entry into the war was the plight of Belgium and 
some 200,000 Belgians fled to Britain in 1914.  Pugh asserted that their arrival ‘helped 
to reinforce the view and to give a high moral tone to the British cause’.23  Locally, this 
was endorsed on 12 September 1914 when Councillor Nat Bishop confirmed that ‘His 
Majesty’s Government had offered to the Belgian victims of the war the hospitality of 
the British nation...and it is necessary to distribute a very considerable number in 
various parts of the country’.24   In total, 30 Belgians were situated in Wednesbury, 22 of 
them at Wolsey House (home of the late Mayor, Alderman John Knowles) and the 
others in cottages owned by Wednesbury resident, Arthur Spittle.  The press reported 
Wednesbury’s generosity in providing cash, clothing, food and other necessities 
marched the warmth of the reception that the Belgians received, with £235 15s. being 
raised initially, rising to £415 19s. 5d. in 1915.25  On behalf of the refugees, a letter of 
appreciation from Messrs. C. Caene and J. Vandenbergh was published in the 
Wednesbury Herald on 24 October 1914.  This stated, ‘the public of Wednesbury 
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understanding our distress, overwhelmed us with their kindness and we feel their 
enthusiastic reception has, if not cured, at least healed the soreness of our hearts’.26 
The first anniversary of the outbreak of the war was marked by a public meeting 
attended by Wednesbury’s leading citizens and chaired by the Mayor, Councillor 
Bishop.  This was arranged at the request of Lord Dartmouth, the Lord Lieutenant of 
Staffordshire, to bolster ‘resolute determination to carry on the conflict until a peace, 
honourable, durable, and satisfactory to our allies and ourselves is obtained’.  Alderman 
A.E. Pritchard moved a resolution of abiding loyalty, recalling ‘twelve months of 
unparalleled crimes and atrocities, the blackest the world has ever seen’.27  Similar 
sentiments were expressed when the Bishop of Lichfield, Dr John Kempthorne, 
addressing the congregation of St. John’s church, Wednesbury, asked whether God was 
‘writing “Tekel” on the wall of the British Empire’, deeming it ‘in danger of being 
weighed in the balance and found light’.28  The second anniversary was marked 
officially on 12 August 1916, and Alderman E.J. Hunt moved a resolution of loyalty: 
That in this, the second anniversary of the Declaration of a righteous 
war, this meeting of the citizens of Wednesbury records its inflexible 
determination to continue to a victorious end the struggle in 
maintenance of those ideals of liberty and justice, which are the 
common and sacred cause of the Allies.29 
 
It would be in the years 1917-1918 that war-weariness and the seemingly bleak 
prospects of winning the war decisively began to have an impact on public confidence.  
Despite the positive representation offered by the local and national press, such as that 
following the brief breakthrough at Cambrai in 1917, as Adrian Gregory noted, news of 
the blood baths of the Somme and Passchendaele had also reached the wider public.30  
This was at the time when Tsarist Russia’s departure from the war following the 
                                               
26
  Wednesbury Herald, 24 October 1914. 
27
  Ibid., 7 August 1915. 
28
  Ibid., 30 October 1915. 
29
  Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald, 12 August 1916. 
30
  A. Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p. 213.  As will be illustrated later in this Chapter, the First World War was the 
first conflict in which the civilian population would receive relatively timely news of what was happening 
to the men serving on the front line, with information being forthcoming from a number of sources. 
199 
 
Bolshevik Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, combined with Italy’s defeat at 
Caporetto, threatened to destabilize Britain’s efforts on the Western Front and 
elsewhere.  On the home front, which was being affected by unrest in the munitions 
industries and the repercussions of inflation and profiteering, steps were required to 
reverse this bleak picture and restore some confidence and rekindle national optimism. 31 
On 7 January 1918, the Express and Star reproduced the New Year 
proclamation of King George V, which was read out in all places of worship.  Warning 
of the dangers of pessimism, pacifism and peace-mongering, the Reverend T.H.P. Hyatt 
of St. Bartholomew’s Church, Wednesbury, pronounced that ‘it was the spirit of the 
people at home that mattered, for it was upon their determination to go on working and 
economizing that the efficiency of the men at the front depended’.32  It should be 
recorded that these comments were made before the German offensive that commenced 
on 21 March 1918, and which threatened not just the recent progress made but to turn 
the course of the war.  However, as Trevor Wilson pointed out, ‘anxiety, and the sense 
of having been thrust into uncharted territory, never passed over into despair’.33 
The true nature of the fighting and the human costs incurred shattered any 
illusions of waging a short war; instead, there would be protracted military stalemate 
and increasing calls on national resources preventing those at home from carrying on 
their lives as normal.  Enthusiasm and innocence were battered as the news of fatalities 
and casualties became commonplace.  As described by Woollacott, British society had 
to ‘accommodate the bandaged, the wounded, those on crutches, the limbless, those 
with disfigured faces, lost eyes and damaged nerves’.34  Yet this did not encourage 
outrage or widespread pacifism or subversion; on the contrary, there was an acceptance 
of the situation, which Peter Liddle has referred to as ‘a sort of grim resolve to see 
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things through’.35  In addition to assisting the families of those on active service, 
Wednesbury also provided support to the families of men held as prisoners of war.  In a 
letter in the Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald on 19 January 1918, the 
Mayor, Alderman A.E. Pritchard, indicated that 44 men from the Borough were 
detained by enemy forces, and that parcels of food and other necessities were sent to 
every man on a fortnightly basis, at an annual cost of £3,653 per man.  Alderman 
Pritchard observed that ‘it is for us who are living in comparative safety to make OUR 
sacrifice and show ourselves worthy of the highest tradition of the British Empire’. 36 
When considering such sacrifices, and the efforts to continue to feed the nation 
and maintain living standards, it should be noted that before the war Britain had 
imported approximately 60 per cent of its food.  Even in the earliest days of the conflict, 
there were concerns and reports in the local press of outbreaks of panic buying that 
induced shopkeepers to raise prices immediately.37  Official action was instigated when 
the Board of Trade issued a list specifying the maximum retail prices for sugar, butter, 
cheese, margarine and bacon, as recorded in the Wednesbury Herald on 15 August 
1914.38  This measure proved futile and prices rose regardless, with the working class 
being hit hardest since, as Pennell noted, they ‘were less able to meet rising prices with 
a shift in diet or to cheaper food’.39  For the poor, meat had always been a luxury 
commodity, resulting in a dependency upon bread, flour, potatoes and oatmeal.  The 
effect of such substitution as occurred had an impact on the diet of the nation as a whole 
because of the inflationary consequences that led to food prices ‘representing arguably 
the most significant factor affecting everyday life’.40  For families with breadwinners in 
uniform and reliant on Separation Allowances, everyday existence became a struggle.  
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For the typical working-class family, in 1914 one-fifth of household income was 
expended on bread and flour, and in that year alone the price of wheat had risen by 72 
per cent, that of barley by 40 per cent, and oats by 34 per cent.41  If unchecked, this 
would cause damage to civilian morale and, in turn, to that of the men at the front line. 
Attempts were made by the state to ensure the availability of sufficient 
quantities of basic foodstuffs although the reliance on imports became problematic, 
especially with the sinking of merchant shipping by German submarines.  David Bilton 
recorded that during the last four months of 1916, ‘632,000 tons of shipping had been 
sunk and the President of the Board of Trade reported that a complete breakdown in 
shipping would come before June 1917’.42  A solution was for British farms to produce 
more food.  This would have to be achieved with far fewer workers and fewer horses 
(since both were needed by the army) so that women, children, the elderly, discharged 
soldiers and prisoners of war were induced to help.  Efforts were also made to 
encourage economy, such as the replacement of traditional white bread with a more 
nutritious brown bread, thereby upholding calorific levels.  In the autumn of 1917, 
action was taken to peg prices to their 1916 level, although this was not without 
controversy since, from 1915 onwards, the term “profiteer” had entered into widespread 
usage mirroring a belief in the unfairness of the plight of many in British society.  
Waites contended that ‘issues such as excess profits, high food process and inequalities 
of distribution were affronts to the moral economy of the English working class’ given 
the ‘lip service paid to the ideals of self-sacrifice and communal effort in the war’.43 
A meeting of the Wednesbury and District Trades and Labour Council, held at 
the George Public House, Wednesbury, in May 1916, discussed the rising cost of living.  
The Council’s Chairman, Mr R. Micklewright, commented on the erroneous impression 
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that workers ‘were receiving such stupendous wages that they had nothing to do than to 
put it in the bank’.  By contrast, he added, ‘nothing was said about the enormous wealth 
which was being piled up in other directions, whereby the price of food was being 
raised’.44  The working class, and particularly the previously impoverished semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers, were ‘believed to be spending their money on pianos, furniture, 
good quality boots and shoes for their children, and even gramophones’.45  Resentment 
at high prices and unfair distribution of food became one of the causes of industrial 
unrest in the factories in 1917 and there was the growing belief that unscrupulous 
producers and traders were manipulating the situation to the own ends.  In his 
assessment, Sir George Askwith attributed this to ‘the fact that some people were 
making money out of the war without any restraint upon their methods’ and in August 
1917, the Ministry of Food began to take a harder line with profiteering shopkeepers.46 
Queues for foodstuffs initially appeared in the spring of 1917.  For working-
class people this became an acute problem because time spent queuing meant being 
away from work and a reduced income.  Adrian Faber’s study of the provincial press 
related that ‘the queues almost took on the form of a shared emblem that showed people 
were playing their part in helping to win the war’.47  Recognizing the potential for 
civilian morale to be undermined, the first step towards a nationwide distribution of 
food was the Regulation of Meals Order, which came into effect in December 1916.  
This restricted hotel and restaurant meals to either three courses for evening meals or 
two at other times of the day.48  A Food Department was established in 1916, based 
initially within the Board of Trade until Ministry status was conferred in 1917, and 
empowered by DORA to enter and search premises in order to tackle food hoarding. 
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Local food committees with statutory powers to fix prices and distribute food 
were established, supervised by local authorities.  However, these bodies were a source 
of class tension because, as Waites suggested, they ‘were unduly representative of local 
traders and middle-class voluntary workers inimical to working-class interests’.49  
Consequently, until labour representation was agreed, food vigilance committees were 
set up by local Labour parties, Trades and Labour Councils and Cooperative Societies.  
In Wednesbury, such dissatisfaction resulted in deputations visiting local factories and a 
public meeting was held in the town’s Market Place in January 1918.  At this gathering, 
trade unionist George Stokes spoke out against the unfair distribution of food and urged 
the implementation of a rationing scheme that would operate on an equitable basis.50 
On 3 February 1917, an appeal for voluntary rationing and reduced consumption 
was instigated, which was ‘in effect a Derby Scheme for food’ but with ‘compulsion 
held in the background as a threat’.51  The Food Controller offered advice to local 
councils on plans for rationing.  According to the Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury 
Herald, a deputation from the Black Country’s municipal authorities had met in 
conference and a discussed a voluntary scheme and sought the views of the Food 
Controller.52  Following its introduction in London and the Home Counties, food 
rationing was extended to the rest of the nation in April 1918, firstly for meat and then, 
from July, for other foodstuffs.  Each household was to register with a retailer supplied 
only according to the needs of their customers.  Initially they were provided with a 
document of entitlement, eventually to be replaced by coupons held in a ration book.53 
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The Express and Star reported on 22 November 1917 that the Wednesbury 
Tradesman’s Association had met in response to public meetings organized to protest at 
the price and inadequate supply of food.  A resolution was adopted by this body 
‘sympathizing with the workers in their difficulty in getting goods, pointing out that it 
was not in the province of the Association to alter the existing state of supplies’. 54  In 
January 1918, large queues were reported in Wednesbury, with reports that the Deputy 
Mayor, Councillor W. Warner, gave assistance in allocating necessary commodities.55 
With public concern mounting, a committee was appointed by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer and chaired by Lord Summers to investigate price rises and increases in 
the cost of living to the working class since June 1914, with its report being published in 
October 1918.  In considering factors apart from wage increases arising due to the war, 
this body highlighted food, rent, clothing, fuel, insurance, fares and household sundries.  
With food comprising the largest portion of working-class budgets, by 1918 ‘there was 
clear reason to suppose that the quantities of different articles of food ordinarily 
consumed had changed materially since 1914’.56  The report categorized the impact of 
this by reference to the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, with the percentage 
increases in prices being felt more keenly by the unskilled than the skilled.  In summary, 
however, the Committee’s findings were that the families of unskilled workers were 
better fed at the end of the war than at its beginning, with the number of undernourished 
children declining by more than half, as their parents were now receiving better food.  
Nevertheless, for the average family of 4.75 equivalent people, weekly expenditure on 
food had almost doubled from 24s. 11d. in June 1914 to 47s. 3d. in June 1918.57 
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As was the case for most families across the country, the majority of 
Wednesbury’s working class were compelled by circumstances to live in private sector 
rented accommodation.  From 1914, they were increasingly the victims of rising rents 
and a housing shortage, so that dwellings otherwise considered unfit for human 
habitation remained in use.58  Following successful agitation, the Rent Restriction Act 
1915 was introduced, holding the rents of working-class dwellings at pre-war levels.59  
According to Winter, this was ‘probably the most important measure in the defence of 
working-class living standards in wartime; it is arguable that without it, the war 
economy would have collapsed’.60  Despite the Housing (No. 2) Act 1914, empowering 
the Local Government Board to spend £4 million on housing, the reasons for the 
shortage were economic, for the construction of working-class homes was considered a 
matter for the private sector.61  This was constrained because of the soaring costs of 
building materials and a labour force depleted by military service or the finding of 
better-paid work in the munitions industries.  The maintenance of the existing housing 
stock was similarly impaired and dilapidated accommodation was allowed to remain in 
use.  Nationally, for the period between 1911 and 1918, only 238,000 houses were built; 
a wartime average of 38,000 compared with an annual 84,000 in the pre-war years.62 
Discussion of Wednesbury’s housing shortage occurred in early 1915.  The 
Wednesbury Herald confirmed proposals to purchase a site for 24 dwellings to be 
constructed by the firm of Messrs. Summerhill and Jellyman, with the total cost of the 
project being £5,240.63  Yet this did not assuage concerns about overcrowding and, on 
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18 March 1915, the Express and Star featured an unsigned letter stating, ‘for years men 
employed in Wednesbury have had to find houses in neighbouring towns owing to a 
lack of houses’.64  The local authority was subsequently advised that as well as the 
building of a new school at nearby Moxley, the proposed housing scheme had been 
halted by the Treasury.  That the issue of housing supply remained unresolved is shown 
in the reports of Wednesbury’s Medical Officer of Health, indicating that whilst the 
number of occupants per household remained stable at 4.9, between 1914 and 1916 the 
number of houses decreased from 5,900 to 5,895 and none were built from 1916 to 
1918.65  Nevertheless, in October 1918, as a first step in rectifying the national housing 
shortage, a Local Government Board inspection in Wednesbury led to anticipation of a 
scheme wider in scope than that of 1915.  Pragmatically, the Midland Advertiser and 
Wednesbury Herald commented that this would ‘involve very considerable expense but 
there will be some satisfaction in paying for the happiest necessities of peace’.66 
The consequences of rising food prices and housing costs became marked in the 
real distress increasingly felt during the war’s early years, with Waites asserting that 
conditions ‘threw into sharp relief the chronic insecurity of the urban millions who 
relied on the low, often irregular, wages of unskilled work.’67  Locally, the Wednesbury 
Herald reported on official surveys being conducted into the extent of unemployment 
and action that local authorities might implement to offset distress.68  Whilst the poorest 
continued to be vulnerable to some extent, there were tangible improvements once 
Separation Allowances were paid with increased regularity and munitions production 
created employment to keep pace with the military necessity.  This resulted in 
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contradictory effects on living standards, however.  For families having several adults 
able to work, increased wages and regular overtime improved matters; whereas, in 
contrast, for those on fixed incomes or with one adult and several children (typically a 
female with a husband on active service), rising prices could be devastating. 
It was only during the war that there was the beginning of a national 
commitment by the state towards welfare provision, which Janis Lomas attributed to the 
Asquith administration’s decision to extend Separation Allowances and widows’ 
pensions to the wives of volunteers.  Separation Allowances were paid according to an 
incremental scale linked to military rank, with the spouses of privates receiving 1s. 2d. 
per day and those of senior non-commissioned officers a daily 2s. 3d.  Increments were 
also made for each additional child in the household.69  Initially, this was administered 
by the SSFA, which interpreted its remit to include assessing whether wives’ conduct 
and morality was sufficiently virtuous to merit a payment.  Consequently, invasions of 
privacy occurred, and with great resentment caused, this resulted for instance in the 
discovery ‘that a large number of working-class soldiers were not married to the women 
they lived with’.70  Eventually it was decided that payment would be made even when a 
marriage licence was not produced, and the SSFA was relieved of this role, which was 
taken over by the Ministry of Pensions in 1916.  Separation Allowances were beneficial 
to the health and welfare of working-class families, so that ‘by 1917, the pressures of 
war had led the state to accept the introduction of benefits for soldiers’ wives on an 
unprecedented scale’.71  This was due to recognition that ‘to maintain civilian morale it 
could not allow the wives and families to be forced on to the Poor Law’.72  Nevertheless, 
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when resulting from the loss of a husband on active military service, widowhood could 
still represent an extremely bleak financial future indeed for the man’s family.73 
That ‘the war period must be viewed as one of the most significant 
improvements in public health’ was Winter’s assertion, attributed to improvements in 
nutrition, especially in the case of infants and those whose health was impaired by pre-
war casual employment.74  In the decade 1910-1920, there were noteworthy increases in 
civilian life expectancy, rising from 49 to 51 years for men and 53 to 60 years for 
women.  Infant mortality, which Gregory described as ‘the most sensitive indicator if 
general economic wellbeing’ owing to the importance of survival at the most vulnerable 
stage of life, declined considerably from 105 to 80 deaths per thousand.75  In 
Wednesbury during 1915-1918, the total population increased from 29,100 to 30,364 
(an average annual increase of between 207 and 309), the death rate for children aged 
below five years reduced, and the total infantile death rate fell from 136 to 94 per 
thousand.  Having regard to diseases known to be especially prevalent amongst 
children, for example puerperal fever, the rate remained stable during wartime.76 
When compared with the other European nations engaged in the war, Britain 
was the only one in which there were real improvements in the infant mortality rate.  
However, any examination of the reasons for this, identifying such common 
denominators as rising wage rates, a more equitable distribution of food, smaller 
families and a reduced birth rate owing to men being away on military service, suggests 
that these were also to be found in other countries.77  Furthermore, there has been 
criticism of a perspective that can be viewed as ‘rather self-congratulatory and 
Whiggish’ and ‘which sees this social progress as a product of the superiority of British 
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representative government’.78  Laybourn referred to the poorest as being those that 
experienced the greatest gains through the introduction of rationing.79  Whilst the living 
standards and poverty to be found in the poorer working-class neighbourhoods had 
undoubtedly contributed to high mortality rates in the late Victorian and Edwardian 
periods, as pointed out by Chinn, some improvements to the British mortality rate, for 
example, occurred in the years that preceded the conflict.80  Yet, the pre-war 
demographic legacy for the working class could not be eliminated and with the 
occurrence of the Spanish Influenza pandemic in 1918, such privations increased 
susceptibility to the virus.81  In Wednesbury, there were expressions of alarm at the 
number of recorded deaths arising from pulmonary tuberculosis, with the Express and 
Star reporting that this matter had been referred for the attention of the county 
authorities; later reports indicated that this escalated from 163 in 1915 to 652 by 1917.82 
 
7.3 Citizenship and community support for the war 
 
It has been asserted by Pennell that ‘national identity is never more sharply defined than 
in times of conflict’ and the maintenance of morale is vital during any period of 
warfare.83  One of the corollaries of this involves the vilification of the enemy in 
general, and their leaders in particular, as part of the justification for a nation’s 
involvement in a conflict.  Gower alluded to the pre-war antipathy towards Germany, 
which to the public was reaffirmed most dramatically by the atrocities committed by 
German forces on the Western Front in the autumn of 1914.84  This sentiment was 
communicated by the Express and Star and the coverage of public meetings where not 
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only the justice and righteousness of Britain’s cause and the requirement to preserve 
national honour were mentioned; there was also the importance of teaching the Kaiser 
and Germany a lesson for their outrages.85  Such acts of barbarism made it ‘abundantly 
clear that the Germans were beyond redemption – except through the lesson of complete 
and utter defeat.  Such a defeat could only be achieved by everyone doing his bit’.86 
Of all the belligerent nations, only Britain made some allowance for 
conscientious objectors avoiding military service and following the introduction of 
conscription in 1916 some 16,500 registrations occurred.  Those whose beliefs placed 
them in this category were frequently abused by others ‘and the term conchie became an 
expression of approbation’.87  The process by which objectors were registered entailed 
appearance before a local panel, which would typically comprise local clergymen, 
prominent local dignitaries and retired army officers.  Invariably hostile, such panels 
mirrored the widespread distain felt for those seen to be shirking.  Although the working 
class might grumble and on occasion go on strike, it did not see this as dissent despite 
the lack of military progress, casualties and fatalities, shortages and rising prices.  
Millman’s assessment of working-class patriotism views this as being the majority 
reaction and ‘for most of the working class, in 1918 as in 1914, nation comes before 
class’.88  Evidence of this was drawn from Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner 
Basil Thomson’s report, which records the strong public feeling against pacifist 
meetings and that these were often prohibited to prevent breaches of the peace’.89 
One consequence was the intrusion of the state into life on a scale unimaginable 
before the war, and there was the anticipation that as well as maintaining morale, good 
order should be upheld to ensure national survival.  An example cited by Gower was a 
circular letter of 13 August 1914 from Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Plumer, 
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Commander-in-Chief of Northern Command, recognizing that disorder could occur in 
the event of unemployment or food shortages.90  Two days later, Staffordshire’s Chief 
Constable convened a meeting of magistrates to appoint special constables to deal with 
such eventualities.  These specials would be private citizens, usually above military age 
or engaged in essential occupations and able to volunteer for a few hours per week.91 
The extension of police duties took place in numerous ways, such as the 
identification of groups and organizations suspected of undermining the war effort.  
Wilson related that a watch was kept on aliens and ‘all foreigners had to register with 
the constabulary and must keep indoors between the hours of 9 pm and 5 am, unless 
furnished with a police permit’.92  On 1 January 1916, the Midland Advertiser reported 
that under the Aliens Restrictions (Amendment) Order 1915, husband and wife Thomas 
and Jessie Jacques, proprietors of a lodging house in the Market Place, Wednesbury, 
were charged with failing to register a Russian subject, Ivan Adler, who performed at 
Wednesbury’s Music Hall in November 1915.  Both defendants were fined 20s. by 
Wednesbury’s Police Court.93  The fear of spies continued, so that on 6 July 1918 the 
Midland Counties Express reported that the National Party had gathered 3,000 
signatures in the area for a petition favouring the immediate internment of aliens.94 
Public morality received attention during 1914 with an outbreak of so-called 
Khaki Fever, the term acting as a metaphor for relaxed morality.  With few women 
visiting public houses, perceived as a male domain, where military establishments were 
nearby, the social and sexual behaviour of young women attracted to men in military 
service created concerns.  Moreover, the authorities wished to control the problem of 
sexually transmitted diseases among the troops.  From September 1914, women in such 
areas came under surveillance via morality patrols instigated by the middle-class 
                                               
90
  S.J.L Gower, p. 86. 
91
  Wednesbury Herald, 15 August 1914. 
92
  T. Wilson, p. 153. 
93
  Midland Advertiser, 1 January 1916. 
94
  Midland Counties Express, 6 July 1918. 
212 
 
Women’s Patrol Committee and the Women Police Volunteers (becoming the Women’s 
Police Service in 1915).  Predominantly middle- and upper-class women, they 
responded to ‘grave rumours of uncontrolled excitement’ and their remit later extended 
to the workplace following agreement with the Ministry of Munitions in July 1915. 95  As 
Waites added, this reinforced resentments that the law, police and judiciary ‘were the 
devil in working-class ethics precisely because they were seen as not being fair to us’.96 
Mounting apprehension that consumption of alcoholic beverages was damaging 
to the war effort was famously espoused by Lloyd George in 1915, when he said, ‘we 
are fighting Germans, Austrians and drink, and as far as I am concerned the greatest of 
these deadly foes is drink’.97  The first regulatory measure was the Intoxicating Liquor 
(Temporary Restriction) Order of 31 August 1914, which empowered the licensing 
authorities and the police to restrict public house opening hours.  As a mainstay of the 
leisure time of working-class men in the Black Country, the motivation for this was 
practical; it was to uphold industrial production and public order by reducing 
drunkenness, rather than as a response to ideas of temperance.  Indeed, the Wednesbury 
and District Licensed Victuallers Association deemed this step unnecessary, which was 
understandable in view of the number of public houses in the town, and for whom this 
would have adverse financial consequences.98  Selective regulation was undertaken from 
May 1915 by the Liquor Trade Central Control Board, a body that ‘addressed insobriety 
with radical ideas that transformed virtually every aspect of drinking – from hours, 
liquor strengths and taxes to retailing and social customs’.99  Henceforth, public house 
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opening hours were to be between 8 am and 9 pm on the weekdays and from 12.30 pm 
to 2.30 pm and 6 pm to 9 pm on Sundays.  Notification that a Wednesbury Restriction 
Order had been promulgated and was going to be imposed by the Home Secretary to 
confirm these earlier public house closing times, with checks being made to corroborate 
adherence to these, was reported in the Express and Star on 21 May 1915.100 
A further Central Control Board initiative was to reduce the potency of alcoholic 
drink to a 70 per cent maximum proof for spirits and a commensurate weakening of 
beer.  With its production reduced and prices increased through the imposition of taxes 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in successive budgets, and with less time available 
for consumption, sales of beers and spirits fell dramatically.  According to Cunningham, 
by 1918 it had more than halved since 1914.101  All these changes contributed to a 
lowering of the incidence of alcoholism and cases of parental neglect of infants, and 
were therefore beneficial to the nation’s health generally.  Evidence of this is supplied 
by Winter, who quotes the Registrar-General’s reports for 1916.  These noted the 
decline of a pre-war pattern whereby the number of infant deaths due to suffocation 
reported on Sunday mornings outnumbered all other days of the week, attributable to 
parents being too drunk on Saturday evenings to take proper care of their children. 102 
Social conventions and attitudes towards drinking as a leisure activity were also 
changing during the war years.  For example, there was general adherence to Lord 
Kitchener’s plea for the sake of military discipline that people should refrain from 
treating servicemen on leave to a drink.103  Yet, at the same time, Gutzke asserted that 
‘respectable working-class and lower middle-class women, who had shunned public 
drinking for almost a century, began patronizing the pub in unprecedented numbers.’104 
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Since the nineteenth century, the great spectator sports had become, in the words 
of Marwick, ‘the very marrow of working-class and lower middle-class activity’.105  The 
crowds attending the matches of the professional teams were often exceedingly partisan 
and, in the case of teams associated with particular religious denominations, this 
reflected more than geographic rivalry.  What is more, as Veitch asserted, football had 
‘been rapturously embraced by the working classes, and the teams emerging from the 
industrial heartlands of England...began to gain the ascendancy’.106  That matches 
continued in the first months of the war was not well received by the middle and upper 
classes, the perception being that this was unpatriotic and an impediment to military 
recruitment and industrial production.  On 23 November 1914, The Times gave a 
scathing account of recruitment drives at matches yielding poor results despite the large 
crowds in attendance.107  Pressure exerted on the Football Association led to the 
cessation of football for the war’s duration.108  Other working-class pastimes were also 
curtailed by the war.  The Wednesbury Herald of 22 August 1914 confirmed that 
fearing espionage, the War Office had prohibited pigeon racing since ‘Germans in 
England may use the races as an opportunity of releasing birds to fly to Germany’.109 
The necessities of waging total war resulted in there being reduced time for 
leisure generally; however, increased incomes from factory employment, channelled 
people’s habits towards escapism and the forms of entertainment that had previously 
been enjoyed principally by the working class.110  Whilst the theatre had been the 
preference of the middle and upper classes, the music hall was that of the working class.  
Both were to be overshadowed by the arrival of the cinema.  With an estimated 3,000 
cinemas open nationally in 1914, popularity was such that 20 million cinema tickets 
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were being purchased each week and social customs, such as the playing of the national 
anthem at the end of performances, may be traced back to this period.111  Stephen 
Badsey described the ‘unprecedented British interest and enthusiasm for what would be 
the first of the big documentary films’, The Battle of the Somme, produced in August 
1916.112  Its appearance at Wednesbury’s picture house, with matinee and evening 
showings, which were being arranged by the manager, Mr S.W. Siddaway, was 
promoted by the Midland Advertiser as ‘the most historic film the cinema world has yet 
produced’.113  This performance was viewed by at least 30 million people nationally and 
was a film that added immeasurably to the rich propaganda value of the allied cause. 
 
7.4 Press and propaganda on the home front 
 
Public opinion, according to Stevenson, was ‘in one sense the ultimate commodity 
which underpinned the continuation of the war and the ability of the government to 
demand ever greater sacrifices from the country’.114  The immediate way of upholding 
national morale, whilst eroding that of the enemy, was with the use of propaganda at 
home and abroad.  This was not only a question of newspaper content, especially at a 
time of mass literacy, when public appetite for information was seemingly 
unquenchable but there were also those novel means of visual communication, the 
cinema and the poster.115  Numerous official and unofficial activities and social groups 
were influenced because morale could not be taken for granted and had to be rallied 
continuously.  When entering the war, Britain possessed neither a policy for news 
management nor the bureaucracy to implement it, and this was the first time in Britain’s 
history that a government consciously mounted a public campaign to win support for its 
war aims.  As Philip Taylor and Michael Sanders contended having regard to the means 
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by which the British Government ‘came to employ the weapon of propaganda during 
the First World War, it was undeniably an impressive piece of improvisation’.116 
An official Press Bureau was first established at the Royal United Services 
Institute in August 1914 to dispense war news.  As Badsey pointed out, this ‘normally 
went no further than to issue editors with guidance on which stories were to be avoided 
or treated with caution’.117  The opening of this office, which was headed by the noted 
barrister and Conservative MP, F.E. Smith, was reported in the Wednesbury Herald, 
adding that it ‘will be issuing to accredited representatives of the press the news relating 
to naval and military matters in the war’.118  The growing importance of propaganda, and 
the recognition that is should be undertaken more consistently and systematically, both 
at home and abroad, and to minimize confusion, followed the proliferation of 
unauthorized atrocity stories and other rumours at the start of the war.  Nevertheless, 
stories of German outrages were circulated by the press for the duration of the 
hostilities.119  Eventually, the need for a more rigorous approach to propaganda 
prompted the creation in 1917 of a National War Aims Committee (NWAC) and a 
Ministry of Information in 1918.  The view of the NWAC was that it was imperative to 
remind the nation of the causes of the war, to sustain continuation of the struggle until 
victory had been achieved, and it worked with patriotic trade unionists to this end.120 
Until the middle of 1915, the press were frequently able to secure information 
via letters and reports passed on from troops, and some correspondents even managed to 
reach and make reports from the front lines, though as the war continued censorship 
increased.  The 1914 Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) was created to prevent the 
obtaining and relaying of information directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, rather 
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than to control domestic public opinion, although that become one of its consequences.  
The management of news began to involve the manipulation of information that might 
otherwise undermine Britain’s position, encourage the enemy or jeopardize 
relationships with neutral countries.  As Faber argued, the powers provided by DORA 
have led to some historians perceiving ‘a sophisticated state system being put in place to 
censor and spin in order to stop the nation knowing what was happening’.121  A more 
pragmatic motivation takes account of the war-weariness evident from 1917, namely to 
bolster the national will to win.  The targeting of those opposing the war, such as 
pacifists and some socialists and trade unionists, together with shirkers, profiteers, 
heavy drinkers and food hoarders, led to increased censorship or manipulation of news 
coverage.  Individuals were also placed under surveillance because information on the 
attitudes of ‘unreliable citizens was increasingly sought after by the state and its 
servants in order to manage the social tensions generated by industrial warfare’.122 
Eight categories of propaganda methods were developed during the war.  These 
have been summarized by Alice Marquis, and include the use of stereotypes, pejorative 
names, selection and omission of facts, atrocity stories, slogans, one-sided assertions, 
pin-pointing the enemy and the ‘bandwagon’ effect.123  They allowed British 
propagandists to depict Germany and its people as barbarous enemies of civilisation, 
embodying the traits of despotism, intolerance and militarism; in contrast, the British 
were deemed democratic, peaceful and tolerant.124  The moral superiority of the Allied 
cause and of the British soldier when compared with his opponents on the front line was 
articulated in the Express and Star on 25 November 1914, for example.125  In 
Wednesbury, one event that had an overt propaganda value took place in January 1916.  
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This involved the displaying of a German field gun that had been captured at the Battle 
of Loos in 1915.126  It was noted that a detachment of regular soldiers and the 
Wednesbury Volunteer Training Corp attended this event.  It was reported that it was 
‘certainly a compliment to Wednesbury that this gun is being sent here, for Walsall, 
West Bromwich and Wolverhampton have had no such distinction’ and was a tribute to 
‘the unique efforts of Wednesbury in supplying men and munitions for the war’.127 
One occasion when an essentially local event was of great national significance, 
and which was reflected in both local and national press coverage, was the air raid by 
German Zeppelins on 31 January - 1 February 1916.128  Despite their accounting for 
1,413 of the 1,570 civilian deaths occurring during the war, Ian Beckett recalled the 
habit of the Press Bureau for euphemistically describing such incursions as ‘visits’ in an 
effort to reduce panic.129  Hence, accounts of these events tended to be limited with 
reports being made in very general terms and with minimal detail.  For instance, most of 
the reporting of the aforementioned air raid did not mention by name the towns that 
were bombed.  The Staffordshire Advertiser of 12 February 1916 when describing the 
funerals stated that these were ‘of the victims of the air raid on a Staffordshire town, 
which was twice visited by the Zeppelins’.130  The local press dwelt on the deaths of 
women and children and did report some of the detail of the inquests held during the 
days that followed, and in which much of the emotion of local people was allowed to be 
printed.  As Robb asserted, ‘the press did not create a patriotic public but rather nurtured 
existing patriotism and concealed unpleasant facts that might undermine morale’.131 
Local newspapers flourished during the war years and Wednesbury was well 
served in this regard by the Midland Advertiser and the Wednesbury Herald, together 
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with the Express and Star and Midland Counties Express, which had a greater 
circulation area covering the Black Country and Staffordshire.132  All had their own 
editorial and political agendas yet were devoted to serving their community by 
attempting to connect the front line and home front.  Equally, the voracious appetite for 
news from a public following the progress of fathers, sons and brothers serving with 
local battalions ensured an attentive readership.  First-hand accounts, gleaned from 
letters and other information from the front were often less sensationalized when 
depicted by the local press than by their national counterparts, and features such as the 
‘Letter from the Wednesbury Territorials’ reflected local interest and enthusiasm.133 
It was asserted by Winter and Baggett that ‘waiting for news of loved ones was 
an agonizing and unavoidable preoccupation for millions of families during the war’. 134  
As the months passed, there were features containing casualty lists and biographical 
details about local men wounded or killed in action, and occasionally information about 
the circumstances of the action.  This would begin to diminish with increasing 
censorship and other constraints after 1915, such as wartime shortages of paper that 
reduced the size and content of editions, and the tendency to regurgitate official reports 
became noticeable.  The Express and Star gave the particulars of ten men, mostly 
officers, who had died during the attempt by the 1/5
th
 and 1/6
th
 Battalions of the South 
Staffordshire Regiment to seize the Hohenzollern Redoubt, during the Battle of Loos.135  
With the anniversary of this event imminent, on 9 September 1916 the Midland 
Advertiser confirmed that a memorial had been installed at St James’s Church, 
Wednesbury, in honour of Company Sergeant Major Jack Hayward, who had fallen 
during that day.  It mentioned that in peacetime, he had been the local scoutmaster.136 
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220 
 
The local press took an especial pride when communicating the achievements of 
men who had received commendations for gallantry.  On 18 October 1916, the Midland 
Advertiser gave coverage to the civic reception for Sergeant Joseph Davies, a resident at 
48 Cross Street, Wednesbury, and winner of the Victoria Cross.137  Sergeant Davies had 
been greeted at Wednesbury railway station by the Mayor and Mayoress, Alderman 
John Kilvert (a veteran of the Battle of Balaclava) and a guard of honour.  It added that 
buildings were festooned with bunting, flags and banners that read, ‘Welcome Home to 
our VC Hero’.  A reception was organized in March 1918 at Wednesbury Town Hall for 
Corporal Leonard Waldron, who had been mentioned in despatches and awarded the 
Military Medal following actions in which he had been severely wounded and lost a leg.  
The Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald stated that when he was congratulated 
by the Mayor, Corporal Waldron modestly said ‘it was the proudest moment in his life’ 
and ‘like many other Wednesbury boys he just did the best he could for his country’.138 
In considerable contrast, the Midland Counties Express on 23 February 1918, in 
an article entitled ‘Not a Hero – Wearing Army Decorations without Authority’, 
reported on a markedly different matter.  This concerned the case of Harry Parker, aged 
35 years, a native of Birmingham and a man of no fixed abode, who had worn in public 
the Queen’s South Africa Medal, Distinguished Conduct Medal and Military Medal, 
and was arrested in Wednesbury for falsely representing himself with the intention to 
deceive.  In accordance with the DORA Regulations, Parker was sentenced to three 
months’ hard labour, with Wednesbury’s magistrates recording their determination to 
protect the public against a man who had previously been convicted for deception.139 
                                               
137
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One measure of practical patriotism was the popularity of subscriptions for 
National War Bonds and War Savings Certificates.  Notably, these were also marketed 
to the public as a prudent investment, albeit one reliant on Britain’s success in winning 
the war.  In February 1918, the Express and Star revealed that in order to give publicity 
to these funds, the Tank Bank was to visit the area to facilitate the making of 
subscriptions.140  The Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald of 23 March 1918 
related that the Savings Certificates were available for purchase at 15s. 6d. and the 
Bonds could be bought at rates between £5 and £5,000.141  In Wednesbury, a War 
Savings Committee had been constituted with the objective of raising £70,000, a sum 
estimated to be the equivalent to providing 28 military aircraft.  Remarkably, it was 
revealed in newspaper reports on 30 March 1918 that Wednesbury’s contribution had 
now exceeded £145,000, with £7,000 donated by workers of the Crown tube works and 
£1,400 from Wednesbury’s schoolchildren, thus enabling some 56 aircraft to be 
acquired.142  A ceremony hosted by Walsall’s Mayor, Councillor S.M. Slater, was held 
at Walsall Town Hall on 30 March 1918.  In a speech delivered from the top of the tank, 
the Mayor of Wednesbury, Alderman A.E. Pritchard, reaffirmed that ‘their main duty as 
civilians at home was to do everything they could to help the brave fellows who had 
stemmed the German advance’.  This was greeted by cries of ‘Good Old Wedgbury!’143 
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7.5 Conclusion 
 
In 1914, it would have been impossible to prophesize what the outcomes of the war 
would be, what changes would follow and how it would be concluded.  Fundamental to 
the continuation of the war and the achievement of victory in 1918 was the upholding of 
civilian morale.  The work that local communities carried out, and which maintained 
this spirit was performed ‘by individuals known to few but who were sustaining the 
national endeavour by their undemonstrative personal resilience’.144  The war’s impact 
on society was visible in numerous ways, though these were not sufficiently devastating 
to destroy Britain’s hierarchical social structure.  As Hobsbawm indicated, the working 
class world, containing its pubs, newspapers, music halls, football teams and the labour 
movement, ‘co-existed with the middle-class world but were not part of it’.145  This 
conflict influenced all of these to the extent of, for example, determining which leisure 
pursuits were deemed acceptable and discouraging or banning those that were not. 
Industrialized warfare revealed as never before the nation’s dependence on the 
working class and many working people would make advances due to the war.  Given 
their pre-war position, arguably, they had the most to gain.  Their health and living 
standards improved, some of the worst features of poverty were removed, at least 
temporarily, and there was more plentiful employment for the semi- and unskilled 
labour force, and better working opportunities for women.  However, the extent of 
exploitation by profiteering landlords and shopkeepers was cause for eventual state 
intervention to prevent discontent from turning into something that would ultimately 
threaten the winning of the war.  In this conflict, as never before, those doing the 
fighting had families at home, and with an efficient postal service facilitating frequent 
contact, they wanted to be assured that their loved ones were being looked after.146 
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Patriotism was deeply instilled in the Black Country’s and Wednesbury’s 
working class communities and this was demonstrated by the widespread contempt 
directed at those who were perceived to be doing well out of the war, with especial 
hostility being reserved for those producers and traders who were unscrupulously 
profiteering at the expense of their fellow citizens.  The scandal that the sacrifice being 
readily offered up by the working class was not equitably replicated elsewhere in British 
society was to some extent minimized by a compliant press and a propaganda effort that 
helped enforce a new morality.  This depicted dissent as being as much an enemy to the 
nation as the armies of its opponents on the battlefields.  Nonetheless, an important 
lesson learnt was that in view of the heightened level of public interest, with the war 
ceasing to be a matter for professional armies by the end of 1914, and thereafter 
becoming instead a struggle between the societies of the belligerent nations, it was no 
longer possible for government to disregard the views of the people.  It was, however, 
permissible for popular opinion to be channelled, controlled and shaped by censorship 
and propaganda so that it too became one of the most potent weapons of war. 
For the working class in Wednesbury, as elsewhere, the war had brought moral 
and cultural transformation, with increased state involvement in their daily lives, which 
might have become rather more tolerable to bear.  The attainment of genuine change 
and social mobility remained as elusive as ever.  This is succinctly stated by De Groot, 
who has observed that ‘the cul-de-sac of working-class experience became a little less 
drab, and a bit more secure but it remained difficult to escape’.147  Nevertheless, from 
August 1914 through to November 1918, and despite all the injustices, privations and 
the personal losses suffered by countless families, as has been illustrated by the various 
examples supplied throughout this Chapter, Wednesbury’s working-class community 
remained stoic in the face of such adversity and its patriotism was unwavering. 
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CHAPTER 8:  POLITICAL CHANGE DURING THE WAR 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In the January 1910 general election, the constituency of Wednesbury returned as its 
Member of Parliament the Conservative candidate, John Norton Griffiths, popularly 
known as Empire Jack.1  The second general election held during December of that year 
witnessed him hold this seat with an increased majority, retaining it until 1918.2  The 
Liberal Party had been his only opposition at either contest, since neither the Labour 
Party nor the Independent Labour Party (ILP) participated.3  When examining the extent 
of Labour’s advance during the Party’s formative years, both Duncan Tanner and 
Martin Pugh have associated the West Midlands with the existence of a tradition of 
working-class Conservatism, and Wednesbury was completely consistent with this.4 
By 1914, the Liberal administration of H.H. Asquith had governed Britain for 
most of the previous decade, described by Trevor Wilson as ‘an astonishing series of 
constitutional and social reforms’ interwoven with ‘heightened political passions and by 
the mismanagement of some important episodes’.5  The electoral alliance between the 
Labour and Liberal Parties dating back to 1903 meant working-class voters’ only real 
alternative was the Conservative Party, led since 1911 by Andrew Bonar Law.  With its 
imperialist, nationalistic and patriotic attitudes, this appealed because, as Hugh 
Cunningham remarked, ‘in the later nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, patriotism 
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was extensively propagated by those in authority, and its political location was on the 
right’.6  However, with a mere eight million adults enjoying the right to vote, political 
inequality was ‘much more widely diffused than social or economic inequality’.7 
The First World War changed this political landscape in dramatic fashion.  It 
contributed to the Liberal Party’s schism and the ousting of Asquith as Prime Minister 
in 1916; the introduction of Coalition government, increased state intervention and 
franchise reform; and Labour’s emergence as a viable political party in its own right.  At 
the 1918 general election, as John Turner stated, there ‘was the culmination of wartime 
political machinations, and it was the first time for nearly eight years that the political 
elite had confronted the mass electorate’.8  In that year, the Representation of the People 
Act replaced household suffrage with adult suffrage, to include women over 30 years of 
age and those men not previously enfranchised.9  The outcome was a resounding victory 
for the Coalition, winning 473 seats compared with the 234 gained by other parties.  Yet 
account must be taken of the speed with which the election was called, incomplete 
electoral rolls and the many servicemen who were unable to vote.  The national turnout 
was only 57 per cent.  With a noticeable shift in political loyalties in the Black Country, 
of this area’s ten constituencies, Wednesbury was one of four electing a Labour Party 
candidate for the first time, signalling a change in working-class allegiances. 
This Chapter examines the key political events affecting Wednesbury when 
there was a growing sense of an increasingly unified, if not yet class-conscious, working 
class.  As Mike Savage attested, it is important to examine the local dimension ‘because 
it is in this arena that formal politics, based around the national state, meets with and 
interacts with practical politics’.10  This discussion will cover the three principal political 
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parties but given the changes to be assessed and the outcome in 1918, the Labour Party 
will receive particular attention in terms of Tanner’s three components of political 
change.11  Firstly, Labour’s shift away from co-operation with the Liberals, thereby 
testing the assumption that before 1914, Labour was beginning to supersede Liberalism, 
and that war accelerated this process.  This is a view that Pugh criticized as ‘the product 
of hindsight’.12  Secondly, Labour’s cumulative improvement in electoral performance.  
Thirdly, internal changes enabling Labour’s creation of a distinct identity within the 
centre-left.  As Laybourn asserted, this ‘broad debate has spawned several sub debates - 
the most important covering the issues of the franchise, the New Liberal ideology and 
local developments’.13  Hence, the labour movement’s role in the 1913 Black Country 
strike and 1917 Crown tube works strike is stressed.  Since the mid-nineteenth century, 
the working-class channelled its efforts into trade unions, cooperatives and friendly 
societies; but events demonstrated the reacquisition of a political relevance not enjoyed 
since Chartism.  Consideration of working-class politics is essential to this thesis. 
 
8.2 National politics in wartime 
 
Certain areas of the country that were Conservative in allegiance before 1914 were 
nationally important.  This included the West Midlands, where Joseph Chamberlain’s 
charismatic personality and brand of Liberal Unionism matched with civic service 
reflected the populist imperial sympathies of the area’s working class, extending beyond 
Birmingham and into the Black Country.14  Several strands within this political culture 
are identifiable.  There were the deferential working class who accepted governance by 
their social superiors; the pragmatic working class who were Conservative by instinct 
and allegiance because it reflected their own self-interests; and non-unionized 
employees, isolated from and suspicious of the labour movement, and having a greater 
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sense of class collaboration due to working in smaller workplaces.15  In describing 
Conservatism’s powerful appeal, John Belchem cited the politics of recreation and 
entertainment, not least the imperialism found in popular culture such as the music hall.  
He stated that ‘the Tories offered a range of attractions which radicals and socialists, 
divided over temperance and other ascetic considerations, were unable to match’.16 
From the 1880s, the Conservative Party reinforced its attractiveness to the 
affluent and aspirational members of society, while the Liberal Party slowly began to 
lose its appeal to the working class.  It has been argued by both Tanner and Pugh that 
‘Liberalism’s historic weaknesses in some parts of these areas suggested that there was 
an electoral space which Labour might exploit’ even though ‘Asquith’s party seemed 
entrenched in office, if battered by a succession of controversies’.17  Those workers 
disinclined to vote Liberal might be persuaded, therefore, to vote for Labour men of the 
same social class, so that the interests they supported could be upheld locally and in 
Parliament.  As John Ward asserted, ‘a number of constraints held back the emergence 
of the Labour Party, both nationally and locally, in the years before 1914’.18  These 
included exclusion from the franchise of all women and a substantial number of men, 
inadequate organization and the absence of political agents, together with a weakened 
financial position arising from the 1909 Osborne judgement.  Consequently, reliance on 
the electoral pact with the Liberals imposed ideological cautiousness, repressed 
Labour’s independent identity and limited its position to that of a supporting role.19 
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During the period 1911-1914, an improvement in Labour’s position became 
discernible.  This was connected to economic and social change in the workplace, 
declining craft production and increasing demand for non-skilled workers.  Also 
contributing to this was intensified industrial unrest and the growing power of several 
trade unions that had recently become affiliated to the Labour Party.  The first local 
evidence of this emerged during the 1913 Black Country strike, when concerted union 
participation during this successful trade dispute broadened the labour movement’s 
appeal to the working-class community.20  Nevertheless, had an election been held in 
1915, it was unlikely that the Labour Party would have been able to contest more than 
150 parliamentary constituencies.21  In the Black Country, whether working-class 
support would have translated into votes for Labour was questionable, with the Party 
having been accurately described by Eric Taylor as having a very tenuous foothold.22 
In February 1914, there was political upheaval when Wednesbury’s MP, John 
Norton Griffiths, communicated his intention not to stand in the next general election 
owing to increased business demands.  According to The Times on 6 February 1914, his 
decision was accepted with regret by Wednesbury Conservative and Unionist 
Association, a sub-committee being appointed to select a new candidate.23  In his 
biography of Frank Dudley Docker, Davenport-Hines described Norton Griffiths as ‘a 
man with a bad financial record’ whose ‘business went into liquidation at this time with 
heavy losses to everyone except himself’.24  Also contributing to local misgivings were 
his long absences abroad, limited Parliamentary impact and neglect of constituency 
interests.  As business owners and employers themselves, especially in local 
manufacturing, many Conservatives were undoubtedly dismayed by Norton Griffiths’ 
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donations to hardship funds during the 1913 Black Country strike.25  In March, the 
Midland Advertiser confirmed that Archibald White Maconochie had been selected as 
prospective Conservative candidate for the next general election.26  In accordance with 
the Parliament Act, this should have been arranged by 1915, being delayed by the 
outbreak of war, and Norton Griffiths remained as Wednesbury’s MP until 1918.27 
In the summer of 1914, international events had shifted public attention away 
from the domestic controversies that had recently dogged the Asquith administration.  
However, when considering what has subsequently been described as ‘the choice of 
1914’, A.J.P. Taylor’s contention was that appearances of national unity were deceptive, 
there being ‘deep cleavages in the party outlooks’.28  For instance, with its radical and 
non-interventionist elements, there was a danger that both the Cabinet and the Liberal 
Party would be divided on Britain’s participation in the conflict.  The Conservatives had 
long regarded Germany as a dangerous rival threatening the global balance of power 
and felt their views to have been finally vindicated.  Publicly, the treaty obligation to 
defend Belgian neutrality was the principle underpinning British involvement and the 
Government sought to take the moral high ground; however, the politicians were 
acutely aware of the necessity of defending national and Empire interests against 
German expansionism.  Failure to stem this carried with it massive implications for 
prestige, prosperity and national security, and there was considerable apprehension but 
the industrialized total war that followed was simply unimaginable in August 1914. 
Bourne pointed out that even the ‘rage of politics’ was stilled, so that national 
unity became evident even in Parliament, due to the ‘patriotic opposition’ of 
Conservatives and Labour.  The electoral and political truce achieved in the earliest 
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days held, although, as optimism faded, disagreements over the conduct of the war 
exposed divisions in all political parties.29  This prompted the formation of the first 
Coalition on 25 May 1915, described as an ‘unhappy amalgam’ in which Asquith’s 
‘years of playing off one personality against another seemingly enhanced his own 
indispensability’.30  Making some concessions to other parties did not heal the rifts in 
the Cabinet; instead, it allowed grievances to be aired, particularly between Asquith and 
Lloyd George to the detriment of the Liberal Party.  The primary reason for the fall of 
this first Coalition in late 1916 was continued contentiousness on the introduction of 
conscription.  This was combined with insufficient clarity in relation to war objectives 
and a lack of military success in any of the theatres of operation and especially given the 
fatalities and casualties incurred during the Somme offensive.  Asquith’s control of the 
House of Commons was slipping and he was thought to be too dilatory.  There were 
calls for a more decisive style of leadership, so that with Bonar Law declining the Royal 
invitation, Lloyd George felt able to capitalize on his success as Minister of Munitions 
and seize the Premiership for himself, albeit with Conservative support.  Upon forming 
his Coalition on 6 December 1916, which was in effect a palace revolution to displace 
Asquith, Lloyd George also met the Labour Party Executive and the Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP) because, as Clegg observed, he required their support.31 
Carl Brand noted that until ‘the very day of the empire’s entry into the war, the 
British Labour movement unitedly strove for peace’ with the Daily Herald of 5 August 
1914 lamenting being ‘plunged into a European war, the extent and the horrors of which 
no man can foresee’.32  The initial indications were that its internationalist and anti-
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militarist traditions would split Labour into factions that opposed and supported the war.  
In the former were the pacifists; the latter contained most of the wider movement, 
mainly rank-and-file trade unionists who, ‘once it was clear that hostilities could not be 
avoided, came to feel there was little alternative but to support their own country’.33  It 
was this transformation of opinion and the decision of the PLP to back the 
Government’s request for war credits of £100 million that prompted James Ramsay 
MacDonald to resign the Party’s chairmanship on 7 August.  This position would be 
filled by Arthur Henderson, now commanding broad support in Parliament and 
nationally, who would steer a path of supporting the war effort, yet criticizing policy 
failures when they occurred.  This was a major achievement because this strategy 
successfully averted intra-party division during the first three years of the war.34 
Studies of social patriotism and the British working class refer to its patriotic 
loyalties as a counterweight to the class-consciousness that was beginning to emerge in 
the years before 1914.  As Field contended, for instance, August 1914 highlighted the 
attitudes of leftward-learning intellectuals to ‘the potential malleability and irrationalism 
of the masses’.35  Cunningham, in examining ‘the linguistic shift on the patriotism of the 
age leading up to the First World War’ drew comparison with the notions of patriotism 
employed by earlier generations of radicals, such as the Chartists, as integral to the 
language of freedom and opposition to tyranny.  He argued that although emphasizing 
duty and loyalty to a higher cause through expression in jingoistic terms from the 1870s 
onwards, when the initiative passed to the political right, it remained fundamental to 
‘the relationship between the state and the working class in the age of imperialism’.36  
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Considerable caution should be employed in this regard, nevertheless; because, as 
Hinton has emphasized, patriotism was ‘neither a very stable attitude (moments of 
patriotic fervour alternated with moments of war-weariness and militant protest among 
the same groups of workers), nor did it necessarily rule out radical social demands’.37 
In compliance with their pre-existing electoral alliance with the Liberals, the 
Labour Party accepted the political truce for the duration of the hostilities in a similar 
manner to which the labour movement accepted the industrial truce.  G.D.H. Cole 
criticized those trade unionists that ‘made their concessions without first obtaining 
corresponding concessions from the other side’.38  Arthur Henderson became the first 
representative of the Party to take a seat in the Cabinet, becoming in 1915 the President 
of the Board of Education in the Asquith Coalition administration.  In December1916, 
he joined Lloyd George’s five-man War Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio and was 
influential in shaping the nationalization of the coalmines.  Although the impact was not 
immediately noticeable, Henderson’s involvement in resisting industrial conscription 
while minimizing industrial unrest on matters including the direction of the labour force 
and contributed to the development of the corporatist approach to industrial relations 
that endured after the war.  Two other Labour men, John Hodge and George Barnes, 
were appointed to roles in the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Pensions.39 
Following his resignation, Ramsay MacDonald became Chairman of the Union 
of Democratic Control (UDC).  This organization included disaffected Liberals and 
socialists, who believed ‘the war could only be brought to an end by negotiation and a 
compromise settlement’ and ‘its principal attack was directed at secret diplomacy, 
which in its opinion was responsible for the war’.40  This represented ‘a small proportion 
of the left, and only a tiny minority when compared to the population as a whole’ who 
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believed that ‘a temporary loss of freedom was a fair price to pay for victory’.41              
A memorandum on pacifist propaganda from the Home Secretary, Sir George Cave, to 
the War Cabinet listed several organizations including the UDC, ILP, British Socialist 
Party, and the No-Conscription Fellowship.  The revolutionary organizations were 
identified as the Shops Stewards and Amalgamation Committee (otherwise known as 
the rank-and-file movement), the Industrial Workers of the World, and Workmen’s and 
Soldiers’ Council.42  By employing DORA, the Government assumed powers to suspend 
civil liberties by banning public meetings likely to involve a breach of the peace.43  By 
comparison, John Horne cited local meetings in 1918 showing ‘working-class audiences 
ranging typically from a hundred to a thousand supporting government war aims and 
opposing the calls of rival (usually ILP) meetings advocating a negotiated peace’.44 
By 1916, and with the lack of a decisive victory at Jutland or in the Dardanelles 
or Somme campaigns, political opinion at home had begun to diverge and polarize, and 
Brock Millman argued that ‘British society was quite simply beginning to turn against 
itself’.45  With the advent of the March 1917 revolution in Russia, all left-wing political 
movements had cause to reflect.  In August 1917, a special Labour Party conference 
voted in favour of a negotiated peace, concluding ‘the time had come to use the political 
weapon to supplement the military in order to secure an honourable and democratic 
peace’.46  Wishing to attend an International Socialist Congress in Stockholm, 
Henderson felt compelled to resign from the Government when Lloyd George refused 
to sanction an exit visa; an event which became known as the “Doormat incident” when 
a humiliated Henderson was made to wait outside the Cabinet room while the matter 
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was discussed.  This was a turning point, after which Labour increasingly distanced 
itself from the Coalition whilst beginning to reconcile its pacifist and trade union 
elements; it also allowed Henderson to reorganize in readiness for a general election.47 
Turning to the impact of war on political life, Mike Savage highlighted the local 
dimension’s significance because ‘everyday politics allows us to conceptualize agency 
not simply as manifested in spectacular political events (a la E.P. Thompson) but as 
rooted in and tied up with the hum drum routines of everyday life’.48  Take for instance 
the role played by Wednesbury’s MP, which was largely dictated by the extent of his 
war service and was chronicled by the local press.49  For example, at a public meeting 
held in the Town Hall in connection with a local campaign for thrift and saving, as 
reported in the Midland Counties Express on 22 July 1916, he urged co-ordination of 
effort was needed in every direction to win the war.  Sacrifice being necessary, he 
deemed buying imported goods to be an unpatriotic action.  Stressing that a splendid 
army had been created, unless the munitions army continued day and night then they 
were going to ask the army to do the impossible, so the combined efforts of labour and 
the army were required to achieve victory.50  Coincidentally, another article in the same 
issue carried the message from the commander-in-chief, Sir Douglas Haig, to munitions 
workers, imploring them to empower the army to complete its task in France, together 
with Arthur Henderson’s response, in which the assurance of the labour movement was 
given that efforts would not be relaxed until a victorious conclusion was reached. 
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8.3 Local politics in Wednesbury during the war 
In 1914, Wednesbury Borough Council was comprised of four Aldermen (two 
Conservatives, one Liberal and one of unknown allegiance) and twelve Councillors 
(eight Conservatives, three Liberals and one independent), and drawn from these, its 
Mayor and Deputy Mayor were both Conservatives.  By 1918, due to the acceptance of 
the political truce, apart from there being a Liberal Deputy Mayor, there was no change 
to party composition, the only alteration being of replacement personnel in 1914/15.51 
However, at the November 1913 local government elections, and for the first 
time, the Labour Party had contested two seats in Wednesbury’s Town Hall and Kings 
Hill wards, being defeated by a narrow margin.  Describing this initial performance in a 
municipal contest, and Labour’s only one in Wednesbury until 1919, the Wednesbury 
Herald of 8 November 1913 recorded that a Labour man was ‘carried shoulder high up 
Russell Street’ with supporters singing songs associated with the 1913 strike.  This 
newspaper claimed ‘No doubt the leaders of the great strike have got round them a body 
of men who they have detached from Liberalism and in a lesser degree from Unionism, 
men who benefited from the settlement of the strike’.  It conceded that whether termed 
Labour or socialist, a ‘party has been brought into being in the borough of Wednesbury, 
which will have to be reckoned with in the future’.52  In June 1914, the Midland 
Advertiser recognized that in some Conservative areas, most notably in Wednesbury, 
West Bromwich, Handsworth and West Birmingham, ‘Labour/socialist groups were 
becoming an anti-Tory force’.53  Hence, with the steady growth of organization at 
constituency level, a view was beginning to establish itself that rather than the two main 
political parties, the Labour Party was the party for the working man to belong to.54 
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Four days after the outbreak of war, a joint message appealing for loyalty was 
issued by Wednesbury’s MP and its Mayor, Councillor Nat Bishop, both of whom were 
Conservatives, and reproduced in the Midland Counties Express and the Wednesbury 
Herald.  Entitled Wednesbury’s Duty, this highlighted the desirability of all sections of 
the community working together to make the necessary arrangements to help the 
unemployed, co-ordinate the supply and distribution of food, and care for the families of 
reservists called to the colours.  It urged that all ‘domestic and internal differences must 
be forgotten, and all our amiable energies must be directed to the one end in view’.55  
This marked the commencement of a political truce locally, and diminishment of overt 
political activity.  As Lawrence pointed out, however, ‘we should not imagine that 
wartime emergency regulations simply closed the arena of public politics for the 
duration’ and to which it may be added that political and other interest groups continued 
to influence decision-making, becoming increasingly involved in volunteer work.56 
On 10 August 1914, Wednesbury Borough Council formed a special committee 
comprised of councillors, charitable organizations and trade unions to co-ordinate relief 
activities.  This arose from a Local Government Board communication to all county, 
town and urban district councils regarding steps to alleviate distress via local 
committees conducting relief distribution.  It was anticipated that industry would 
manage a shortage of men and increase overtime accordingly.  The Board stipulated that 
these committees survey existing employment conditions and assume responsibility for 
measures, including applications to the National Relief Fund, when conventional 
methods of assistance were exhausted.57  On 5 September 1914, the Mayor stated that 
‘We had to be thankful that in Wednesbury, there had been as yet no civil distress’.58 
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An intervention was made in November 1914 by R.G.L. Simpson, the 
prospective Liberal Party candidate, on the issue of recruitment.  Writing in the Midland 
Advertiser, he emphasized the politicization of local meetings that were dominated by 
the Conservatives, especially via the attendance and making of speeches by John Norton 
Griffiths and A.W. Maconochie, the sitting Member and prospective candidate 
respectively.  Simpson complained that he was ‘still waiting to be invited to address a 
non-political meeting for recruiting purposes in the constituency’.  Furthermore, he 
supported the Labour Party’s demands that the dependents of soldiers and sailors should 
be treated well, because this would bolster recruitment without the need to have 
recourse to conscription since ‘the masses have done and are doing their duty nobly’.59 
On 5 August 1915, an event held in Wednesbury Town Hall commemorated the 
anniversary of the outbreak of the war and, as the Wednesbury Herald reported, ‘The 
large building was packed and a representative platform of the town’s leading public 
men supported the Mayor, Councillor Bishop, who presided’.  The Wednesbury 
Volunteer Training Corps were also present.  The Conservative and Liberal prospective 
Parliamentary Candidates, Messrs A.W. Maconochie and R.G.L. Simpson, also 
attended the gathering and wholly endorsed the resolution.  Maconochie urged 
supporting ‘the Government of the day, and whatever they demanded’.60  A resolution of 
abiding loyalty was moved by Alderman A.E. Pritchard.  In this, he stated that the war 
was ‘waged on the side of liberty, justice and righteousness.  It was a war not on our 
part of aggression but in defence of the small, feeble nations unjustly attacked’.61 
One aspect of municipal life having understandable prominence was recognition 
of the heroism of those members of the community serving in the armed forces.62  For 
example, on 2 October 1916, Wednesbury Borough Council’s minutes record that the 
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Mayor, Councillor W. Warner, made the gratifying announcement of the award of the 
Victoria Cross for Valour to Sergeant Joseph Davies, a resident of 48 Cross Street, 
Wednesbury, for his heroic conduct during the campaign on the Somme.  It was 
unanimously resolved by the Council that a letter of congratulations be forwarded to 
Sergeant Davies on behalf of the Burgesses, for his valorous services to his country.63 
Local authorities continued to carry out their normal peacetime activities and, in 
its first years, the war had a negligible effect in this regard.  The political dimension 
eventually resumed an importance in Wednesbury because of a vacancy on the town’s 
Enlistment Tribunal.  The Midland Advertiser of 12 February 1916 maintained that ‘it is 
well known that Labour is not represented on that tribunal and some dissatisfaction has 
been occasional on this score’.  Consequently, the Labour Party was requested to make 
a nomination that would be satisfactory to the local authority and Mr F.G. Thorpe, the 
Workers’ Union representative for Wednesbury, was accordingly designated as the 
Labour’s preferred candidate.64  This particular outcome commended itself ‘to all who 
want to see justice done between a man and the state in these all important matters’.65 
Trades councils were another dimension of local political life.  Formed to co-
ordinate trade union activity, they trained future generations of Labour politicians, both 
locally and nationally.  They were associations of trades unions or trade union branches 
in a geographic area, and ‘flung themselves into surveying, discussing and agitating 
about the economic distress which was widely expected to follow the declaration of 
war’.66  With a turning point in attitudes increasingly evident after 1916 through 
discontent and war-weariness, they campaigned against profiteering, declining real 
wages, rising prices and rents, together with erosions of civil liberties by the Munitions 
Acts and the Defence of the Realm Act.  By articulating such grievances, they accessed 
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local opinion and were instrumental in creating if not class-consciousness then a sense 
of working-class awareness.67  They complemented the War Emergency Workers’ 
National Committee (WEWNC), formed in August 1914 as a peace committee and 
which actively promoted ‘the defence of the rights and interests of the working class 
from unreasonable encroachment’.68  As well as gaining concessions for the working 
class, both trades councils and the WEWNC aided inter-party cohesion and cooperation. 
On 26 May 1917, the Midland Advertiser reported on a public meeting of the 
Wednesbury and District Trades and Labour Council at Wednesbury Town Hall, 
presided over by Mr R. Micklewright.69  The topic was the food supply, which this 
gathering concluded should have been administered by the state from the start of the 
war.  The guest speaker, Mr R.C. Wallhead, argued that ‘the men who had been waxing 
rich were those put in charge of the people’s food and yet were pleading for equality of 
sacrifice’.70  Through such participation, local views fed into the democratic process, as 
demonstrated by the minutes of the Wednesbury branch of the ASE from May 1917, 
concerning the nomination of delegates to attend the Labour Party’s 1918 conference.71 
As it seemed that hostilities would continue relentlessly, and there appearing to 
be no obvious solution to the many economic and social problems experienced, the 
trades councils had to prepare for struggles with local politicians and agencies.  For 
instance, the Express and Star of 20 November 1917 noted that Mr B.W. Griffiths, 
Secretary of Wednesbury’s Trades and Labour Council, sought greater involvement for 
the body in local affairs, alleging that the ‘local Council more or less select who they 
think fit to serve on the Committees’.72  Convinced that there was fairer representation 
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elsewhere, and questioning why Wednesbury should be different, demonstrations were 
staged with workers leaving their employment to protest against the method of food 
distribution in the Borough and to demand increased Labour representation.  Eventually, 
a change in official attitude prevailed and four Labour representatives were nominated 
to serve on Wednesbury’s Food Committee.73  On 10 February 1918, Mr Griffiths 
corresponded with Mr J.S. Middleton, Secretary of the WEWNC, concerning the newly 
established Vigilance Committee and requesting information to place this on a 
satisfactory basis.  A reply despatched on 16 February, suggested that reference be 
made to the National Food Journal, issued fortnightly by the Ministry of Food.74 
On 25 February 1918, the Express and Star published a letter from Mr Griffiths, 
communicating the Ministry of Munitions’ announcement that Wednesbury was now 
officially designated as a Munitions Area and therefore constrained by the Ministry’s 
rules.  However, owing to the ejection from their residences of a number of the 
locality’s families, the Trades and Labour Council had become involved in this matter 
with Mr Griffiths confirming that it had been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.75  
The Midland Counties Express of 6 July 1918 verified that the shortage of coal amongst 
local dealers was questioned by Mr Griffiths who recommended that concerns be 
forwarded for investigation by the local authority, which had responsibility for this.76 
The working-class community began to shed the deferential attitudes often held 
before the war.  A trade union movement with increased authority and the Labour Party 
were increasingly viewed as giving the best guarantee of defending their interests from 
a return to unfavourable working practices.  Adams asserted that support ‘provided by 
local Labour Parties and Trades and Labour Councils at a local level could also produce 
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electoral benefits’ and this is echoed by Turner’s comments that they were becoming 
‘active in local politics, supporting candidates for municipal elections’.77  In 
Wednesbury, in January 1918, there was discussion of the advisability of running 
Labour candidates at the next general election.  Attended by over 100 delegates 
representing 36 trade union branches, the conclusion was that Labour should stand.  
Reference was made to the receiving of women into political life since the franchise had 
been extended and the Labour Party’s duty was to encourage them to use their vote.  
The conference was of the opinion that the Parliamentary Division should be fought by 
Labour at the next general election, and the following motion was unanimously passed: 
The Wednesbury, Darlaston and Tipton Trades Councils to call a 
selection conference, under the constitution of the Labour Party, to 
select a Labour candidate for the Division and further asks the Trades 
Councils to take the necessary steps to organize a Divisional Labour 
Party for the constituency.78 
 
Other politically motivated mass organizations became prominent, especially 
during the latter years of the war, and the materialization and rise to prominence of ex-
servicemen’s movements commenced with the introduction of conscription in 1916. 79  
These organisations planned to articulate the grievances of their membership with 
regard to disability pensions and the rehabilitation of ex-servicemen.  Believing these 
matters to be a legitimate ground for activism, demonstrations and propaganda 
campaigns were instigated.  In the light of events in Russia in 1917, and fear of 
radicalization comparable to that underlying the shop floor unrest in the industrial 
workplace, as Stephen Ward asserted, ‘distrust and fear influenced the Government’s 
decision to monitor ex-servicemen as a potential source of revolutionary activity’.80 
The National Association of Discharged Sailors and Soldiers (NADSS) was 
founded in Blackburn in September 1916, drawing together working men who had 
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served in the armed forces and been honourably discharged, to campaign for better 
pensions and opportunities for retraining.  Led by James Howell, it developed links with 
the trade unions and the Labour Party.  In the 1918 General Election, having severed 
these links, however, it became more Conservative in outlook, sponsoring several 
candidates of the so-called Silver Badge Party.81  The National Federation of Discharged 
and Demobilised Sailors and Soldiers (NFDDSS) was a veterans’ group founded in 
London in April 1917 and led by left-wing Liberal MPs James Hogge and William 
Pringle, which sought improved pensions and representation on government 
committees.  As Paul Burnham has indicated, ‘the Federation excluded commissioned 
officers from its membership, and it was controlled by the rankers themselves’. 82  In 
1921, many of these comrades’ associations merged to form the Royal British Legion. 
On 14 August 1917, the Midland Advertiser reported that a large crowd had 
gathered in Wednesbury’s Market Place to hear addresses from the NFDDSS, the event 
being presided over by former Sergeant-Major G.W. Blythe (who had recently served 
with the Royal Engineers).  The aims and objectives of the Federation being outlined, 
he said that men had been assured they would not be forgotten when returning from the 
war and he thanked ‘the men of Wednesbury for taking up the case of a discharged 
soldier’.83  Stressing that it would be wrong for workers to be idle during wartime, he 
argued that no discharged soldiers should be called back to the colours until all other 
classes of men of similar ages and categories had been called up.84  A branch of the 
Federation was formed in Wednesbury, having taken 60 requests for membership. 
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Another organization to be active in Wednesbury was the British Workers’ 
National League, initially formed in April 1915 as the Socialist National Defence 
Committee by the journalist Victor Fisher to counter calls for peace at any price from 
pacifists in the labour movement.85  By 1916, it was being financed by Lord Milner and 
locally was supported by John Beard of the Workers’ Union.  The Midland Advertiser 
of 2 December 1916 described a well-attended gathering at Wednesbury’s Picture 
Palace.  It was commented that ‘the Social Democrats in Germany had forfeited all 
respect formerly given to them when they formed part of the vast army of invasion into 
Belgium’.  The Chairman, Reverend. J.A. Shaw of Wolverhampton accused such men 
as Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden of ‘only wanting the things that Germany 
wanted’.86  The Reverend Shaw reappeared at a meeting of the League in Wednesbury 
in April 1918, at which the sum of £18 gathered from a collection was passed to the 
Mayor of Wednesbury for his prisoners of war fund.87  The significance of this perhaps 
is that it occurred at a time when politicians in all parties were starting to contemplate 
how politics would be practised once the war was finally brought to its conclusion. 
 
8.4 Wednesbury and the 1918 general election 
Alastair Reid argued that of the changes that occurred in Britain during and immediately 
after the war, ‘the extension of the vote to women and the Labour Party’s rise to 
influence…could be seen as the natural political fruition of an underlying 
transformation of social relationships’.88  The pre-war franchise, which had been 
determined by the Representation of the People Act 1884, was restrictive, being limited 
to adult males householders.89  This prevented many people from voting, especially the 
young (such as sons living with parents), domestic servants living with employers, 
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lodgers paying less than £10 per year in rent and workers who moved frequently.  The 
twelve-month registration period for non-owner-occupiers, followed by a six-month 
wait for all, effectively created delays for those re-joining the electoral register.  These 
factors ensured that no more than sixty per cent of adult males were eligible for 
electoral registration in 1911.90  The 1918 transformation of the franchise was initiated 
via a conference chaired by the Speaker of the House of Commons and Laybourn’s 
assessment, alluding to pre-war suffragette agitation, was that the war ‘provided the 
occasion, rather than the cause of the Reform Act; it was unfinished business’.91 
The Representation of the People Act of 1918 realized a ‘demand that went back 
to the Chartists and beyond’, by giving the vote to all men aged over 21 years, subject to 
a six months’ residence period, and to women aged over 30 years who were eligible for 
the municipal vote.92  This trebled the electorate, which was now 21 million.  There was 
also a reduction in the number of seats and in plural voting.  Consequently, there were 
far-reaching implications for all the political parties now that the majority of the adult 
working-class population had the vote, and possibly would be using it for the first time.  
Also of importance were the 1918 boundary revisions, which Tanner acknowledges had 
created essentially industrial seats benefiting Labour and rural constituencies favouring 
the Coalition.93  As observed by Ward, the legislation further ‘weakened the bonds 
between employers and their workforce, which had traditionally characterized the 
workshop economy of Birmingham and extended into parts of the Black Country’.94 
Liberalism’s inability to cope with the pressures of war and the failure of the 
Asquithian policy of Business as Usual gave rise to increased economic mobilization 
and state intervention to run several industries and control others by fixing wages and 
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profits.95  This did not mean that the Conservatives and Liberals had been converted to 
the virtues of state control and socialism; these were expedient responses to crises.  
Nevertheless, there was serious consideration of whether the essentially collectivist 
methods employed by the state in wartime could be used to improve the security of 
workers and to tackle the economic and social problems to be expected after the war 
had ended.  The labour movement’s new found respectability, for instance, was matched 
with the Whitley Committee’s reports in 1917/18, which advocated corporatism, trade 
union recognition and joint negotiating machinery in every industry.  For the Labour 
Party, this raised the requirement for a detailed programme of policies, not least on the 
economy, as attention began to shift from current grievances to post war prospects. 
In June 1918, ‘the Labour Party took the long-awaited decision to drop its 
recognition of the political truce; the departure of Labour from the Coalition became a 
real possibility’.96  At its conference, it ratified a Constitution introducing local 
organization and individual membership.  This would benefit finances and appeal to the 
increased electorate created by the 1918 Act.  Also featured in the new Constitution was 
Clause IV, calling for nationalization of the means of production, which, in anticipation 
of a general election, was to be linked to the Party’s electoral programme.97  This 
document sought the ‘securing to every member of the community…all the requisites of 
healthy life and worthy citizenship’ and the ‘socialisation of industry in order to secure 
the elimination of every kind of inefficiency and waste’.98  It proposed the common 
ownership of land, nationalisation of railways, canals, coal and electricity, a capital levy 
to pay off the National Debt and social reforms in housing, health and education. 
The 23 March 1918 Midland Counties Express reported on four nominations for 
the Labour Party candidacy in the Wednesbury parliamentary division, with the 
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selections process occurring at the town’s Holyhead Road schoolrooms.  The nominees 
were Councillor A. Short (Boilermaker’s Society), Mr J. Baker (British Iron and Steel 
and Kindred Trades), Mr H. Whitehouse (Miners’ Federation) and Mr J. Brownlie 
(Amalgamated Society of Engineers).99  Confirming his successful nomination, the 
Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald detailed Alfred Short’s interests as 
housing, public health and the pensions paid to servicemen and their dependants.100  The 
prospective Labour candidate attended an Ironworkers and Blacksmiths Society social 
gathering on 26 October 1918, and, when explaining his views, was of the opinion that 
they ‘needed men of their own class in Parliament to look after their own interests’.101 
By 1918, even though Prime Minister, Lloyd George commanded allegiance 
from a fraction of the Liberal Party and he depended upon Conservative support for his 
parliamentary majority.  Magill suggested fear that ‘his government might be voted out 
before he could hold an election continued to haunt him until the summer of 1918’.102  
The timing was vital and in expectation that there would be some positive war news by 
then, he held out; the allied advances on the Western Front in the summer and autumn 
1918 persuaded him to go to the people.  Hence, on 22 August 1918, at a conference in 
Criccieth, Lloyd George tentatively approved the notion of an autumn election.  
Realizing that their electoral fortunes were tied together, and despite opposition from 
Austen Chamberlain, Curzon and Lord Robert Cecil, Bonar Law carried the 
Conservative Party into an electoral alliance with Lloyd George and his supporters. 
Prior to the formal announcement of the general election, a resumption of local 
political activity could be discerned. For instance, the Midland Advertiser and 
Wednesbury Herald ran an article on 12 October 1918 speculating on the prospects of 
the parties.  Supporting the Conservative candidate, Maconochie, this newspaper 
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highlighted ‘the patriotic traditions associated with the Borough by the valiant Colonel 
Sir John Norton Griffiths’.103  On 16, 17 and 18 October, Christabel Pankhurst addressed 
audiences in Tipton, Wednesbury and Darlaston respectively, on the dangers of 
Bolshevism.  For the duration, the Suffragette movement in which she had previously 
been active had turned its attention to supporting the war effort, including the notorious 
practice of handing white feathers to young men in civilian attire in order to induce 
them to enlist.104  These meetings represented the first steps in Pankhurst’s candidacy at 
the 1918 general election, when she stood in Smethwick for the Women’s Party.105 
On 11 November 1918, the Express and Star described the scenes in 
Wednesbury when intelligence of the armistice reached the locality.  It reported that 
female workers emerged from their employment ‘in high glee, many of them cake-
walking along the streets, and, with the male workers joining in patriotic songs’.106  
Permission to dissolve Parliament had been granted by the King on 5 November and, 
within twenty-four hours of the end of hostilities, it was announced that a general 
election would occur on 14 December 1918.  This election had been periodically 
postponed by Parliament, and there being an assumption that it would take place in 
wartime, or shortly after a victory was gained, in view of Lloyd George’s belief that it 
should precede the impact of demobilization and pre-empt the threat of socialism.  With 
the objectives of confirming his Coalition in office, excluding Asquithian Liberals from 
power, and marginalizing political elements still deemed unpatriotic, the timing gifted 
him the opportunity to exploit his prestige as ‘The man who won the war’.107  It became 
recognized as the ‘Coupon’ election because of the letter of support dated 20 November 
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1918, signed by both Lloyd George and Bonar Law, and circulated to Coalition 
candidates.  Being suggestive of candidates’ patriotism, those not receiving the letter 
were negatively portrayed by their opponents as pacifists, with the contest becoming ‘a 
virtual plebiscite for or against Lloyd George, as the architect of the victory’.108 
At a delegate conference on 14 November 1918, the Labour Party recognizing 
the necessity for reintegrating its pacifist and patriotic elements, formally withdrew 
from the Coalition and stood on its own programme.109  By this time, Labour’s position 
had strengthened to such an extent that it was able to endorse 361 candidates, 
considerably more than at previous general elections.  The decision to make this 
increase was motivated by several factors.  Firstly, the split from the Liberals allowed 
Labour to compete with them as the party of reform appealing to the moderate left; 
secondly, boundary revisions worked to Labour’s advantage in the industrial centres; 
and thirdly, the recent revolution in Russia gave Labour confidence in what might now 
be achieved.  Labour felt poised to make inroads into the Conservative working-class 
areas of the North West and West Midlands, as noted by Tanner, because of ‘the party's 
association with the gains made by the predominant local unions’ in regard to the 
negotiation of pay claims and improvements in working and living conditions.110 
By 25 November 1918, when Parliament was dissolved, The Times reported that 
the election campaign was in full swing, with Lloyd George making two important 
speeches when visiting Wolverhampton.  In these, he steadfastly rejected the suggestion 
that he would be hampered by any Conservative reactionaries, and emphasized that 
‘deadheads and cranks were no party’s monopoly’ but that he preferred the word 
‘comradeship to coalition’.  Significantly, there was reference to housing and the social 
conditions to which millions were subjected, when he pledged that the principal 
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responsibility of the new government would be ‘to make Britain a fit country for heroes 
to live in’ because the ‘slums were not fit homes for the men who had won the war’.111 
The Wednesbury Constituency contained the three districts of Wednesbury, 
Darlaston and Tipton and descriptions of the three candidates who were standing in the 
election were published in the Midland Counties Express on 7 December 1918 and 
Birmingham Gazette on 10 December 1918.  The Conservative Party’s candidate was 
A.W. Maconochie who, from 1900 to 1906, had represented the parliamentary 
constituency of East Aberdeenshire, and was described as a manufacturer; the Liberal 
Party’s candidate, R.L.G. Simpson, was a barrister-at-law; and the Labour Party’s 
candidate, Alfred Short, was by occupation a boiler smith and a trade union official.112 
Alfred Short’s adoption by Wednesbury’s Labour Party was proposed by 
George Stokes on 25 November 1918 and carried unanimously.113  Short’s acceptance 
speech criticized the timing of an election taking advantage of ‘the position of the 
moment and the excitement following upon the victory in France’.  He questioned the 
treatment of soldiers and their families, since ‘the wife of a serving soldier without 
children had to try and exist upon 12s. 6d. per week, and the widow of a man who had 
made the supreme sacrifice was paid 13s. 9d. in pension’.114  Wednesbury Conservative 
and Unionist Association confirmed Maconochie’s adoption on 26 November 1918, 
when he remarked that ‘as a business man it would be a delight for him to represent a 
business constituency’.  The Association’s President, Dudley Docker, said they could 
leave the questions of the peace terms ‘to the Government which had won the war’.115 
In his electoral programme, Short argued for the restoration of pre-war trade 
union rights and workshop customs, increased pensions, better education and the public 
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ownership of railways, canals and coalmines.116  This was a popular stance to take, as a 
letter to the Express and Star from Mr William Andrews, a member of the Executive 
Council of the Amalgamated Society of the Tubes Trade, demonstrated.  This urged 
trade unionists to vote Labour because it was ‘the first opportunity trade unionists in 
Wednesbury have had of supporting a fellow trade unionist’.  Noting Short’s 
credentials, he stressed ‘the efforts he has made for our cause’ and that they should 
‘remember your principles and vote for an actual trade unionist on Saturday next’.117  
Crucially, this verified the importance of trade union support to Labour in 1918. 
What were perceived to be radical attacks on the Coalition alarmed local 
Conservatives.  In a speech at Tipton’s Tivoli picture house, Alfred Short warned that 
the Coalition offered continuation of ‘the economic and social system which had 
brought to the workers of the country the depressing social conditions, the foul putrid 
houses, low subsistence wages and the monopoly of land for the landlords’.  He 
questioned, ‘Why was it that the great landowners like the Earl of Derby and the Duke 
of Portland were supporting Mr Lloyd George?  Was it not because they were using him 
for the purpose of securing political domination and bolstering up the old policy of 
class?’  At the same meeting, Hollowware Workers trade unionist Simeon Webb 
suggested ‘it was time the working classes made up their minds that Labour was the 
only party any decent citizen could belong to’.118  The Express and Star noted that after 
a meeting, Short was ‘hoisted shoulder high by an enthusiastic body of discharged 
soldiers and carried from Darlaston to Wednesbury, amid considerable excitement’.119 
The local press steadfastly supported the Coalition, with the Midland Advertiser 
and Wednesbury Herald of 23 November 1918 enthusiastically declaring that ‘Lloyd 
George having saved his country in time of war is best qualified to define the policy on 
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which the permanence of the peace shall be established.120  The Wednesbury 
Conservative Marshall Freeman aggressively attacked the Labour Party in the local 
press, accusing Short of having links to Ramsay MacDonald and the ILP, and claiming 
that ‘It looks as if you sympathise with the men whose traitorous language had to be 
suppressed in the interest of our own national liberty’.121  Furthermore, the Tipton 
Herald enquired of Short: ‘Do you or do you not believe in making the brutal Huns pay 
compensation to the uttermost farthing for what they have done to innocent civilians, 
men, women and children, and to property in this district’.  The Labour candidate 
rebutted these claims, affirming that he supported ‘full and complete reparations for the 
wrongs Germany had done’.122  This failed to convince the Midland Advertiser and 
Wednesbury Herald, however, which emphatically proclaimed, ‘every true lover of his 
country is plumping for the candidate who is pledged to support Mr Lloyd George’.123 
At Darlaston Town Hall on 4 December 1918, the Conservative candidate said 
that ‘the question for the British working man at this time was to decide who should pay 
the cost of the war…should it be paid by the innocent or those who had caused the 
war?’  Echoing Lloyd George’s call for housing reform, Maconochie stated that ‘those 
people who said they wanted healthy workmen must give them healthy homes; they 
could not have good workers if they lived in hovels’.  Yet he was reluctant for there to 
be any state involvement, arguing that ‘it was not the duty of the government to 
interfere with any business’.124  Allegations were made that Maconochie had accused   
90 per cent of the Labour Party of being either pacifists or pro-Germans.  In a letter 
printed in the Express and Star, when considering Labour’s leaders, he cited the plight 
of thousands of Russian peasants who had they not believed the promises of Lenin and 
Trotsky, ‘would be alive today…instead of rotting on the land they were promised 
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should be their own’.  The Coalition candidate sought to clarify this by claiming that he 
was referring to the Independent Labour Party but this failed to alleviate the gaffe.125 
Polling took place on Saturday, 14 December 1918, with the local newspapers 
continuing to report the conclusion of campaigning.  In his final address, delivered from 
the steps of Wednesbury’s Conservative Club, Maconochie accused Short of ‘trying to 
stir up blood between employers and workpeople’, describing him as ‘a full blown 
Socialist, whose wild ideas would bring the country to absolute ruin’.  Alfred Short 
attended meetings at Mesty Croft and at Wednesbury Town Hall on 13 December, with 
the latter being especially notable because “Teddy” Williams, a leading trade unionist 
during the 1913 Black Country strike, was welcomed back after 22 months captivity as 
a prisoner of war in Germany.126  In a gathering at Wednesbury’s market place, attended 
by an estimated 2,000 people, Short described ‘very encouraging reports from all 
centres’ suggesting ‘plenty of votes to spare to put him at the head of the poll’.127 
Nationally, the result declared on 28 December 1918 was a triumph for the 
Coalition, which won 523 seats with 379 being Conservative victories.  Labour 
contested 361 seats, winning 57, and the Asquithian Liberals collected just 36 seats.128  
Although Labour was now the main party of opposition, and had increased its strength 
by 15 seats, it is justifiable to question whether the Party could have done better.  
Contributing factors must include Lloyd George’s timing of the election to derive 
maximum benefit for his cause, and the low national turnout of 57 per cent owing to the 
limitations of the electoral rolls and the large number of servicemen who were unable to 
vote.  In Wednesbury, the result was given as: A. Short (Labour) 11,341 (49.8 per cent); 
A.W. Maconochie (Coalition Conservative) 10,364 (45.9 per cent); and R.L.G. Simpson 
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(Liberal) 988 (4.3 per cent).  With an electorate of 34,415, the turnout was 66.2 per 
cent.129  The announcement of the vote was made by the Mayor, Alderman                
A.E. Pritchard.  The newly elected Member stated that he was ‘indeed very proud to be 
declared the representative of so great an industrial borough, and it would be his duty, 
while having regard for the principles for which he had fought and the principles dear to 
his party, to adequately represent all sections in the division’.130  Maconochie counselled 
that ‘while the country came first, the constituents were next’ and Simpson added that 
‘the time must cease when Wednesbury could be regarded as a Conservative seat’.  
Labour Party supporters gathered in Wednesbury’s Market Place and Alfred Short was 
‘escorted through the streets by a multitude of cheering and enthusiastic supporters’.131 
Labour was not expected to win in Wednesbury, and for a Conservative to lose 
‘in this election was quite an achievement, shared by only seven others’.132  As Ward 
stated, ‘Labour’s success in Wednesbury was more predictable than West Bromwich’, 
which was also a Labour gain.133  The Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald’s 
assessment was that Labour had exploited ‘the emotions aroused in the aftermath of the 
many petty strikes which have taken place in the Black Country in recent years’ and 
exclaimed ‘thank heaven Wednesbury is not England’.134  President of Wednesbury’s 
Conservatives since succeeding Lord Dartmouth in 1909, Dudley Docker furiously 
criticized the apathy and bad organization of the local activists.  He resigned and ceased 
to take much interest in local politics thereafter.135  Labour consolidated its position, 
becoming a growing force and then the majority party on Wednesbury Council.  Alfred 
Short held the parliamentary constituency until 1931, when it was lost to the National 
Government candidate, Viscount Ednam, then regained at a by-election in 1932. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
Between 1910 and 1918, an important political transition occurred in Wednesbury, 
resulting in the town ceasing to be a bye-word for working-class Conservatism.  The 
constituency became one within which the Labour Party established an enduring 
presence and a number of far-reaching consequences would follow from this. 
In 1914, although its progressive wing was intact, the Liberal Party’s social 
democratic ideas were vulnerable and it was ‘no longer the party of the left’.136  Four 
years of war compromised its commitment to individual liberty and, when combined 
with failures in the economic and military spheres, it resulted in a loss of appeal to the 
nation as a whole.  With the evolution of Coalition government, Asquithian loyalists 
became sidelined, whilst Lloyd George’s supporters moved away from the tenets of 
traditional Gladstonian Liberalism.  Previously, the Liberal Party had been the focus for 
non-conformists and radicals; increasingly, they were attracted to either the Labour 
Party or the ILP.  Hence, Pugh’s argument that for the Liberals, the war ‘derailed their 
domestic reform agenda and destroyed their successful Edwardian government’.137 
Traditional allegiances to Conservatism was intrinsic to many working-class 
communities across the Black Country, demonstrating that not all workers would turn to 
Labour.138  The values underpinning this included deference to social superiors, 
enthusiasm for tradition, the monarchy and empire, together with hostility to the state 
and suspicion of improving legislation.  McKibbin suggested that ‘working-class 
Tories, by misinterpreting their class, misinterpret social reality and crucially confuse 
their appropriate influence groups’.139  Nevertheless, ‘recurrent grievances against their 
employers and participation in strikes rendered their loyalty to the Conservative Party 
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inherently unstable’.140  Industrial action during 1913 and 1917 caused many in the 
working class to re-evaluate their position and the war’s emphasis on equality of 
sacrifice tested assumptions about the fitness to govern of the established political class. 
In 1914, Labour resembled a pressure group struggling to carve out an identity 
separate from a Liberal Party not always receptive to working-class interests.  By 
gathering trade union support, Labour embarked on a journey from junior partner in a 
progressive alliance to an independent force credible to the electorate.  Locally, this 
happened in an industrial context within which the class collaboration formerly located 
in small workshops, between employers and their workforces, was superseded by 
mechanization and factories.  Local trade unions had developed in size and influence 
and sought an outlet for their political ambitions.  Wednesbury’s experience differed 
from that described by Savage, as the perception that the rise in the Labour Party and 
class-based politics was ‘bound up with the declining salience of local politics’.141 
As Edward Royle stated, the ‘conditions for Labour to register considerable 
gains nationally were created between 1916 and 1918’.142  During these years, the 
working class benefited from increased employment, rising wages and living standards, 
and Labour began to emerge as the political force supportive of the workers.  Whether 
skilled or unskilled, they had a greater homogeneity and awareness of their importance 
politically, especially when wartime government had consulted the trade unions on 
policy matters.  With the exception of the pacifists and UDC, often deeply unpopular 
with the labour movement’s patriotic rank-and-file, the Labour Party was able to 
generate, if not class collaboration and class-consciousness, then heightened working-
class awareness and class loyalty, where previously there was no uniform experience.  
Winter noted other wartime changes, suggesting that ‘many people also turned to 
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Labour in 1918 and the years that followed because its political programme had 
changed’.143  Workers were impatient to restore pre-war skilled status whilst protecting 
wartime gains and locally based trades councils were influential in articulating grass 
root views.  When the general election was called in November 1918, this influence 
ensured that Labour’s candidates tended to be moderate, patriotic and respectable 
working-class men, as was the case in Wednesbury with the nomination of Alfred Short. 
The 1918 Representation of the People Act was important because the pre-war 
franchise was restrictive and unrepresentative.  Yet the limitation to females aged over 
30 years was, ‘both a large step towards democratization and a clear refusal to carry the 
step too far’.144  Although the war demonstrated the extent of political inequality and the 
inadequacies of the traditional parties, perceptions of a Labour Party dominated by male 
trade unionists hostile to female employment drew suspicion.  As more middle-class 
women were enfranchised than from the other social classes, this benefited the Coalition 
more than the other political parties.  If the war marked a turning point then the 1918 
general election profoundly affected political relationships, with Tony Adams 
maintaining that ‘the growth of electoral support for Labour and the concurrent decline 
in Liberalism remains the single most important change in British party politics’. 145  
Labour’s performance appears more positively although it may be argued that the 
election came too soon for the Party.  Nevertheless, in Wednesbury, Labour capitalized 
on the advances it had made during the strikes of 1913 and 1917, and its role in 
improving conditions for working people, to win a victory of great significance.  The 
breakthroughs in four formerly Conservative Black Country’s constituencies confirmed 
that a political realignment was under way and ‘Labour had put a foot in the door’.146 
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CHAPTER 9:  CONCLUSION 
 
 
The principal aim of this thesis has been to contribute towards achieving a greater 
understanding of the forms that working-class patriotism took during the First World 
War.  Extending our appreciation of the relationships within and between communities, 
and the effects of economic, political and social change during this period, has been 
realized through this local study of Wednesbury.  Secondary aims have been to explore 
the complex dynamics in greater depth, to shed light on whether their origins should be 
attributed to changes occurring in the pre-war years, and to determine if attitudes and 
identities were modified during the war.  Accordingly, the home front has been 
examined from several different perspectives, with each chapter assisting in the 
assembly of a fuller account of the wartime experiences of working-class communities. 
Several themes underpin this work, including the cohesiveness and sense of 
community identity, the distinctions between citizenship, nationalism and patriotism, 
the realignments occurring within economics, politics and society, and the enduring 
importance of social class in British society.  Waites pointed to the distinction between 
class awareness and class-consciousness, adding that ‘many of the attitudes and values 
common to the working class have frequently been inimical to developed levels of 
class-consciousness.1  This was fashioned by the industrial changes emanating from the 
later eighteenth century, with Joyce remarking that it was ‘built out of the often ill-
fitting bricks of those distinctive local and regional experiences, in which the parochial 
and the sectional were often finely balanced with the catholic and the solidaristic’.2 
Why has it been deemed appropriate to carry out such an assessment of 
Wednesbury during this period?  Certainly, there has been no other substantial study of 
this town.  Furthermore, micro histories of this type can be seen to represent part of a 
                                               
1
  B.A. Waites, A Class Society at War: England, 1914-1918, p. 181. 
2
  P. Joyce, p. 330. 
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growing trend that complements the wider-ranging accounts of conventional military 
history.  This has been shown by the doctoral theses of R.J. Batten, J.G.M. Cranstoun, 
S.J.L. Gower and L.K. Riddell, with reference to Devon, East Lothian, Wolverhampton 
and Shetland respectively.  Such holistic approaches, therefore, fill some of the gaps in 
the historiography by focusing on aspects that have been neglected.  This is an approach 
that supports the notion that this war acted as one of the most prolific agencies of social 
change; perhaps more so than in any conflict in history, prior to this.  With a 
methodology reliant on primary source material, and acknowledging the existence of 
gaps in the evidence unlikely to be ever filled, one innovative approach was adopted 
and may serve as a model for future research.  This was to carry out a survey to reflect 
critically on the demographic, economic and social life of Wednesbury, as based on a 
sample of six streets selected by dividing the town into six approximately equal parts. 
In order to understand better a working-class community such as Wednesbury, 
and how it was influenced by the war it is important to explore its composition.  To 
achieve this, a review of the immediate pre-war years was necessary.  Chapter 2 has 
revealed that since the mid-nineteenth century, although there had been improvements, 
prosperity and relative stability, huge disparities in income and living standards caused 
the life chances of the working class to be extremely limited.3  To counter this, there 
was reliance on informal networks of mutual aid and support that provided a measure of 
agency and independence beyond the control or influence of the affluent and powerful.  
Nevertheless, hierarchy existed even in the working class with demarcations between 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers.  Previously, this pervaded attitudes and 
reduced the chances for real solidarity but as Bourne stated, ‘Labour unrest ran at 
unprecedented levels before the war, seeming to some to presage revolution’.4  
Increased mechanization and technological change generated a level of economic and 
                                               
3
  M. Savage and A. Miles, p. 33. 
4
  J.M. Bourne, ‘The Midlands and the Great War’, p. 161. 
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political agitation amongst the organized working class that had not seen since the 
disturbances associated with the Chartist movement of the mid-nineteenth century. 
Despite its overwhelmingly working-class configuration, Wednesbury (as with 
the Black Country generally) had a long-standing political allegiance to Conservatism, 
as demonstrated by the local authority composition and election of John Norton 
Griffiths as its Member of Parliament.  This was not mere deference; it resulted from 
economic pragmatism at a time when the majority of workers were un-unionized and 
the local labour movement was weak and divided.  When a strike by Wednesbury tube 
workers broke out in May 1913, spreading across the Black Country, attitudes began to 
change as trade unions organized the unskilled workers.  Even the local newspapers, 
traditionally hostile to such a cause, which initially attempted to ascribe the dispute to 
syndicalist revolutionaries, had to concede that support from the wider community was 
steadfast.  This was evidenced by the many charitable acts and demonstrations mounted 
to that end and counting towards the successful settlement of the dispute in July 1913. 
The radical patriotism of the nineteenth century had given way to a social 
patriotism that sought not merely to oppose the state; instead, it aimed to work through 
it.  Patriotism continued to remain a contested value.  Indeed, during the first days of 
August 1914, when Britain’s entry into the war became inexorable, there was the 
question of how a working class that might otherwise have protested over British 
involvement would react, and this has been considered in Chapter 3.  The range of 
emotions and factors that influenced individual decisions can never be known save for 
the evidence pointing towards the response of the majority of the British working class 
being to support the war effort.  Locally, this included those who had been on strike in 
1913, as confirmed by the Roll of Honour of the Workers’ Union, showing those 
members who had volunteered and been killed in action.  One of the dispute’s principal 
leaders, Wednesbury trade unionist Teddy Williams, having volunteered for military 
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service, had been taken as a prisoner of war, as reported in the local press in 1917.5  
There is a comparison to be made between the action of the working class during the 
1913 strike and its response to the war through voluntary enlistment.  Both included 
elements of sacrifice and the moral conviction about what was right and fair treatment. 
Patriotism was demonstrated in many forms, therefore, and this allowed those 
unable to offer their services to the armed forces to continue to claim citizenship during 
wartime.  In view of David Young’s assertion that much of the labour historiography 
has concentrated on those challenging the state, and that ‘less attention is paid to those 
industrial workers who volunteered for the forces or who, otherwise supported the war 
effort’, this thesis has sought to redress this from a local perspective.6  Lord Kitchener’s 
recognition that the army needed millions of men, combined with propaganda such as 
Alfred Leete’s poster of September 1914, undoubtedly helped to elicit the vast numbers 
of men who volunteered.  Recent research by Gregory and Pennell indicated that this 
was a much more of a layered experience than an ideologically charged, jingoistic and 
spontaneous rush to join the colours, as suggested by earlier generations of historians.  
For instance, a key point in the chronology of events was the retreat from Mons, reports 
of which prompted many to feel that the nation needed their help in its hour of need.  
Separating out the specific motives that are woven together within the evidence remains 
problematic and for many, as pointed out by Silbey, ‘if they did not understand what 
they were getting themselves into then neither did the politicians, generals...’.7 
Although the war that they would encounter and the duration for which they 
would be in uniform would have been incomprehensible to them in 1914, this did not 
dissuade whole communities from encouraging their men to enlist.  Cunningham argued 
that ‘it was impressive testimony to the identification forged between people and 
                                               
5
  Express and Star, 2 June 1917. 
6
  D.M. Young, ‘“All means short of murder” British Socialists, ‘Patriotic Labour’ and the Politics of 
Recruitment during the Great War’, Stand To! The Journal of the Western Front Association,                    
89 (August/September) (2010), p. 33. 
7
  D. Silbey, p. 122. 
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nation’.8  To many localities, it was a matter of civic pride and they responded to Lord 
Kitchener’s call to arms by raising service battalions for his New Armies; whereas other 
areas already had close relationships with existing formations of the Territorial Force.  
There was an especially strong connection with the Territorials in Staffordshire and the 
Black Country, and Wednesbury had its own unit, H Company of the Fifth Battalion of 
the South Staffordshire Regiment.  Later redesignated as D Company of the 1/5
th
 
Battalion, these Territorials had their first experience of a major battle in the assault on 
the Hohenzollern Redoubt.  As they left their trenches at 2.00 pm on 13 October 1915, 
the German machine guns opened fire and Wednesbury lost fourteen of its sons.  Thus, 
the town had an early experience of the collective trauma that many other communities 
felt following the first day of the Battle of the Somme.  Wednesbury’s men went on to 
play their role in the decisive action when they crossed the St. Quentin Canal and broke 
through the Hindenburg Line on 29 September 1918 to hasten the end of the war.  
Chapter 4 has been concerned with the demands placed on the war economy and 
Wednesbury’s role in munitions production, most notably by the construction from 
1916 onwards of tanks for the British Army.  By participating in the Battle of Cambrai 
in 1917 and the Hundred Days Campaign in 1918, these Wednesbury-made machines 
made a crucial contribution to the eventual victory.  However, the mobilization of 
manpower and resources on the scale required would be a problem for all of the nations 
involved in the war.  Britain was the only country to achieve this successfully, so that it 
could equip the mass army it had created from voluntarism and eventual conscription.  
Following an initial period of trade disruption and an unsuccessful attempt to pursue a 
regime of business as usual, shortages of ordnance that impeded military progress 
prompted the foundation of a Ministry of Munitions and successive steps towards the 
rationalization of production to optimize output.  Accordingly, it was during this 
                                               
8
  H. Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy: Britain, 1832-1918, p. 230. 
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conflict that the ‘wartime experience offered a fundamental challenge to the doctrines of 
economic industrialism and laissez-faire which had dominated the nineteenth century’.9 
Increasingly, this entailed the utilization of female labour, with over 1.6 million 
women eventually being drafted in to replace the men who were combed-out, firstly by 
the Derby Scheme and then by conscription.  The manufacture of munitions was only a 
step away from using them at the front line.  Hence, it was in this manner that the 
nation’s workforce was able to express its patriotism.  For many female workers, their 
industrial career, and enjoyment of increased wages that accompanied it, proved to be a 
temporary one when the men began to return from their military service.  Tribute must 
be paid to them and the patriotism they demonstrated in performing work of an often 
highly dangerous nature because without them the war could not have been won. 
Other accompanying social changes were in the field of employee relations, as 
shown in Chapter 5.  Producing vast quantities of ordnance under conditions of great 
urgency required industrial harmony.  Initially, an industrial truce had been agreed by 
the trade unions, thereby demonstrating their patriotic commitment to the war effort, yet 
this was threatened by discontent over such matters as the Leaving Certificates 
introduced by the Munitions Act 1915 and the impact of food shortages and rising 
prices.  Such considerations came to provoke searching questions regarding the 
operation of sectional interests, profiteering and equality of sacrifice, meaning the 
expectation that wartime burdens ought to be shared equally across the social classes.  
The working class made considerable gains with regard to their wages and working 
conditions during the war, owing to collective negotiation with firms and the 
departments of the Government.  With an increased trade union membership, both for 
male and female workers, there would be political repercussions.  An early indication of 
this was shown by an event that occurred in late July and August 1917, at the Crown 
                                               
9
  N. Kirk, p. 163. 
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tube works of James Russell & Sons.  The workforce of this firm went out on strike in 
order to support a former employee, a recently discharged and wounded soldier, who 
had been prevented from regaining his job by an officious manager.  As mentioned in 
the press at the time, this strike was an echo of the 1913 dispute because the people 
were calling upon the networks of support as they had done then.10  This should be seen 
as a deeply patriotic action by the workforce because this soldier had done his duty, 
been wounded in action, and was now depending on a promise that had been made at 
the start of the war.  If this could not be honoured, then what were they fighting for? 
The people of Wednesbury, together with those in Tipton and Walsall, became 
victims of the first air raid on the Midlands on 31 January and 1 February 1916, when 
two German Zeppelin airships that had deviated from their intended target of Liverpool 
dropped explosive and incendiary bombs killing and injuring civilians.  As stated in 
Chapter 6, this strategic bombing campaign represented an entirely new form of warfare 
that targeted industry, infrastructure and people.  Its intention was to demolish not just 
the physical structures but also the morale and will of the communities to resist 
aggression.  Effectively, this ‘had given rise to the total battlefield where no one was 
safe and everyone was a target’.11  Despite the wartime censorship preventing the 
publication of the names of the towns bombed or of the victims, it is still possible to 
gauge the level of anger felt by the community at what they viewed as an atrocity of 
war.  Moreover, the defiance and determination of the local population was evident in 
the steps taken to introduce the first air defence measures, with the civic leaders of 
Wednesbury and the other Black Country towns participating in key discussions held. 
War had an impact on civilian life in terms of living standards and exposed the 
deficiencies and inequalities of the pre-war years, many of which were outlined in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis.  This was particularly the case for working-class women whose 
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  Express and Star, 4 August 1917. 
11
  N. Faulkner and N. Durrant, p. 148. 
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husbands, fathers or brothers had gone off to fight, with some not to return, and who 
now had to contend with harsh economic realities.  Steps were necessary to provide 
essential relief during the early days of the war, both for those working people 
vulnerable to the conflict’s immediate economic consequences, and to the Belgian 
refugees who found shelter in Wednesbury.  The conflict also frustrated many measures 
for improvement that had been planned, for example, as shown in Chapter 7, the 
housing scheme in Wednesbury was curtailed for the duration and did not commence 
until 1919.  The impact of the First World War had changed British society in numerous 
different ways and a return to the pre-1914 patterns of life was therefore impossible. 
Politically, progress for the working class had been inhibited before the war.  
The franchise was denied to all women and many working-class men and, as Chinn 
argued, ‘the urban poor fought and worked for a country which had denied them the full 
rights of citizenship and which had degraded them.  They did not fail England.  England 
had failed them’.12  As demonstrated in Chapter 8, the activities of the trade unions and 
trades councils were instrumental in connecting with local people.  This ‘brought wider 
endorsement of the need for independent political action to protect working-class 
communities’.13  One aspect of this was the role of ex-servicemen’s organizations, with 
some forging connections to the labour movement on allowances, pensions and the 
reintegration of former servicemen back into civilian life.  By not following the path 
taken by the Bolsheviks or the Freikorps, the point has been well put by Young that ‘the 
stolidity and the broad church of British labour is, I feel, one principal factor why 
patriotic labour did not change into proto-fascism’.14  Historians of the labour movement 
have argued that the foundations of political change were established before 1914, with 
the war reshaping the Labour Party to make it attractive to members of the working 
                                               
12
  C.S.A Chinn, Poverty Amidst Prosperity: Urban Poor in England, 1834-1914, p. 97. 
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  T. Adams, p. 32. 
14
  D.M. Young, p. 38. 
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class who had previously supported the Conservative Party.15  In the Black Country, 
Labour’s power base had been narrow but the repercussions of the strikes of 1913 and 
1917 were to be appreciated in Wednesbury during the general election of 1918. 
At the commencement of his electoral campaign, David Lloyd George had 
pronounced that ‘the war had been won by the unity of all classes, by the sacrifice of 
every rank, in every condition of life.  Patriotism is the common inheritance and virtue 
of all’.16  Sacrifices were made by all of the social classes and it remains the case that 
the immense demands of industrialized warfare, whether on the battlefields or in the 
munitions factories, were such that the war could not have been won without the British 
working class.  Many of the men who died during the war did not have the vote and 
even with the passing of the Representation of the People Act 1918, it was noted in the 
local press that there was a ‘virtual disenfranchisement of the army’ since three out of 
five servicemen had been unable to vote.17  Given the Conservative Party’s pre-war 
dominance of the Black Country, the outcome in Wednesbury was a very credible one 
for the Labour Party, particularly in view of those appeals made by the Prime Minister, 
the Coalition and its candidates for the working class to respond with patriotism. 
The solidarity of the people of Wednesbury, as described in this work, derived 
from shared experience and the necessity of mutual support, which was reinforced by 
their innate sense of patriotism.  Whilst not seeking in any way to devalue or underplay 
the sacrifices made by all the other social classes, the immense burdens, challenges and 
demands of the First World War fell especially on such communities.  Extensive and 
intense, working-class patriotism was varied in the many forms that it took.  
Commentators of more recent times, jaded perhaps by cynicism, will have seen the 
working class as being distracted by patriotic, monarchist and imperial sentiment to 
                                               
15
  K. Laybourn, ‘The Rise of Labour and the Decline of Liberalism: The State of the Debate’, p. 225;                     
M. Pugh, ‘The Rise of Labour and the Political Culture of Conservatism, 1890-1945’, pp. 531-532. 
16
  Express and Star, 23 November 1918. 
17
  Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Herald, 21 December 1918. 
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make them easy prey for manipulation.  That point of view does a great disservice to the 
many men and women who were motivated by a very real sense of duty and obligation 
to their country.  To them this was not contradictory and it applied equally to the front 
line and the home front.  It was shaped by events and experiences in the pre-war years 
that endowed people with a capacity for endurance in the face of adversity, and 
continued during wartime to influence the ongoing transformation of British society.  
By the end of the war, working-class deference had become markedly less evident, 
replaced by a cohesiveness and greater awareness of both the influence and power now 
held, so that any return to the pre-1914 patterns of life was simply not possible. 
In conclusion, Wednesbury’s wartime experiences were in many respects an 
accurate microcosm of the wider national condition.  Furthermore, this thesis has shown 
that relevant local studies can also have their place in the national context by providing 
a point of connection to the larger themes that have been addressed recently by, for 
example, the work of Gregory and Pennell with reference to the outbreak of the war.  
Each chapter has taken this ideal further and reflected on many examples to demonstrate 
that it was much more than that and, therefore, the important aims set out in this thesis 
have been accomplished.  Working-class patriotism was exhibited throughout the war 
and if it did not diminish, it certainly adapted to circumstances and changed over time.  
This thesis has supported some views to be found in the historiography and it has 
challenged others, thereby adding to and advancing the sum of knowledge concerning 
the Black Country during the early years of the twentieth century.  Finally, it is hoped 
that through the chronicling of Wednesbury’s striking workers of 1913, its servicemen 
of 1914-1918 and those munitions workers who supported them throughout, it has gone 
some way towards rescuing them from what E.P. Thompson described in The Making of 
the English Working Class as ‘the enormous condescension of posterity’.18 
                                               
18
  E.P. Thompson, p. 12. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
The appendices are organized as follows: 
 
Appendix 1: Maps of the Black Country and of Wednesbury  
 
Appendix 2: A map and tables summarizing a survey of employment and housing in a 
sample of six Wednesbury streets 
 
Appendix 3: A table showing the political composition of Wednesbury Borough 
Council, 1913-1918 
 
Appendix 4: A table summarizing data from the Reports of Wednesbury’s Medical 
Officer of Health, 1913-1918 
 
Appendix 5: A table summarizing commercial and industrial activity in Wednesbury, 
1912-1918 
 
Appendix 6: Illustrations and Photographs 
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APPENDIX 1:  MAPS OF THE BLACK COUNTRY AND OF WEDNESBURY 
 
 
1. Map showing Wednesbury in relation to the Black Country. 
Source: D. Vodden, Our Black Country (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2003), p. 7. 
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2. Ordnance Survey Map for Wednesbury, 1902 
This map is reduced from the original Ordnance Survey 1:2500 map to a scale of approximately 1:4340 
Source: (Consett: Alan Godfrey Maps, 1987) 
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APPENDIX 2:  EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING  
IN A SAMPLE OF SIX WEDNESBURY STREETS 
 
 
3. Map of Wednesbury indicating the six streets analysed with reference to the 1911 Census 
Source: Ordnance Survey Maps for Wednesbury, 1902 
(reprinted Consett: Alan Godfrey Maps, 1987). 
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1. Church Hill 
 
House No. Surname of  
main occupant 
No. of 
males 
No. of 
females 
Occupations Employed/ 
Employer/ Self-
employed 
Caldwell 
House 
Knowles 2 4 Iron tube manufacturer; 
Clerk; 
Servant (living in) 
Employer; 
Employed; 
Employed 
Church 
Hill House 
Guy  3 Private means - 
Hill Crest Partridge  3 Private income; 
Servant (living in) 
- 
Employed 
Rose Hill 
Tavern 
Richards 2 2 Licensed victualler; 
Housekeeper (living in); 
Servants (x2) (living in) 
Employer; 
Employed; 
Employed 
The 
Vicarage 
Pritchard 3 3 Clergyman; 
Servants (x2) (living in) 
Employed; 
Employed 
43 Perry 4 2 Travelling salesman; 
Hairdresser 
Self-employed; 
Self-employed 
62 Smith 1 3 Tube manufacturer; 
Servant (living in) 
Cook (living in) 
Employer; 
Employed 
Employed 
63 Faultless 2 4 General Hotelier;  
School mistress;  
Servant (living in) 
Self-employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
64 Walker 4 3 Borough Surveyor Employed 
74 Bubb 2 2 Coachman Employed 
75 Wilson 1 1 Tube tester Employed 
76 Higgins  2 Elementary school 
teacher (x2) 
Employed 
77 Pitcock 6 5 Blacksmith: tube works; 
Pinafore maker; 
Nut and bolt worker 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
78 Davies 4 2 Fitter at Patent Shaft 
works 
Employed 
79 Davis 2 2 General engineer (x2) 
Housekeeper (x2) 
Employed; 
Employed 
104 Powell  2 Shopkeeper (x2) Self-employed 
105 Fiffer 2 2 Labourer; 
Crane Driver 
Employed; 
Employer 
106 Rollaston 2 1 Builder’s foreman; 
Coal miner 
Employed; 
Employed 
107 Tibbetts 2  Salvation Army Captain; 
Salvation Army 
Lieutenant 
Employed; 
Employed 
108 Wright 2 1 Chemist’s Assistant Employed 
109 Chandler 5 3 House decorator; 
Leather trade worker 
Employed; 
Employed 
110 Roger 2 3 Planner- Bridge works Employed 
111 Woodhall 2 2 Spring Maker Employed 
112 Harrington 1 1 Brick layer Employed 
113 Moseley 4 2 Worker in tube factory Employed 
114 Turner 2 1 Axle smith Employed 
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2. Foley Street 
 
House No. Surname of  
main occupant 
No. of 
males 
No. of 
females 
Occupations Employed/ 
Employer/ Self-
employed 
4 Chandler 1 4 Ironmonger’s shop 
manager 
Employed 
5 Burns 1 2 Municipal accountant Employed 
6 Gue 1 1 Clerk of Works Employed 
7 Griffiths 2 2 Corporation Clerk; 
Assistant school mistress 
Employed; 
Employed 
8 Taylor 2 3 Worker in gas tube trade Employed 
9 Gilroy 3 2 Accountant Employed 
10 Wassall 1 3 Blacksmith Employed 
11  Bowdler 1 3 Foreman in tube works Employed 
12 Taylor 2 3 Wrought iron fitter Employed 
13 Bayley 5 2 Compositor-printer; 
Commercial clerk; 
Errand Boys (x2) 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
14 Morgan 1 3 House painter Employed 
15 Dawes 3 1 Joiner Employed 
16 Bond 3 3 Wheel turner; 
Electrician;  
Tailoress 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
19 Clift 1 3 Clerk Employed 
20 Addison 1 2 Tailor and cutter Employed 
21 Beardmore 5 3 Electrical engineer Employed 
22 Wedge 3 2 Wagoner Employed 
23 Hale 3 3 Turner in tube works; 
Post Office Clerk 
Employed 
Employed 
24 Owen 1  Carpenter Employed 
25 Yorke 3 2 Estate agent;  
Bailiff 
Employed; 
Employed 
26 Fellows 2 1 Furnace Labourer Employed 
27 Tranter 2 2 Pattern maker Employed 
28 Dodd 1 1 Retired - 
29 Stanley 4 2 Borough Librarian; 
Clerks (x2) 
Employed; 
Employed 
31 Lowe 1 1 Sand merchant Employer 
32 George 1 2 School teacher Employed 
33 Francis 1 2 Commercial clerk Employed 
34 Bates 4 2 Blacksmith’s striker Employed 
35 Cherrington 5 3 Coach axle fitter; 
Dressmaker 
Employed; 
Employed 
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3. Meeting Street 
 
House No. Surname of  
main occupant 
No. of 
males 
No. of 
females 
Occupations Employed/ 
Employer/ Self-
employed 
11 Maddox 4 3 Press Driver;  
Builder 
Employed; 
Employed 
12 Harrison 6 3 Blacksmith;  
Gas fitter;  
Office boy 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
13 Banks 2 1 Steel smelter Employed 
14 Jevons 5 5 Brass caster;  
Rivet maker;  
Tailoress 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
16 Kemp 3 4 Time keeper;  
Storeman 
Employed; 
Employed 
17 Bragg 2 2 Core maker;  
Labourer 
Employed; 
Employed 
18 Gulley 2 1 Building labourer Employed 
19 Lloyd 3 8 Labourer,  
Nut and bolt worker 
Employed; 
Employed 
20 Wheatley 3 3 Labourer; Fitting striker Employed 
21 Bray 3 2 Engine driver;  
Shop Assistant 
Employed; 
Employed 
23 Hopkins 1 1 Labourer Employed 
24 Evans 3 3 Labourer Employed 
25 Gaden 3 2 Tube fitter Employed 
26 Gaden 2 1 Labourer Employed 
27 Severn 4 4 Miner; Steel worker Employed 
28 Collins 3 1 Steel worker; Labourer Employed 
29 Morris 1 2 Wooden box maker Employed 
30 Stevens 3 4 Boiler stoker;  
Grocer’s Assistant 
Employed; 
Employed 
31a Jones 5 2 Die maker Employed 
31b Lee 2 1 Ash Loader;  
Errand boy 
Employed; 
Employed 
32 Pugh 3 2 Labourer, Turner Employed 
33 Woodward 2 5 Cast iron worker Employed 
34 Harris 3 1 Labourer Employed 
35 Mason 3 2 Butcher Employed 
36 Humphries 4 1 Plater Employed 
37 Brooks 3 1 Railway Platelayer; 
Assistant Butcher 
Employed; 
Employed 
38a Pugh 1 1 Labourer Employed 
38b Doughty 2  Collier; Carter Employed 
39 Davis 1 1 Pattern Maker Employed 
40 Wall 3 3 Wheel and Axle worker Employed 
41 Barrett 3 2 Furnaceman Employed 
42 Davies 1 3 Waggoner Employed 
42a Ashton 2 2 Furnaceman Employed 
42b Garrett 2 1 Iron Puddler Employed 
43 Grew 3 4 Collier;  
Scrivener 
Employed; 
Employed 
45 Ward 3 2 Undertaker’s Coachman Employed 
46 Dent 2 2 Carter; Printer Employed 
47 Barrett 8 3 Brickyard labourer Employed 
48 Smith 1 2 Iron worker Employed 
49 Bamford 6 3 Iron works stoker Employed 
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4. Piercy Street 
 
House No. Surname of  
main occupant 
No. of 
males 
No. of 
females 
Occupations Employed/ 
Employer/ Self-
employed 
4 Campion 2 2 Blacksmith’s striker; 
Laundry Maid 
Employed; 
Employed 
5 Wyles 1 4 Boot maker Employed 
6 Bradbury  3 Tailor’s machinist Employed 
8 Wade 1 1 Iron turner Employed 
9 Fellows 1 1 Boiler tube maker Employed 
10 Farmer 4 3 Insurance agent; 
Boiler tube worker 
Employed; 
Employed 
11 Paxford 3 2 Brewery carter Employed 
12 Thompson 1 1 Life insurance collector Employed 
13 Davies 2 2 Life insurance agent Employed 
14 Bayliss 3 3 Carter Employed 
15 Palmer 3 3 Blacksmith; 
Tailor’s machinist 
Employed; 
Employed 
16 Powell 2 2 Fitting maker; 
Laundress; 
Milk man 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
17 Kendrick 8 1 Tube fitter; 
Groom; 
Labourers (x2); 
Butcher 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
18 Hartwell 2 3 Boiler stoker; 
Fitter 
Employed; 
Employed 
18 Upton 2 4 Blacksmith’s striker Employed 
19 Neale 5 2 Warehouseman; 
Blacksmith’s striker; 
Labourers (x2) 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
20 Booth 1 3 Manager of Off Licence; 
Shop assistant; 
Boot repairer 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
21 Elkington 2 1 Coach lock turner Employed 
22 Ingram 1 7 Fitting maker Employed 
23 Woodhall 2 2 Gas tube fitter Employed 
24 Nicholls 3 5 Railwayman Employed 
25 Grove 4 4 Axle Smith Employed 
26 Hughes 3 1 Blacksmith Employed 
27 Manley 3 1 Warehouseman Employed 
28 Timmins 5  Axle forger; 
Insurance agent; 
Blacksmith; 
Carter (x2) 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
29 Johnson 3 5 Castings presser; 
Shop errand boy 
Employed; 
Employed 
30 Wynne 3 5 Boiler stoker; 
Tailoress (2) 
Laundress 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
31 Rymill 5 2 Carter; 
Blacksmith’s striker 
Employed; 
Employed 
32 Wearing 3 7 Carter; 
Sewing machinist (x4) 
Tap and die maker 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
33 Wilson 1 3 Fitting maker Employed 
34 Leech 3 1 General Labourer (x2) Employed 
35 Rowe 5 3 Tube enameller Employed 
36 Lewson 5 2 News agent; 
Apprentice fitter 
Employed; 
Employed 
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5. Ridding Lane 
 
House No. Surname of  
main occupant 
No. of 
males 
No. of 
females 
Occupations Employed/ 
Employer/ Self-
employed 
26 Bailey 2 1 Baker/Confectioner Employer 
27 Williams 3 1 Hearse driver; 
Boot maker 
Employed; 
Employed 
28 Robinson 5 3 Police sergeant; 
Electrical fitter 
Employed; 
Employed 
30 Chambers 2 2 Locket maker; 
Dress maker 
Employed; 
Employed 
31 Bailey 7 5 Printer; 
Printer’s clerk; 
Insurance clerk; 
Tailoress 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
32 Richards 3 2 Overseer at Iron tube 
works 
Employed 
33 Bishton 4 2 Furnace Labourer Employed 
34 Grew 3 4 Tube Welder; 
Shop Assistant 
Employed; 
Employed 
35 Carrington 3 2 Printer; 
Postman; 
Clerk 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
36 Pinner 2 3 Hairdresser (x2) Self-employed 
37 Lowe 2 2 Moulder Employed 
38 Jones 2 1 Printer/Compositor Employed 
40 Price 3 3 Coach builder Employed 
41 Dilworth 2 6 Coach axle turner; 
Assistant school mistress 
Employed; 
Employed 
42 Robinson 3 3 Bricklayer; 
Apprentice bricklayer 
Employed; 
Employed 
43 Moore 2 2 Mechanical engineer Employed 
44 Clarke 1 1 House agent Self-employed 
44 Dawson 1  Clergyman Employed 
45 Beardmore 1 2 Assistant headmaster Employed 
46 Jones 6 1 Assurance 
superintendant 
Employed 
47 Pinson 2 1 Estimating clerk Employed 
49 Wolfe 1 1 Jeweller/shopkeeper Self-employed 
50 Masson 4 3 Store clerk; 
Assistant clerk 
Employed; 
Employed 
51 Brooks 1 2 Grocer Employed 
52 Nutt 3 6 Switch maker; 
Solicitor’s clerk 
Employed; 
Employed 
57 Raybould 3 2 Tube fitting maker; 
Commercial clerk 
Employed; 
Employed 
58 Hawkins 4 4 Foreman at Gas tube 
works 
Employed 
59 Horton 2 3 Coach axle worker; 
Insurance clerk 
Employed; 
Employed 
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6. Russell Street 
 
House No. Surname of  
main occupant 
No. of 
males 
No. of 
females 
Occupations Employed/ 
Employer/ Self-
employed 
2 MacDuff 1 1 Printer Employed 
4 Williams 2 2 Hairdresser Self-employed 
5 Timmins 1 1 Packer in tube works Employed 
6 Forgham 1 1 General dealer Self-employed 
7 Cole 3 2 Wardrobe dealer; 
Railway porter 
Self-employed; 
Employed 
8 Evans 1 1 Shopkeeper Self-employed 
9 Roberts 5 4 Labourer; 
Machinist; 
Junior clerk 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
10 Halling 2 3 Blacksmith; 
Fitter at tube works 
Employed; 
Employed 
11 Hill 4 5 Wheel turner; 
Train driver; 
Labourer 
Employed; 
Employed; 
Employed 
12 Pymm 4 3 Blacksmith’s striker; 
Furnace worker 
Employed; 
Employed 
13 Kelly 3 1 Commercial clerk; 
Apprentice 
Employed; 
Employed 
14 Harrington 2 2 Bricklayer Employed 
15 Moore 1 2 Engineer Employed 
16 Astbury 3 4 Turner at iron works Employed 
16 Thomas  1 Charwoman Employed 
17 Oldbury 8 3 Template maker Employed 
18 Styles 4 3 Butcher Employed 
19 Small 6 2 Iron founder Employed 
20 Slove 1 4 House painter Employed 
21 Moseley 4 2 Gas stoker 
Labourers (x2) 
Employed; 
Employed 
22 Davies 2 2 Blast furnace worker; 
Labourer 
Employed; 
Employed 
24 Hall 5 2 Fireman; 
Labourers (x2) 
Employed; 
Employed 
25 Purchase 4 2 File cutter; 
Warehouseman 
Employed; 
Employed 
26 Hawthorn 1 2 Shopkeeper Self-employed 
27 Brocklehurst 4 1 Iron worker; 
Office boy 
Employed; 
Employed 
28 Edwards 2  Postman; 
Furnaceman 
Employed; 
Employed 
29 Hughes 6  Collier; 
Iron workers (x2) 
Employed; 
Employed 
30 Banner 6 4 Tube workers (x2) Employed 
31 Titley 1 2 Warehouseman Employed 
32 Stokes 3 2 Insurance agent Employed 
33 Sullivan 4 1 Labourer Employed 
34 Higgs 5 1 Steam hammer operator Employed 
35 Burns 3 3 Tool maker Employed 
36 Bissell 4 3 Steel smelter Employed 
37 Savage 1 2 Electrician Employed 
38 Oldbury 1 1 Stamper Employed 
39 Fitzgerald 3 1 Blacksmith Employed 
40 Rosewarne 2 1 Engine fitter Employed 
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APPENDIX 3: THE POLITICAL COMPOSITION OF 
WEDNESBURY BOROUGH COUNCIL, 1913-1918 
 
Year 1913/1914 1914/1915 1915/1916 
Mayor Cllr N. Bishop (C) Cllr N. Bishop (C) Cllr W. Warner (L) 
Deputy Mayor Ald A.E. Pritchard (C) Ald A.E. Pritchard (C) Ald E.J. Hunt (C) 
Aldermen Ald I. Griffiths (L) 
Ald J. Handley (C) 
Ald J.A. Kilvert (X) 
Ald A.E. Pritchard (C) 
Ald I. Griffiths (L) 
Ald J. Handley (C) 
Ald J.A. Kilvert (X) 
Ald A.E. Pritchard (C) 
Ald N. Bishop (C) 
Ald E.J. Hunt (C) 
Ald J.A. Kilvert (X) 
Ald A.E. Pritchard (C) 
King’s Hill Ward Cllr N. Bishop (C) 
Cllr J. Disturnal (L) 
Cllr W.P. Edmunds (C) 
Cllr N. Bishop (C) 
Cllr J. Disturnal (L) 
Cllr W.P. Edmunds (C) 
Cllr A. Beebee3 (C) 
Cllr W.P. Edmunds (C) 
Cllr J. Jeffries1 (L) 
Ward Electorate 1,542 1,553 1,553 
Market Ward Cllr S. Beardmore (L) 
Cllr T.R. Knowles (C) 
Cllr T.J. Withers (C) 
Cllr S. Beardmore (L) 
Cllr T.R. Knowles (C) 
Cllr T.J. Withers (C) 
Cllr S. Beardmore (L) 
Cllr T.R. Knowles (C) 
Cllr T.J. Withers (C) 
Ward Electorate 1,186 1,220 1,220 
Town Hall Ward Cllr J. Lacey (C) 
Cllr H. Peace (I) 
Cllr J.H. Sheldon (C) 
Cllr J. Lacey (C) 
Cllr H. Peace (I) 
Cllr J.H. Sheldon (C) 
Cllr J. Lacey (C) 
Cllr H. Peace (I) 
Cllr J.H. Sheldon (C) 
Ward Electorate 1,339 1,340 1,340 
Wood Green 
Ward 
Cllr E.J. Hunt (C) 
Cllr A. Richards (C) 
Cllr W. Warner (L) 
Cllr E.J. Hunt C) 
Cllr A. Richards (C) 
Cllr W. Warner (L) 
Cllr A. Richards (C) 
Cllr L.A. Shirlaw2 (C) 
Cllr W. Warner (L) 
Ward Electorate 1,135 1,152 1,192 
Total Electorate 5,242 5,305 5,305 
Year 1916/1917 1917/1918 1918/1919 
Mayor Cllr W. Warner (L) Ald A.E. Pritchard (C) Ald A.E. Pritchard (C) 
Deputy Mayor Ald E.J. Hunt (C) Cllr W. Warner (L) Cllr W. Warner (L) 
Aldermen Ald N. Bishop (C) 
Ald E.J. Hunt (C) 
Ald J.A. Kilvert (X) 
Ald A.E. Pritchard (C) 
Ald N. Bishop (C) 
Ald E.J. Hunt (C) 
Ald J.A. Kilvert (X) 
Ald A.E. Pritchard (C) 
Ald N. Bishop (C) 
Ald E.J. Hunt (C) 
Ald J.A. Kilvert (X) 
Ald A.E. Pritchard (C) 
King’s Hill Ward Cllr A. Beebee (C) 
Cllr W.P. Edmunds (C) 
Cllr J. Jeffries (L) 
Cllr A. Beebee (C) 
Cllr W.P. Edmunds (C) 
Cllr J. Jeffries (L) 
Cllr A. Beebee (C) 
Cllr W.P. Edmunds (C) 
Cllr J. Jeffries (L) 
Ward Electorate 1,553 1,553 2,523 
Market Ward Cllr S. Beardmore (L) 
Cllr T.R. Knowles (C) 
Cllr T.J. Withers (C) 
Cllr S. Beardmore (L) 
Cllr T.R. Knowles (C) 
Cllr T.J. Withers (C) 
Cllr S. Beardmore (L) 
Cllr T.R. Knowles (C) 
Cllr T.J. Withers (C) 
Ward Electorate 1,220 1,220 2,654 
Town Hall Ward Cllr J. Lacey (C) 
Cllr H. Peace (I) 
Cllr J.H. Sheldon (C) 
Cllr J. Lacey (C) 
Cllr H. Peace (I) 
Cllr J.H. Sheldon (C) 
Cllr J. Lacey (C) 
Cllr H. Peace (I) 
Cllr J.H. Sheldon (C) 
Ward Electorate 1,340 1,340 3,195 
Wood Green 
Ward 
Cllr A. Richards (C) 
Cllr L.A. Shirlaw (C) 
Cllr W. Warner (L) 
Cllr A. Richards (C) 
Cllr L.A. Shirlaw (C) 
Cllr W. Warner (L) 
Cllr A. Richards (C) 
Cllr L.A. Shirlaw (C) 
Cllr W. Warner (L) 
Ward Electorate 1,192 1,192 2,331 
Total Electorate 5,305 5,305 10,703 
 
1. Elected 1 November 1914 
2. Elected 26 February 1915 
3. Elected 9 November 1915 
 
Key:  C (Conservative) 
I (Independent) 
L (Liberal) 
X (Unknown) 
 
Sources:  Borough of Wednesbury Municipal Year Books, B/W/3/8–13; Ryder’s Annual, 1885-1918 
(Sandwell Community History and Archives Service) 
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APPENDIX 4:  REPORTS OF WEDNESBURY’S MEDICAL OFFICER 
OF HEALTH, 1913-1918 – A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 
 
 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
Area in Acres 2,287 2,287 2,287 2,287 2,287 2,287 
Estimated population 28,108 29,100 28,414 27,776 29,760 30,364 
Population per Acre 12.29 12.72 12.42 12.14 13.0 13.27 
Number of houses in the 
Borough 
5,812 5,900 5,919 5,895 6,108 6,108 
Number of persons per house 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.87 4.9 
Number of births (Total) 868 929 780 787 707 788 
Number of births (Male) 446 474 374 392 364 415 
Number of births (Female) 422 455 406 395 343 373 
Number of deaths (Total) 521 497 471 480 415 518 
Increase/Decrease in total 
population 
+347 +432 +309 +307 +292 +207 
Birth rates 30.8 32.1 27.4 26.0 21.3 20.5 
Death rates 18.5 17.1 16.5 17.3 14.2 20.3 
Infantile death rates 152 136 114 101 94 104 
Total deaths from Diarrhoea 31 27 17 7 7 8 
Infantile mortality from 
Diarrhoea per 1,000 births 
35.7 29.0 27.45 17.7 4.9 1.0 
Total deaths of children aged 
under 5 years 
246 182 150 137 146 176 
Death rate of children aged 
under 5 years 
  5.28 5.0 4.9 6.1 
Respiratory death rate 2.77 6.2 2.7 2.4 2.9 5.0 
Death rate from Phthisis 1.17 2.3 1.5 1.8 0.7 1.1 
Death rated from other forms 
of Tuberculosis 
0.64 1.23 0.31 0.5 0.15 0.01 
Zymotic death rates1 4.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.6 
Number of cases of infectious 
diseases notified2 
189 246 163 398 652 291 
Rateable value (£) 101,899 102,991 104,120 104,258 106,060 112,786 
1d. in the £ yields for general 
purposes (£) 
330 330 380 380 380 360 
General district rates (£) 3s. 6d. in £ 3s. 10d. in £ 4s. 4d. in £ 4s. 4d. in £ 4s. 8d. in £ 5s. in £ 
Poor rate 4s. 2d. in £ 4s. 8d. in £ 5s. in £ 4s. 4d. in £ 4s. 8d. in £ 5s. 8d. in £ 
Number of new houses built 53 26 21 0 0 0 
 
1. Zymotic diseases include Puerperal Fever, Scarlet Fever, Measles, Diphtheria, Diarrhoea and 
Whooping Cough. 
2. Infectious diseases include Small Pox, Cholera, Cerebro-spinal Meningitis, Poliomyelitis, 
Pulmonary Tuberculosis and other forms of Tuberculosis 
 
Source: Reports of Wednesbury’s Medical Officer of Health, 1913-1918 
(Sandwell Community History and Archive Service) 
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APPENDIX 5:  WEDNESBURY’S COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
ACTIVITY 1912-1918 - A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 
 
1. Principal Employers in Wednesbury in 1912 
 
Name of Employer Type of Business 
Alfred Beebee Nut and bolt manufacturer 
Walter P Edwards Iron founder 
Edward Job Ltd. Tube manufacturer 
Edward Elwell Ltd. Edge tool manufacturer 
Richard Garbett Gas valve manufacturer 
Griffiths and Billingsley Tube manufacturer 
Isaac Griffiths & Sons Tube manufacturer 
Samuel Hampton & Sons Nut and bolt manufacturer 
John Knowles Gas fittings and tube manufacturer 
F.H. Lloyd & Co. Ltd. Steel castings manufacturer 
James McDougall Ltd. Tube manufacturer 
Patent Shaft & Axletree Co. Ltd. Axles, wheels and railway infrastructure 
Samuel Platt Ltd. Iron founder 
Thomas Pritchard Tube manufacturer 
James Russell & Sons Ltd. Tube manufacturer 
John Russell & Co. Ltd. Tube manufacturer 
Edward Smith Ltd.  Tube manufacturer 
John Spencer Ltd. Tube manufacturer 
Steel Nut & Hampden Ltd. Nut and bolt manufacturer 
William Trow & Sons Ltd. Brass and iron founder 
 
Source:  Kelly’s Directory for Staffordshire, 1912 (London: Kelly & Co., 1912). 
 
 
2. Additional Principal Employers in Wednesbury in 1914 
 
Name of Employer Type of Business 
Adams & Richards Iron and steel merchants 
J. Bagnall & Sons Iron founders 
Foster Brothers Ltd. Tube manufacturers 
Isaac Oldbury Axle spring manufacturer 
 
Source:  Bennett’s Business Directory for Staffordshire, 1914 (Birmingham: Bennett & Co., 1914). 
 
 
3.  Additional Principal Employers in Wednesbury in 1916 
 
Name of Employer Type of Business 
Hampden & Dean Nut and bolt manufacturer 
Thomas Newton Nut and bolt manufacturer 
Isaiah Oldbury Coach maker 
Henry Peace Ltd. Brass founder 
Richard & Co Ltd. Axle manufacturers 
 
Source:  Kelly’s Directory for Staffordshire, 1916 (London: Kelly & Co., 1916) 
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4. Type and Number of Commercial and Industrial Organizations in Wednesbury 
 
Organization Number in 1912 Number in 1916 
Accountant 1 1 
Architect/Surveyor 1 3 
Bailiff 1 0 
Baker 19 17 
Bank 3 3 
Beer Retailer/Shop 66 59 
Blacksmith 4 4 
Builder/Carpenter 15 14 
Building Society 1 1 
Butcher 33 20 
Chemist 5 7 
Chimney Sweep 1 1 
Clothier 12 6 
Coal Merchant 10 17 
Confectioner 27 25 
Dentist 1 1 
Draper 32 34 
Dress Maker 9 16 
Engineering, etc. 10 10 
Fish Monger/Seller 20 23 
Furniture Dealer 3 3 
Grocer (including Green Grocer) 64 52 
Hair Dresser (including Barber) 15 18 
Insurance Agent 10 26 
Iron Monger 2 2 
Jeweller 1 1 
Leather Goods 25 29 
Motor Garage 0 1 
News Agent 5 11 
Pawnbroker 17 15 
Painter/Decorator 7 11 
Photographer 1 6 
Physician/Surgeon 4 4 
Plumber 7 6 
Printer 5 4 
Public House 56 56 
Shop (Other) 98 161 
Solicitor 7 6 
Tailor 9 11 
Theatre 1 1 
Tobacconist 18 17 
Toy Seller 3 1 
Undertaker 1 1 
Vet 1 1 
Watch Maker 0 1 
 
Sources:   Kelly’s Directory for Staffordshire, 1912 (London: Kelly & Co., 1912); 
Kelly’s Directory for Staffordshire, 1916 (London: Kelly & Co., 1916) 
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APPENDIX 6:  ILLUSTRATIONS AND PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
 
 
 
1. Wednesbury Market Place, after 1911 
Source: http://www.localhistory.scit.wlv.ac.uk/articles/Wednesbury/Industry.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Workers at the South Staffordshire Patent tube works, Wednesbury 
Source: F.W. Hackwood, Wednesbury Faces, Places and Industries 
(Wednesbury: Robert Ryder, 1897), p. 81. 
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3. The ‘Pit Bank Wenches’ of Wednesbury 
Source: F.W. Hackwood, Wednesbury Faces, Places and Industries 
(Wednesbury: Robert Ryder, 1897), p. 29. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Pre-war advertisement for the Patent Shaft & Axletree Co. Ltd. 
Source: http://www.localhistory.scit.wlv.ac.uk/articles/Wednesbury/Industry.htm. 
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5. Pre-war advertisement for John Russell & Co. Ltd. 
Source: Ryder’s Annual, 1907. 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Frontage of the Old Patent tube works of John Russell & Co. Ltd. 
Now part of the entrance to the Black Country Museum. 
Source: Photograph by the author. 
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7. Pre-war advertisement for James Russell & Sons Crown tube works 
Source: Ryder’s Annual, 1907. 
 
 
 
` 
 
8. James Russell & Sons Crown tube works 
Source: F.W. Hackwood, 
(Wednesbury: Robert Ryder, 1897), p. 69. 
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9. James Russell & Sons Crown tube works 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
10. John Norton Griffiths, MP for Wednesbury, 1910-1918 
Source: Peter Knowles, Private Collection. 
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11. Striking workers leaving Wednesbury to picket in another town –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Ryders Annual, 1914. 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Striking workers accompanied by band of musicians –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Ryders Annual, 1914. 
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13. Striking workers leaving Wednesbury to picket in another town –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
14. The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
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15. Meeting in the Market Place - Tom Mann (seated with coat over shoulder) 
waiting to address crowd – The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Ryders Annual, 1914. 
 
 
 
 
 
16. Workers in Wednesbury Market Place for handouts of free food –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: http://www.localhistory.scit.wlv.ac.uk/articles/Wednesbury/Industry.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
17. Children receive a meal at Mesty Croft, Wednesbury –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
289 
 
 
 
18. Children receive a meal at the Old Park Hotel, Wednesbury –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
19. Children receive a meal at the Fountain Inn, Wednesbury –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: David Worley Private Collection. 
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20. Wives and Children queuing for bread in Wednesbury –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source:http://www.localhistory.scit.wlv.ac.uk/articles/Wednesbury/Industry.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
21. Brays Fish Fryers distributing free fish in Wednesbury –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
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22. Advertising the benefit concert at the Palace Theatre, Wednesbury –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Demonstration outside of works, Walsall –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
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24. Coventry Workers give their support to the strike –  
The 1913 Black Country Strike, Wednesbury 
Source: Centre for Modern Records, University of Warwick. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
25. Personalities of the 1913 Black Country strike –  
(1) Workers’ Union Organizer, Julia Varley (when imprisoned in 1907 for activities as a suffragette); 
 (2) Workers’ Union Organizer, John Beard; 
(3) Board of Trade Chief Industrial Commissioner, Sir George (later Lord) Askwith 
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26. Recruitment advertisement in the local press 
  Source: Wednesbury Herald, 15 January 1915                     Source: Wednesbury Herald, 23 January 1915 
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27. Recruitment advertisement in the local press 
  Source: Wednesbury Herald, 30 January 1915                  Source: Wednesbury Herald, 15 May 1915 
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28. Recruitment for the Fifth Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment 
Source: Wednesbury Herald, 3 October 1914. 
 
 
 
29. Notice in the local press for a patriotic meeting in Wednesbury 
Source: Wednesbury Herald, 31 Jul 1915. 
 
 
 
30. Example of an Attestation Form 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
31. Example of a Derby Scheme Registration Form 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
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32. Attestation Form for the Fifth Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment. 
(The man’s occupation is given as ‘Striker’, which was a blacksmith’s assistant, 
i.e. the man who wielded the sledgehammer in heavy forging work.) 
Source: www.Ancestry.co.uk 
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33. The South Staffordshire Regiment, Market Place, Wednesbury 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
34. H Company, Fifth Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
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35. Wednesbury soldiers of the South Staffordshire Regiment 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
36. Parade of the Wednesbury Volunteer Training Corps 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37. Member of the Wednesbury VTC and VTC cap badge (featuring the fighting cock symbol) 
Source: Vic Vayro, Private Collection. 
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38. Three Wednesbury soldiers, who were pre-war trade unionists, and were killed in action in 1915 
Their photographs form part of the Roll of Honour in the Workers’ Union Annual Report, 1915 
Source: Centre for Modern Records, University of Warwick, MSS.126/WU/4/1/10. 
 
 
 
 
 
39. Victoria Cross recipient Sergeant Joseph Davies was born in Tipton and resided at 48 Cross Street, 
Wednesbury.  He is receiving a public welcome on his arrival at Wednesbury.  In the group are the  
Mayor and Mayoress of Wednesbury (Councillor and Mrs W. Warner), the mother and grandmother of 
Sergeant Davies, and Alderman John Ashley Kilvert JP, a veteran of the Battle of Balaclava. 
Source: Birmingham Gazette, 21 October 1916. 
 
 
300 
 
 
 
40. Following the breaking of the Hindenburg Line, Brigadier General J V Campbell, VC,  
addressing the men of the 137th (Staffordshire) Brigade, a part of the 46th Division, and which        
included the 1/5th Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment, at the St. Quentin Canal. 
Source: Walsall Chronicle No. 8 - Walsall at War (Walsall: Walsall Local History Centre, 1998), p. 7. 
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41. Notice in the local press – Wednesbury Local Tribunal 
Source: Midland Advertiser, 26 February 1916. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
42. On War Service’ lapel badge and 
authentication document for Munitions 
Worker, Wednesbury 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
Silver War Badge and Certificate of Entitlement 
Source: www.iwm.org.uk. 
 
302 
 
  
 
43. The Munitions Department, Samuel Platt’s Foundry, Wednesbury, 1915 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
44. Women War Workers at Wednesbury in 1917 
Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
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45. Women Munitions Workers, the Globe works of John Spencer Ltd., Wednesbury 
Source: David Worley, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
46. Artillery shell production, the Globe works of John Spencer Ltd., Wednesbury 
Source: David Worley, Private Collection. 
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47. Railway chassis constructed at the Old Park works, Wednesbury 
Source: Sandwell Community History and Archive Service. 
 
 
 
 
 
48. Railway chassis constructed at the Old Park works, Wednesbury with 12-inch naval gun mounted 
Source: Sandwell Community History and Archive Service. 
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49. Mark I ‘Male’ Tank, which saw service in September 1916 
 © IWM (Q 2486) http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205194947 
 
 
 
 
 
50. Mark II Tank under construction, winter 1916/1917.                                                                                      
Source: K. Beddoes and C & S Wheeler, Metro-Cammell: 150 Years of Craftsmanship 
(Huddersfield: Runpast Publishing, 1999), p. 28. 
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51. Mark IV ‘Male’ Tank, constructed at the Old Park works, Wednesbury, 1917 
Source: Sandwell Community History and Archive Service. 
 
 
 
 
 
52. Mark IV Tanks, constructed at the Old Park works, Wednesbury 
Source: Sandwell Community History and Archive Service. 
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53. Mark V Double Star Tank constructed at the Old Park works, Wednesbury. 
Source: Sandwell Community History and Archive Service. 
 
 
 
 
 
54. Mark V Tanks under construction
 © IWM (Q 14520) http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205249622 
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55. Caption Reads: SOLDIERS ALL –  
Tommy (home from the front, to disaffected workman): 
‘What would you think o’ me, mate, if I struck for extra pay in the 
 middle of an action?  Well, that’s what you’ve been doing’. 
Source: Midland Counties Express, 13 March 1915. 
 
 
 
 
 
56. Caption Reads: THE LAST WORD –  
First Worker: ‘Look here mate, you’re working too hard. You’re a traitor to your union’.  
Second Ditto: ‘Well I’d sooner be that than a traitor to my country’. 
Source: Midland Counties Express, 25 September 1915. 
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57. Caption Reads: THE BIG PUSH –  
Munitions Worker: ‘Well I’m not taking a holiday myself just yet,  
but I’m sending these kids of mine for a little trip to the Continent’ 
Source: Midland Counties Express, 5 August 1916. 
 
 
 
 
 
58. Caption Reads: FOR SERVICES RENDERED – 
A German decoration for British strikers 
Source: Midland Counties Express, 26 May 1917. 
310 
 
 
 
59. Caption Reads: THE RIGHT KIND OF QUEUE 
Source: Midland Counties Express, 9 March 1918. 
 
 
 
 
 
60. Caption Reads: THE TRAITOR 
Source: Midland Counties Express, 5 October 1918. 
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61. Zeppelin L19 and its commander, Kapitänleutnant Odo Loewe 
Source: http://www.zeppelin-museum.dk 
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62. Zeppelin L21 and its commander, Kapitänleutnant Max Dietrich 
Source: http://www.zeppelin-museum.dk 
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63. Air raid damage to buildings in King Street, Wednesbury, 31 January 1916 
Sources: R. Pearson, Tipton, Wednesbury and Darlaston in Old Photographs (Gloucester:  
Alan Sutton Publishing, 1989), p. 114; T. Fegan, T., The Baby Killers: German Air Raids 
on Britain in the First World War (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2002), p. 26. 
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64. Incendiary bomb and fragment of high explosive bomb 
Sources: Andrew Thornton, Private Collection and Express and Star. 
 
 
 
65. The 2012 Monument to the 13 air raid victims, Wednesbury Cemetery 
(Source: Photograph by the author).  The names on the monument are: 
Matilda Mary Burt (Aged 10) (40 Dale Street, Wednesbury) 
Mary Emma Evans (Aged 5) (High Bullen, Wednesbury) 
Rachel Higgs (Aged 36) (13 King Street, Wednesbury) 
Susan Howells (Aged 30) (12 King Street, Wednesbury) 
Mary Ann Lee (Aged 59) (13 King Street, Wednesbury) 
Francis Thomas Linney (Aged 36) (12 Perry Street, Wednesbury) 
Albert Gordon Madeley (Aged 21) (48 Great Western Street, Wednesbury) 
Betsy Shilton (Aged 39) (13 King Street, Wednesbury) 
Edward Shilton (Aged 33) (13 King Street, Wednesbury) 
Ina Smith (Aged 7) (14 King Street, Wednesbury) 
Joseph Horton Smith (Aged 37) (14 King Street, Wednesbury) 
Nellie Smith (Aged 13) (14 King Street, Wednesbury) 
Thomas Horton Smith (Aged 11) (14 King Street, Wednesbury) 
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66. Example of a ration book for 1918 
 Source: Ian Bott, Private Collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
67. Notice in the local press for War Bonds 
Source: Midland Advertiser, 23 March 1918. 
 
316 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68. The tank ‘Julian’  and his crew, and outside Walsall Town Hall. 
Source: www.blackcountrybugle.co.uk. 
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69. War Savings Certificates 
Source: www.blackcountrybugle.co.uk. 
 
 
 
 
 
70. Two of the candidates in the 1918 general election 
Source: Midland Counties Express, 7 December 1918. 
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